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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
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JUSTIN BRADLEY DA VIS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Supreme Court Case No. 37387 
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Date: 8/3/2010 h Judicial District Court - Ada Coun User: CCTH IE BJ 
Time: 10:25 AM ROA Report 
Page 1 of4 Case: CR-FE-2OO9-OOO3944 Current Judge: Deborah Bail 
Defendant: Davis, Justin Bradley 
State of Idaho vs. Justin Bradley Davis 
Date Code User Judge 
3/4/2009 NCRF PRHARRSK New Case Filed - Felony Magistrate Court Clerk 
PROS PRHARRSK Prosecutor assigned Whitney Welsh Magistrate Court Clerk 
HRSC TCMCCOSL Hearing Scheduled (Video Arraignment Cawthon I Irby 
03/04/2009 01 :30 PM) 
ARRN TCCASTAE Hearing result for Video Arraignment held on Cawthon/ Irby 
03/04/2009 01 :30 PM: Arraignment/ First 
Appearance 
ORPD TCCASTAE Order Appointing Public Defender Ada County Magistrate Court Clerk 
Public Defender 
HRSC TCCASTAE Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary 03/18/2009 Kevin Swain 
08:30 AM) 
BSET TCCASTAE BOND SET: at 100000.00 - (118-923 Magistrate Court Clerk 
Strangulation-Attempted) 
NCON TCCASTAE No Contact Order: Magistrate Court Clerk 
MADAVISM Notice Of Hearing Magistrate Court Clerk 
3/5/2009 MFBR TCRAMISA Motion For Bond Reduction Magistrate Court Clerk 
NOHG TCRAMISA Notice Of Hearing Magistrate Court Clerk 
RODD TCRAMISA Defendant's Request for Discovery Magistrate Court Clerk 
3/18/2009 BOUN CCEDWARM Hearing result for Preliminary held on 03/18/2009 Cawthon I Irby 
08:30AM: Bound Over (after Prelim) 
HRSC CCEDWARM Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 03/30/2009 Cawthon I Irby 
01:30 PM) 
COMT CCEDWARM Commitment James Cawthon 
BSET CCEDWARM BOND SET: at 25000.00- (118-923 Cawthon / Irby 
Strangulation-Attempted) 
3/23/2009 INFO TCBULCEM Information Deborah Bail 
MFBR TCRAMISA Motion For Bond Reduction Deborah Bail 
3/24/2009 RQDD TCRAMISA Defendant's Request for Discovery/Specific Deborah Bail 
3/30/2009 DCAR CCLUEDTC Hearing result for Arraignment held on Deborah Bail 
03/30/2009 01 :30 PM: District Court 
Arraignment- Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Pages:5O 
HRSC CCLUEDTC Hearing Scheduled (Entry of Plea 04/06/2009 Deborah Bail 
01 :30 PM) 
RSDS TCBULCEM State/City Response to Discovery/Addendum Deborah Bail 
RSDS TCBULCEM State/City Response to Discovery/Specific Deborah Bail 
request 
4/6/2009 DCHH CCLUEDTC Hearing result for Entry of Plea held on Deborah Bail 
04/06/2009 01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Heh 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated:5O 
HRSC CCLUEDTC Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Deborah Bail 
06/15/2009 09:30 AM) 00003 
Date: 8/3/2010 
Time: 10:25 AM 
Page 2 of4 
Judicial District Court - Ada Count 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-FE-2009-0003944 Current Judge: Deborah Bail 
Defendant: Davis, Justin Bradley 
User: CCTHIEBJ 












































































Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 07/07/2009 09:30 Deborah Bail 
AM) 
Notice of Trial Setting 
Motion for Preliminary Hearing Transcript 
Order For PH Transcript 
State/City Response to Discovery 
State/City Request for Discovery 
Memo in Support of Defend Motion to Dismiss 
Motion to Dismiss 
Notice of prep of transcript 
State's Response to Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss 
Brief in Support of State's Motion to Introduce 
Statements Pursuant to 803(5) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Preliminary Hearing Transcript Filed 















Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on Deborah Bail 
06/15/2009 09:30 AM: District Court Hearing Hel1 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated:50 
Request to Modify or Dismiss NCO 
Decision and Order 
Deborah Bail 
Deborah Bail 
Motion to Transport Deborah Bail 
Hearing Scheduled (Change of Plea 07/06/2009 Deborah Bail 
01 :30 PM) 
Notice Of Hearing Deborah Bail 
Hearing result for Change of Plea held on Deborah Bail 
07/06/2009 01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated:50 
Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 08/24/2009 Deborah Bail 
03:00 PM) 
A Plea is entered for charge: - GT ( 118-923 
Strangulation-Attempted) 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 07/07/2009 
09:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 





Date: 8/3/201 0 
Time: 10:25 AM 
Page 3 of4 
h Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-FE-2009-0003944 Current Judge: Deborah Bail 
Defendant: Davis, Justin Bradley 
User: CCTHIEBJ 

























































Stipulation To Enter Conditional Guilty Plea Deborah Bail 
Pre-Sentence Investigation Evaluation Ordered Deborah Bail 
Warrant Issued - Bench Deborah Bail 
STATUS CHANGED: Inactive Deborah Bail 
BOND SET: at 250000.00 Deborah Bail 
Hearing result for Sentencing held on 08/24/2009 Deborah Bail 
03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated:50 
Hearing result for Sentencing held on 08/24/2009 Deborah Bail 
03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated:50 
Warrant Returned Failure to Appear Deborah Bail 
Defendant: Davis, Justin Bradley 
STATUS CHANGED: Activate (previously Deborah Bail 
inactive) 
Booked into Jail on: 
Hearing Scheduled (Video Arraignment 
12/08/2009 01 :30 PM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 12/14/2009 
01 :30 PM) 
Hearing result for Video Arraignment held on 
12/08/2009 01 :30 PM: Hearing Held 
Order Appointing Public Defender 
Order Appointing Public Defender 
Order Appointing Public Defender 
Order Appointing Public Defender 
Deborah Bail 
Daniel L Steckel 
Deborah Bail 





Notification of Penalties for Escape Deborah Bail 
Hearing result for Arraignment held on Deborah Bail 
12/14/2009 01:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated:50 
Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 02/01/201 O Deborah Bail 
03:00 PM) 
Order For DV Evaluation Deborah Bail 
Hearing result for Sentencing held on 02/01 /201 O Deborah Bail 
03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 




Time: 10:25 AM 
Page 4 of4 
Judicial District Court - Ada Count~Jt 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-FE-2009-0003944 Current Judge: Deborah Bail 
Defendant: Davis, Justin Bradley 
User: CCTHIEBJ 
State of Idaho vs. Justin Bradley Davis 
Date Code User Judge 
2/1/2010 HRSC CCLUEDTC Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 02/03/2010 Deborah Bail 
04:00 PM) 
2/3/2010 HRVC CCLUEDTC Hearing result for Sentencing held on 02/03/2010 Deborah Bail 
04:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
HRSC CCLUEDTC Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 02/04/2010 Deborah Bail 
09:30 AM) 
2/4/2010 DCHH CCLUEDTC Hearing result for Sentencing held on 02/04/2010 Deborah Bail 
09:30AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 50 
JAIL CCLUEDTC Sentenced to Jail or Detention (118-923 Deborah Bail 
Strangulation-Attempted) Confinement terms: 
Penitentiary determinate: 2 years. Penitentiary 
indeterminate: 8 years. 
STAT CCLUEDTC STATUS CHANGED: closed pending clerk action Deborah Bail 
NCON CCLUEDTC No Contact Order: No contact order OR Civil Deborah Bail 
Protection Order Issued for- Comment: With 
Kristy Robinson Expiration Days: 0 Expiration 
Date: 
JCOR DCTHERTL Judgment of Conviction and Order Retaining Deborah Bail 
Jurisdiction 
2/5/2010 APSC TCPETEJS Appealed To The Supreme Court Deborah Bail 
2/8/2010 ORDR CCLUEDTC Order Appt State Appellate PD Deborah Bail 
2/11/2010 STAT CCTOMPMA STATUS CHANGED (batch process) 
3/25/2010 NOTA CCTHIEBJ Amended Notice of Appeal Deborah Bail 
00006 
DR# 08-826541 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Whitney A. Faulkner or Brent A. Ferguson 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 















PERSONALLY APPEARED Before me this !i.z;:) day of March 2009, Whitney A. 
Faulkner or Brent A. Ferguson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of Ada, 
State of Idaho, who, being first duly sworn, complains and says: that JUSTIN BRADLEY 
DA VIS, on or about the 20th day of July, 2008, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did 
commit the crime of ATTEMPTED STRANGULATION, FELONY, LC. §18-923 as 
follows: 
COMPLAINT (DA VIS), Page I 
00007 
That the Defendant, JUSTIN BRADLEY DA VIS, on or about the 20th day of July, 
2008, in the County of Ada, State ofldaho, did willfully and unlawfully choke or attempt to 
strangle the person of Kristy Robinson, to-wit: by grabbing Kristy Robinson by the neck 
with both hands ~11£;'{:.i{me=t&mi.i6lo=-kJ4ncMhe, and where, Kristy 
Robinson and the Defendant are household members or have or had a dating relationship. 
All of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such case and 
against the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecutor 
Whitney A. Faulkner rent A. Ferguson 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
SUBSCRIBED AND Sworn to before me this !i___ day of March 2009. 
COMPLAINT (DA VIS), Page 2 
00008 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, ADA COUNTY, MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
PROBABLE CAUSE FORM 
STATE OF IDAHO 
PROSECUTOR ~ ~A ~1}.-.J 
COMPLAINING WITNESS _________ _ 
JUDGE 
D BERECZ D MacGREGOR-IRBY 
D BIETER D MANWEILER 
D CAWTHON D McDANIEL 
D COMSTOCK D MINDER 
D DAY D OTHS 
D GARDUNIA D REARDON 
D HARRIGFELD D STECKEL 
~HAWLEY D SWAIN 




PROBABLE CAUSE FORM 
CASE NO. =f:tlfl-~ 
cLERK AMY McKENZIE 
DATEo~\m TIME \\00 
TOXIMETER __________ _ 




PC FOUND _________ _ 
COMPLAINT SIGNED 
0 AMENDED COMPLAINT SIGNED 
0 NO PC FOUND ________ _ 
0 EXONERATE BOND 
0 SUMMONS TO BE ISSUED 
0 WARRANT ISSUED 
0 BOND SET$ ________ _ 
0 NOCONTACT 
D.R.# __________ _ 
0 DISMISS CASE 
ro IN CUSTODY 
00009 
[REV 7-20081 
ADA COUNTY MAGISTRATE MINUTES 




1 118-923 Strangulation-Attempted F 
/~of VI; Case Called Defendant: __/4sent Not Present ~tody 
__/4sed of Rights __ Waived Rights ~ Appointed __ Waived Attorney 
__ Guilty Plea/ PV Admit N/G Plea Advise Subsequent Penalty 
~nd $ la¼ 6/J/J.{JJ ROR Pay / Stay __ Payment Agreement 
In Chambers PT Memo Written Guilty Plea __ No Contact Order 
Finish ) Release Defendant / 1// f/1/ ~ 
CR-FE-2009-0003944 () 00010 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Case No. Cf£EcJX:ll- q1 s-94( 
Plaintiff, Reference No. ______________ _ 
vs. NO CONTACT ORDER 
DR#__.t2,8':_-__ .&;__,;;;? ___ 'ts,_c,/L_ ____ _ 
D Ada ,Q(Boise 0 GC D Meridian 
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-named defendant shall not contact (including: in person or through another person, 
or in writing or e-mail, or by telephone, P,ager, or facsimile) or a~empt to contact, harass, follow, communicate with, or 
knowingly remain within 100 feet of: ,&;;siy L, ~ St1Z1 . 
Excepti~e: 
~ no exceptions 
D to contact by telephone between____ .m. and _____ .m. on ____________ _ 
_______ for the following purposes: ______________________ _ 
D to participate in counseling/mediation 
D to meet with or through attorneys and/or during legal proceedings 
D to respond to emergencies involving the natural or adopted children of both parties 
D other: --------------------------------------
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant named herein shall not go within 300 yards of the above-named person's 
r ence or workplace as set forth below (provide this information only if requested by prosecution): 
Work Address 
A VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS A SEPARATE CRIME under Idaho Code § 18-920, for which no bail will be set until an 
appearance before a judge, and is punishable by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment in 
the county jail not to exceed one (1) year, or both. Further, any such violation of this order may result in the increase, 
revocation, or modification of the bond set in the underlying charge for which this no contact order was imposed. 
If there is more than one domestic violence protection order in place, the most restrictive provision will control any 
conflicting terms of any other civil or criminal protection order. 
This order controls over all no contact orders previously entered in this case. 
Dofendant 
Served by: ________________ _ 
tNO CONTACT ORDER White-FILE Green-ACSO Pink-DEFENDANT Yellow-PROSECUTOR [REV 4-2005] 
ADA COUNTY PUBL 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409 
l 
"· 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
JUSTIN BRADLEY DAVIS, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-FE-2009-0003944 
MOTION FOR BONO REDUCTION 
COMES NOW, JUSTIN BRADLEY DA VIS, the above-named defendant, by and 
through counsel STEVEN A BOTIMER, Ada County Public Defender's office, and moves this 
Cami for its ORDER reducing bond in the above-entitled matter upon the grounds that the bond 
is so unreasonably high that the defendant, who is an indigent person without funds, cannot post 
such a bond, and for the reason that the defendant has thereby been effectively denied their right 
to bail. 
DATED, Thursday, March 05, 2009. 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on Thursday, March 05, 2009, I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the within instrument to: 
WHITNEY WELSH 
Counsel for the State of Idaho 
by placing said same in the Interdepruimental Mail. 
MOTION FOR BOND REDUCTION 
0001.2 
ADA COUNTY MAGISTRATE MINUTES 
Justin Bradley Davis CR-FE-2009-0003944 () DOB:-
Scheduled Event: Preliminary Wednesday, March 18, 2009 08:30 AM 
Judge: Kevin Swain Clerk:MARILYN EDWA~reter: 
Prosecuting Agency: ':i. AC _ BC _ GC _ MC Pros: -~4\-----Q--~-~----?~ 
@Attorney:----~_,. _ _,.~ __.....,."'---_..,~.,,..=-.:::::..,'---'-' 
1 118-923 Strangulation-Attempted F 
____ Case Called 
__ Advised of Rights 
Defendant: ~ Present Not Present jn Custody 
___ Waived Rights __ PD Appointed __ Waived Attorney 





__ Advise Subsequent Penalty 
__ Pay/ Stay __ Payment Agreement 
In Chambers PT Memo __ Written Guilty Plea ___ No Contact Order 
73/o 
Finish Release Defendant 
00013 
('R.J:"l=_')()()Q ()()()'Jr\A A I\ 
Session: Swain03 l 8 09 
Session: Swain031809 Division: MC 
Ses ion Date: 2009/03/18 Session Time: 08:20 












Case ID: 0005 
2009/03/18 
Case Number: CRFE093944 
Plaintiff: 
Plaintiff Attorney: 
Defendant: Davis, Justin Bradley 
Co-Defendant{s): 
Pers. Attorney: 
State Attorney: Welsh, Whitney 
Public Defender: Botimer, Steven 
13:47:22 Operator 
Recording: 
13:47:22 - New case 
Davis, Justin Bradley 
13:47:26 State Attorney: Welsh, Whitney 
13:47:56 Public Defender: Botimer, Steven 
def present in custody 
13:48:25 - State Attorney: Welsh, Whitney 
Amend complaint by Interlineation language only 
13:49:07 Other: Breckwald, Matthew 
Sworn. 
13:49:09 State Attorney: Welsh, Whitney 
Direct examination of witness. 
13:49:12 - Other: Breckwald, Matthew 
Dective Boise Police officer 
13:51:23 Other: Breckwald, Matthew 
Courtroom: CR204 
Aug 2008 was involved in strangulation on Kristy Robinson 
13:52:18 - Other: Breckwald, Matthew 
Witness ID def 
13:54:56 - Other: Breckwald, Matthew 




he had hurt her 
13:56:18 - Public Defender: Botimer, Steven 
Cross-examination of the witness. 
13:56:32 Other: Breckwald, Matthew 
Nothing further, witness steps down. 
13:57:11 Public Defender: Botimer, Steven 
Argument 
13:57:18 - State Attorney: Welsh, Whitney 
Responds 
13:58:12 - Judge: Ma r-Irby, Cathleen 
Dismiss Case 
13:58:24 State Attorney: Welsh, Whitney 
Wishes to re-open 
13:58:42 Other: Breckwald, Matthew 
recalls Dective to the stand 
13:58:53 - Other: Breckwald, Matthew 
recalled 
13:59:00 - State Attorney: Welsh, Whitney 
Direct examination of witness. 
13:59:32 - Public Defender: Botimer, Steven 
obj hs 




14:01:01 - Judge: 
Defender: Botimer, Steven 
Ma or-Irby, Cathleen 
sustain 
14:02:28 Other: Breckwald, Matthew 
Nothing further, witness steps down. 
14:03:05 - Other: Robinson, Kristy 
Sworn. 
14:03:08 - State Attorney: Welsh, Whitney 
Direct examination of witness. 
14:03:26 - Other: Robinson, Kristy 
was in an accident hit by a car & have a hard time rememberi 
ng 
14:04:17 - Public Defender: Botimer, Steven 
no questions 
14:04:53 - State Attorney: Welsh, Whitney 
Recall Dective Breckwall 
14:05:16 - State Attorney: Welsh, Whitney 
Direct examination of witness. 
14:05:48 - State Attorney: Welsh, Whitney 
Met with Krisiy Robinson 08 & made a police report oft 
he incident 
14:09:41 - Judge: r-Irby, Cathleen 
Denies witness reading from police report 
14:10:00 - Public Defender: Botimer, Steven 
obj hs 
14:11:16 - Operator 
Stop recording: 
14:18:52 - Operator 
Recording: 
14:18:52 - Record 
Davis, Justin Bradley 
14:19:03 - State Attorney: Welsh, Whitney 
14:19:09 - Judge: M or-I Cathleen 




14:19:25 - State Attorney: Welsh, Whitney 
Redirect examination. 
14:19:48 - State Attorney: Welsh, Whitney 
SE# 2 offered to publish 
14:22:35 - Public Defender: Botimer, Steven 
Cross-examination of the witness. 
14:25:35 - State Attorney: Welsh, Whitney 
Responds to def obj 
14:26:50 - General: 
Time stamp 
14:26:53 - Judge: MacGregor-Irby, Cathleen 
Doesn't allow the video 
l4:29:30 - Operator 
Stop recording: (On Recess) 
l4:44:21 - Operator 
Recording: 
l4:44:21 - Record 
Davis, Justin Bradley 
l4:44:23 - General: 
Time stamp 
l4:44:45 - General: 
Time stamp 
l4:44:59 - Judge: MacGregor-Irby, Cathleen 
After recess will allow the video & will bind over 
l4:47:46 - Judge: MacGregor-Irby, Cathleen 
B/O Bail03/30/09@ 1:30pm comm signed 
l4:48:32 - Other: Robinson, Kristy 
Nothing further, witness steps down. 
14:48:40 - Public Defender: Botimer, Steven 
Bond Argument 
l4:50:19 - General: 
Time stamp 
14:50:27 - General: 
Time stamp 
14:55:31 - Judge: MacGregor-Irby, Cathleen 
Bond Reduced to $25,000 
14:55:44 - General: 
Time stamp 
14:55:47 - General: 
Time stamp 
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Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Whitney Welsh 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
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DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
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' 1)EPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
S'fATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
















THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT, JUSTIN BRADLEY DAVIS, having 
been brought before this Court for a Preliminary Examination on the r___,.,__ day of March 
2009, on a charge that the Defendant on or about the 20th day of July, 2008, in the County 
of Ada, State of Idaho, did commit the crime of: ATTEMPTED STRANGULATION, 
FELONY, I.C. §18-923, as follows: 
That the Defendant, JUSTIN BRADLEY DA VIS, on or about the 20th day of July, 
2008, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did willfully and unlawfully choke or attempt to 
strangle the person of Kristy Robinson, to-wit: by grabbing Kristy Robinson by the neck 
COMMITMENT (DA VIS), Page 1 
OOOt7 
with both hands and squeezmg, and where Kristy Robinson and the Defendant are 
household members or have or had a dating relationship. 
The Defendant having so appeared and having had/having waived preliminary 
examination, the Court sitting as a Committing Magistrate finds that the offense charged as 
set forth has been committed in Ada County, Idaho, and that there is sufficient cause to 
believe that the Defendant is guilty of committing the offense as charged. 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant be held to answer to the 
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
~. s=/lNl, d(J Ada, to the charge herein set forth. Bail is set in the sum of$ __._.,d__.... ...... 7..,.......~-='*'-------
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[REV 9-2001) 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: 287-7700 
Fax: 287-7709 
NO. t A AM= ( )rv,j FILE~ -,---~~.,£...... __ P,v! __ _ 
MAR 2 3 2009 
J. DAVID NAVARRO C ,- . 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
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Case No. CR-FE-2009-3944 
INFORMATION 
GREG H. BOWER, Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of Ada, State of 
Idaho, who in the name and by the authority of the State, prosecutes in its behalf, comes 
now into District Court of the County of Ada, and states that JUSTIN BRADLEY DA VIS 
is accused by this Infonnation of the crime of: ATTEMPTED STRANGULATION, 
FELONY, LC. §18-923, which crime was committed as follows: 
That the Defendant, JUSTIN BRADLEY DA VIS, on or about the 20th day of July, 
2008, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did willfully and unlawfully choke or attempt to 
strangle the person of Kristy Robinson, to-wit: by grabbing Kristy Robinson by the neck 
INFORMATION (DAVIS), Page l 
00020 
with both hands and squeezing, and where Kristy Robinson and the Defendant are 
household members or have or had a dating relationship. 
All of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such case and 
against the peace and dignity of the State ofldaho. 
Prosecuting Attorney 
INFORMATION (DA VIS), Page 2 
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ADA COUNTY PUBLI EFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409 
By ERiN BULCHf:F, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff 
vs . 
. JUSTIN BRADLEY DAVIS, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-FE-2009-0003944 
MOTION FOR BOND REDUCTION 
COMES NOW, JUSTIN BRADLEY DAVIS, the above-named defendant, by and 
through counsel ANTHONY R GEDDES, Ada County Public Defender's office, and moves this 
Court for its ORDER reducing bond in the above-entitled matter upon the grow1ds that the bond 
is so unreasonably high that the defendant, who is an indigent person without funds, cannot post 
such a bond, and for the reason that the defendant has thereby been effectively denied their right 
to baiJ. 
DATED, Monday, March 23, 2009. 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on Monday, March 23, 2009, I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the within instrument to: 
WHITNEY WELSH 
Counsel for the State of Idaho 
by placing said same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
MOTION FOR BOND REDUCTION 
000~22 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DEBORAH A. BAIL Date: /~ Jc:~ .dL) 7 
DISTRICT JUDGE 






vs. /7 /) 
) 
) Case No. Cf: tJ 9 i,J{)O .J f I</ 






Appearances: {() ~ tlLzfd__ 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Counsel for the State 
Deputy Public Defender 
y;( ./kLA 
Counsel for the Defendant 
Interpreter __________________________ _ 
THIS TIME SET FOR INITIAL ARRAIGNMENT: 
(,1 The Court informed the defendant of the charges filed being a felony and of the possible 
penalties which could be imposed. 
("J The Court advised the defendant of the right to counsel at public expense in all 
proceedings of this Court. 
(,,,-- Public Defender reaffirmed/appointed to represent the defendant. 
() Mr. __________ appearing as counsel of record for the defendant. 
( ) Right to counsel waived by the defendant. · 
W- The Court advised the defendant of the right to appeal from any judgment entered by this 
Court, to be represented by counsel in said appeal and of payment of costs incurred in 
said appeal at public expense, and of the appeal time being forty-two (42) days. 
(1 True copy of the Information delivered to the defendant and counsel. 
W TrueName. 
() Defendant's corrected name is ______________ ~~--- /_ 
/l/ fl. 11 jJ C,4~~ ... ,..... ./J/,,~ II) /1)(_/ <°?"&2#, 6li,µ2 -~~£., a cli-o-;<-t..hoo' ,03~Mllf C/o)'c/:_I 






Formal reading of the Information waived by the Defendant. 
The Court read the Information to the Defendant. 
The Court advised the defendant of the right to a trial by jury, of the different charge(s) 
set forth in the Information, of the time, not less than one day that could be taken before 
entering a plea and the right to remain silent. 
The Court advised the defendant that if a plea of guilty was entered to a charge, the 
presumption of innocence, the constitutional right to a trial by jury, the right to confront 
accusers, the privilege against self-incrimination and the right of self defense would be 
waived. All legal and factual defenses and any defects in the State's case would be 
\vaived. 
J'equest of the d,ef endant, the Court continued this matter until 
'17 l e (, 3 c) for entry of a plea. 
Statutory time waived by the defendant. 
In answer to the Court, the defendant entered a plea of "Not Guilty". 
( ) There being no objection by the defendant, the Court set this case for trial before the 
Court and a jury on ______________ at _______ m. 
( ) In answer to the Court, the defendant entered a plea of" Guilty". 
( ) Defendant sworn and examined regarding the plea. 
( ) The defendant indicated an understanding of the possible penalties and that no promises 
of leniency or threats had been made to induce the plea. 
( ) The defendant fully understands that BY PLEADING GUILTY the presumption of 
innocence, the constitutional right to a trial by jury, the right to confront accusers, the 
privilege against self incrimination and the right of self defense are waived. All legal and 
factual defenses and any defects in the State's case are waived. 
() The Court accepts the defendant's plea of "Guilty". 
() The Court set aside the defendant's plea of "Guilty" and directed the Clerk to enter a plea 
of "Not Guilty" on behalf of the defendant. 
() Request and Stipulation for Discovery submitted. 
00024 
( ) Compliance date set for -----------------------
l ) The Court ordered a presentence report and continued this matter until 
_________________ at ______ for said report and 
disposition. 
(< Defendant remanded to the custody of the Sheriff. 
t ) Defendant continued on bond. 
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409 
APR O 7 2009 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Cler~' 
By HEIDI KELLY 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUSTIN BRADLEY DA VIS, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-FE-2009-0003944 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 
HEARING TRANSCRIPT 
COMES NOW, JUSTIN BRADLEY DA VIS, the defendant above-named, by and 
through counsel ANTHONY R. GEDDES, Ada County Public Defender's office, and moves this 
Court pursuant to ICR 5.l(d) for an ORDER providing typewritten transcripts of the preliminary 
hearing proceedings, which were held March 18, 2009, as they are essential and necessary for 
filing pretrial motions. The defendant, being indigent, also requests that the transcripts be 
prepared at the cost of Ada County, and as soon as possible. 
DA TED, this f' day of April 2009. 
Attorney for Defendant 
MOTION FOR PRELlM lNARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT 
00027 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this :j:__ day of April 2009, I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the within instrument to the Ada County Transcript Coordinator by placing said same in 
the Interdepartmental Mail. 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT 2 
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APR 8,- 2009 
ANTHONY R. GEDDES 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409 ADA COUNTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUSTIN BRADLEY DA VIS, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-FE-2009-0003944 
ORDER FOR PRELIMINARY 
HEARING TRANSCRIPT 
, Clan 
For good cause appearing, this Court hereby grants the defendant's MOTION FOR 
PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT. Pursuant to ICR 5.1 (d), a typcwTitten transcript of 
the preliminary hearing in this action shall be prepared at the expense of Ada County. and as 
soon as possible. 
. tr-· 
SO ORDERED AND DATED, this L day of April 2009. 
DEBORAH A. BAIL 
District Judge 
OH.DER FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT 
. t1 1 
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409 
Ar,; __ , f,\ 9 
t ·: : : r ?j,~~ 
j [;:.,i!c); 
bys::;;,,~' C ' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUSTIN BRADLEY DA VIS, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-FE-2009-0003944 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
COMES NOW, JUSTIN BRADLEY DAVIS, the defendant above-named, by and 
through counsel ANTHONY R. GEDDES, Ada County Public Defender's Office, and hereby 
moves this Court pursuant to LC. § 19-815A for its ORDER dismissing the INFORMATION 
filed in the above case number upon the grounds and for the reasons that the evidence presented 
at the preliminary hearing on March 18, 2009, failed to establish that there was reasonable or 
probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the crime for which he was held to 
answer within the jurisdiction of this Court. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
00030 
FURTHER, the defendant hereby wishes to incorporate the transcript of the preliminary 
hearing proceedings previously lodged in the above action. 
DATED, this jJ_ day of April 2009. 
/) 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this __ day of April 2009, I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the within instrument to: 
WHITNEY WELSH 
Deputy Prosecutor, Ada County /1 
by placing said same in the Interdepartmental Mail 
MOTION TO DISMISS 2 
ooo:3f 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409 
NQ, ___ """'"r,L-C-cJ--,.~-;-1-
A.fVl _____ ;:-,J,'1,--t-"-"t---
£ ,~ '¼;1 X ~"" f? 't"',""I, 
i-,.;' ~;i 1 :; ~,_;iJj 
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Ot:.PUTV 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUSTIN BRADLEY DA VIS, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-FE-2009-0003944 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
The Defendant was charged by COMPLAThlT with the cnme of ATTEMPTED 
STRANGULATION, a felony violation of Idaho Code § 18-923. A preliminary hearing was 
held on March 18, 2009, and the case was bound over to the district court. The Defendant was 
arraigned on March 20, 2009, and entered a plea of "not guilty" on April 6, 2009; the matter was 
set for trial. The Defendant's MOTION TO DISMISS and the foJlowing memorandum in 
support thereof follow. 
~ MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
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BRIEF SUMMARY OF FACTS AND APPLICABLE LAW 
The Defendant is accused of allegedly attempting to strangle Kristy Robinson during the 
middle to the end of July 2008. This alleged conduct was not reported to the police at that time. 
In August, Ms. Robinson was admitted to Intermountain Hospital. Shortly thereafter, 
Crime Stoppers received an anonymous tip and Detective Brechwald initiated an investigation. 
Based on interviews with Ms. Robinson and the Defendant, Attempted Strangulation charges 
were filed. 
During the preliminary hearing on March 18, 2009, Ms. Robinson testified that, as a 
result of being hit by a car, she suffered memory loss and no longer has any memory of the 
alleged incident. The prosecuting attorney played a previously recorded videotape of Ms. 
Robinson's accusations over objection, and the case was bound over to the district court for 
further proceedings. 
The issues presented by the Defendant's MOTION TO DISMISS are whether the 
videotaped statements of an unavailable witness were improperly admitted into evidence against 
the Defendant at the preliminary hearing, and if so, whether the case should therefore be 
dismissed pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-81 SA. 
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides that "In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him." U.S. Const. Amend VI, cited in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
Prior to Crawford, an unavailable witness's statement against a criminal defendant could 
be admitted if the testimony fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or bore pmiicularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DJSMJSS 2 
00033 
~ In Crawford, the United States' Supreme Court significantly altered the analysis in regard 
17
~~ q_/" the admission of "unavailable w tness" statements. Crawford holds that testimonial 
· ~ttJ.1"' statements of witnesses absent from trial are admissible only where the declarant is unavailable 
~~/, \P ~d where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Id., at 59. 
1 
I~ 1L~) The Court did not de I ineate a comprehensive definition of '·testimonial," but they did set 
··r ctO forth some guidelines. First, the definition of testimony is a '·solemn declaration or affirmation 
efi' made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact." Id., at 51. Second, the Court listed 
- three fommlations of core testimonial statements: 
n IJ [1.] [E]x parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material 
\J". such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was 
unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would 
~ . reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially; ... 




[3.] [S]tatements that were made under circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for 
use at a later trial. 
,j' Id., at 51-52 (citations omitted). 
/I 
The U.S. Supreme Court further clarified these issues in Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 
813 (2006). The Court opined that the threshold question in a Confrontation Clause case is 
whether the statement in question is testimonial. If it is, the evidence may only be admitted if the 
witness is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior oppo1tunity to cross-examine the 
witness. Id., at 821. 
The Court further held that statements are non-testimonial when made in the course of 
police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the 
questioning is to enable the police to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when 
MEMORANDUM JN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 3 
00034 
the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency and that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevent to 
later criminal prosecution. Id, at 822. 
Kristy Robinson's videotaped statements to Detective Brechwald are clearly testimonial 
for purposes of Confrontation Clause analysis. There was no ongoing emergency that the police 
needed to cope with, as Ms. Robinson and the Defendant had broken up, and the alleged conduct 
occurred over a month previously. This was a circumstance which would lead any objective 
observer to reasonably believe that her statements would be available for use at a later trial. 
Further, the primary purpose of the questioning was to establish past events potentially relevant 
to future prosecution. 
Ms. Robinson's statements to Detective Brechwald are not only testimonial pursuant to 
Crawford and Davis, but the Defendant has not had a prior opportunity to confront the witness 
through cross-examination. This videotape was improperly admitted at the preliminary hearing. 
The only other evidence elicited at the preliminary hearing was the testimony of 
Detccti ve Brechwald, who testified that as a result of his questioning. the Defendant made some 
incriminating statements. 
The principle of corpus delicti applies to a defendant's extrajudicial admissions an<l/or 
confessions. State v. Wilson, 51 Idaho 659 (1932); State v. Keller, 8 Idaho 699 (1902). Cmpus 
Delicti prohibits the conviction of a criminal defendant based upon nothing more than the 
defendant's own confession to prove that the crime occurred. State v. Tiffany, 139 Idaho 909 
(2004); State v. Roth, 138 Idaho 820 (Ct.App. 2003). 
The purpose of corpus delicti is to prevent errors m convictions based on false 
confessions, to act as a safeguard against the defendant's act of confessing but being mistaken 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
000~!5 
4 
that a crime occurred, and to force the state to use its best evidence. State v. Urie, 92 Idaho 71 
( 1968). 
To prove a crime generally, the state must provide evidence of three broad elements: 1) 
that an injury occurred, 2) that criminal agency was involved in causing said injury, and 3) the 
identity of the person who caused the injury. Id, at 75. Historically, under the standard 
fomrnlations of the corpus delicti principle, the state was required to show the ""body" of the 
crime-injury and criminal agency-independently from a defendant's confession. Id; State v. 
Darrah, 60 Idaho 479 (1939). Thus, the state could not prove its case by solely using a 
defendant's confession to establish that a crime occurred. See Urie, 92 Idaho at 73; Wilson, 51 
Idaho 659; Keller, 8 Idaho 699. 
However, although a defendant's extrajudicial admission/confession, standing alone, is 
insufficient to support a conviction, only slight corroborating evidence is necessary, and the 
corroborating evidence need not be sufficient to establish each element of the co,pus delicti. 
Tiffany, 139 Idaho at 915. Since the corpus deliciti generally consists of injury and criminal 
agency, the state needs to independently corroborate only one of those elements to meet its 
burden. See id. In other words, in addition to the Defendant's confession, the State needs slight 
corroborating evidence to establish either injury or criminal agency in order to prosecute this 
Defendant. 
In the case at hand, the only evidence against the Defendant, other than the improperly 
admitted videotape, is his own incriminating statement. There is no corroboration to prove either 
injury or criminal agency. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 5 
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CONCLUSION 
The videotaped statements of Ms. Robinson were improperly admitted against the 
Defendant at his preliminary hearing pursuant to Crawford and Davis. Absent this improperly 
admitted evidence, the State has only the Defendant's incriminating statements with which to 
prosecute him. The State cannot proceed without some evidence corroborating the Defendant's 
admissions. They have none. The case should be dismissed pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-81 SA. 
DAT ED, this-+---"-- day of April 2009. 
Attor,t{ey for Defendant 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this __ day of April 2009, I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the within instrument to: 
WHITNEY WELSH 
Deputy Prosecutor, Ada County 
by placing said same in the Interdepartmental Mai!/ 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 7 
000:18 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Whitney Welsh 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 W. Front Street, Rm. 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702-5954 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
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vs. 












Case No. CRFE-2009-0003944 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDAN' S MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
Whitney Welsh, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Ada County, State of Idaho, responds to 
Defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-815A. 
FACTUAL and PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Boise Police Department Domestic Violence Detective Matt Brechwald received an 
anonymous tip regarding ongoing domestic abuse perpetrated by 20 year-old Justin Bradley Davis 
(Defendant), against his 19 year-old girlfriend, Kristen Robinson (victim). Detective Brechwald 
and a Boise Police Department victim witness coordinator contacted the victim at her residence in 
late August 2008. The victim was willing to speak with law enforcement about the abuse and set up 
an appointment to meet at the Family Advocacy Center and Education Services (F.A.C.E.S.) on 
September 2, 2008. During that meeting, the victim disclosed that a pattern of physical abuse had 
State's response to Defendant's motion to dismiss, State v. Davis, Page l oooa9 
developed over the past few months of her relationship with Defendant. She reported that 
Defendant would kick, push, grab or pinch her on nearly a daily basis. The victim had 
photographed multiple bruises on her body during that time. She checked into lntermountain 
Hospital the day the couple ended their relationship in the beginning of August 2008, in part due to 
the physical abuse by Defendant. The victim also disclosed an incident in July 2008 where 
Defendant strangled her to the point that she was "completely unable to breathe." Detective 
Brechwald documented a small portion of that interview on video, specifically the victim 
demonstrating how Defendant strangled her. Detective Brechwald continued his investigation and 
interviewed a mutual friend of victim and Defendant. The witness corroborated portions of the 
victim's account of the strangulation. Finally, Detective Brechwald interviewed Defendant. 
Defendant confessed to all the elements of the strangulation charge. 
The victim suffered severe brain injuries when a drunk driver hit her on September 7, 2008. 
The trauma to the victim's brain has left her unable to remember most of her life prior to the 
accident, including the meetings with Detective Brechwald and the victim witness coordinator in 
August and September 2008. 
Detective Brechwald testified at the preliminary hearing regarding Defendant's confession 
to the strangulation. The victim also testified regarding her brain injury and impaired memory. 
Defendant chose not to cross-examine the victim. The State then introduced the videotape of the 
victim demonstrating the strangulation pursuant to I.R.E. 803(5). The magistrate found probable 
cause and set the case for arraignment in District Court. 
Defendant now asserts that the videotape of the victim demonstrating how Defendant 
strangled her violated Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him 
pursuant to Crattford v. Washington. Defendant further claims that since the erroneously 
State's response to Defendant's motion to dismiss, State v. Davis, Page 2 
admitted videotape was the only evidence offered to corroborate Defendant's confession to the 
strangulation that the doctrine and corpus delicti mandates the case be dismissed. 
The victim was available at the preliminary hearing and subject to cross-examination; 
consequently, the magistrate properly admitted the videotape. Defendant's motion to dismiss 
should be denied. 
ARGUMENT 
The victim appeared at the preliminary hearing and was subject to cross-examination. 
Defendant's argument that the videotape violates the Confrontation Clause is unfounded. 
Crawford v. Washington revitalized the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution. Under Crawford, for a Confrontation Clause violation 10 occur, a 
witness must make a testimonial statement. The witness who made the testimonial statement 
must then be unavailable at trial, and the defendant must have been deprived of an opportunity to 
cross-examine that witness on that statement. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 
1354; See also State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 142 176 P.3d 911, 914 (Idaho 2007). The United 
States Supreme Court clearly stated in Crawford that "when the declarant appears for cross-
examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior 
testimonial statements." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 FN9, 124 S.Ct. at 1369 FN9. 
A witness appears for cross examination if he willingly takes the stand, answers questions 
in whatever manner, and exposes his demeanor to the jury, thus giving the defense an 
opportunity to address the witness's prior testimonial statements. See United States v. Owens, 
484 U.S. 554,559, 108 S.Ct. 838, 842 (1988). It is well established that a declarant's lack of 
memo1y does not make her "unavailable." In State v. Banks, defendant was convicted of 
numerous crimes and sentenced to death. Defendant claimed on appeal that he was deprived of 
his right to confront a witness who had a portion of his temporal lobe that controls speech, 
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memory, and personality removed as a result of injuries he sustained from the incident about 
which he testified. Due to this temporal lobe removal, the witness was susceptible to seizures 
and had cognitive problems that manifested themselves in the form of speech difficulties and 
memory problems. Despite the witness's physical impairments, the state's Supreme Court 
determined Defendant's Confrontation Clause violation claim to be "wholly without merit" since 
the witness appeared at trial and Defendant cross-examined him. Banks, 271 S.W.3d 90 (Tenn. 
Nov 07, 2008). See also Reyes v. U.S., 933 A.2d 785 (D.C. Aug 16, 2007)(holding that witness 
was available for trial "even where the witness has no memory of the prior identification or 
statement that is the subject of cross-examination .... "); People v. Sutton, 874 N.E.2d 212, (Ill. 
App. 1 Dist. Aug 14, 2007)(determining that witness was available for cross-examination despite 
the fact he suffered amnesia regarding the offense and had no memory of his conversation with 
the officer as to non testimonial statements made in an ambulance); People v. Hampton, 899 
N.E.2d 532 (Ill. App. 1 Dist. Dec 05, 2008) (holding no Confrontation Clause violation in 
admitting witness' previous statement when witness professed that memory loss prevented him 
from recalling the details of the shooting and his prior statements). 
Further, case law is clear that the "opportunity to cross-examine" is neither limitless nor 
defined as an opportunity to cross-examine to the defendant's satisfaction. In Owens, an assault 
victim provided police a statement accusing the defendant, but at trial the victim testified that 
he had no recollection of why he made the accusation. The Court held that the victim's memory 
loss did not deprive the defendant of a constitutionally adequate opportunity for cross-
examination, stating that the "Confrontation Clause guarantees only 'an opportunity for 
effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to 
whatever extent, the defense might wish."' Owens, 484 U.S. at 559, 108 S.Ct. at 842. The 
Crawford decision did not overrule United States v. Owens. 
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The State recognizes that video demonstration is testimonial, however, admitting the 
video at the preliminary hearing did not present a Confrontation Clause violation in light of the 
fact that the victim appeared and provided Defendant an opportunity to cross examine her. As 
in the cases above, the victim's lack of memory regarding her statements to officers and the 
event itself does not render her unavailable. The fact that the victim's lack of memory and 
physical challenges may prevent Defendant from cross-examining the victim to the extent he 
may wish does not mean that he has not been afforded or will not be afforded this constitutional 
right. O,vens, 484 U.S. at 559. Defendant's choice not to cross-examine the victim at the 
preliminary hearing does not affect this analysis. See e.g. US. v. Halteh, 2007 WL 806005 (4th 
Cir. 2007 unpublished opinion)(stating that a "Confrontation Clause violation does not occur 
when the witness is before the court and subject to cross-examination about her prior 
testimonial statement. That a defendant opts not to cross-examine the witness does not compel 
a different conclusion."). 
In light of the fact that the victim was present at the preliminary hearing and Defendant 
had an opportunity to cross-examine her, admitting the videotape did not violate Defendant's 
right to confront the witnesses against him. Crawford does not apply and there is no 
Confrontation Clause issue. The magistrate at the preliminary hearing properly admitted the 
videotape and Defendant's motion to dismiss should be denied. 
DA TED this 21 day of April 2009. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
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Case No. CRFE-2009-0003944 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
STATE'S MOTION TO 
INTRODUCE STATEMENTS 
PURSUANT TO 803(5) 
Whitney Welsh, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Ada County, State of Idaho, requests the 
Court permit the State to admit hearsay statements of Kristy Robinson pursuant to l.R.E. 803(5), 
recorded recollection. The State respectfully requests a pre-trial ruling on this issue. 
FACTUAL and PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Boise Police Department Domestic Violence Detective Matt Brechwald received an 
anonymous tip regarding ongoing domestic abuse perpetrated by 20 year-old Justin Bradley Davis 
(Defendant), against his 19 year-old girlfriend, Kristen Robinson (victim). Detective Brechwald 
and a Boise Police Department victim witness coordinator contacted the victim at her residence in 
late August 2008. The victim was willing to speak with law enforcement regarding the abuse and 
set up an appointment to meet at the Family Advocacy Center and Education Services (F.A.C.E.S.) 
in Boise on September 2, 2008. During that meeting, the victim disclosed that a pattern of physical 
abuse had developed over the past few months of her relationship with Defendant. She reported 
that Defendant would kick, push, grab or pinch her on nearly a daily basis. The victim had 
photographed multiple bruises on her body during that time. The victim checked into 
lntermountain Hospital the day the couple ended their relationship in the beginning of August 2008, 
in part due to the physical abuse by Defendant. The victim also disclosed an incident in July 2008 
where Defendant strangled her to the point that she was "completely unable to breathe." Detective 
Brechwald documented a small portion of that interview on video, specifically the victim 
demonstrating how Defendant strangled her. Detective Brechwald continued his investigation and 
interviewed a mutual friend of victim and Defendant. The witness corroborated portions of the 
victim's account of the strangulation. Finally, Detective Brechwald interviewed Defendant. 
Defendant confessed to all elements of the strangulation charge. 
The victim suffered severe brain injuries when a drunk driver hit her on September 7, 2008. 
The trauma to the victim's brain has left her unable to remember most of her life prior to the 
accident, including the meetings with Detective Brechwald and the victim witness coordinator in 
August and September 2008. 
The hearsay statements the State seeks to admit under Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(5) are as 
follows: 
1. Statements by Kristy Robinson made to Detective Brechwald contained in DR# 08-
826541, 6 pages, dated September 2, 2008. This report was provided to defense counsel 
at the preliminary hearing level in the State's Response to Discovery, dated February 20, 
2009. 
2. A videotape of Kristy Robinson demonstrating how Defendant strangled her, taped by 
Detective Brechwald on September 2, 2008, in the course of his investigation. This 
video was also provided to defense counsel in the State's Response to Discovery, dated 
March 30, 2009. 
ARGUMENT 
The statements the victim made to Detective Brechwald and the videotape satisfy the 
requirements ofldaho Rules of Evidence 803(5) and Crawford does not apply in this case. 
Consequently, the evidence should be admitted at trial. 
I. THE STATEMENTS AND VIDEO SHOULD BE ADMITTED PURSUANT TO 
IDAHO RULE OF EVIDENCE 803(5). Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(5) permits the following 
to be admitted at trial, even though the declarant is available as a witness: 
A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness once had 
knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and 
accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was 
fresh in the memory of the witness and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, 
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the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an 
exhibit unless offered by and adverse party. 
I.R.E. 803(5). Whether the evidence is admissible is a preliminary question for the trial 
court to determine. I.R.E. l04(a). Under the plain language of the Rule, any evidence admitted 
must meet three requirements, as follows: 1) The memorandum or record must pertain to 
matters about which the witness once had knowledge; 2) The witness must now have an 
insufficient recollection as to such matters to testify fully and accurately; and 3) The 
memorandum or record must have been made or adopted by the witness and correctly reflect his 
knowledge when the matters were fresh in his memory. I.RE. 803(5). The State is able to 
satisfy all three requirements in this case and, consequently, the evidence should be admitted at 
trial. 
A) The evidence the State seeks to admit is about a matter which the victim once 
had knowledge. In the present case, the victim has firsthand knowledge of the incident 
because she was the victim of the attempted strangulation. This requirement is met. 
B) The witness now has an insufficient recollection of the matters to testify fully 
and accurately. The victim suffered severe brain damage in the car accident. Although it 
continues to improve, the victim has very little memory of her life prior to the accident. The 
State will produce her neurosurgeon to testify to such if necessary. She does not have a 
sufficient recollection of either the attempted strangulation incident in July 2008 or the 
meetings with Detective Brechwald in August and September 2008 to testify fully and 
accurately to these events. Thus, this requirement is also met. 
C) The victim adopted the evidence when the matter was fresh in her memory. 
1) The victim adopted the statements in Detective Brechwald's written 
report and on the video, and the statements and video correctly reflect her knowledge. 
Despite the fact that the plain language of the Rule does not indicate such, defense counsel 
argued at the preliminary hearing level that the memorandum or record had to made by the 
declarant herself to be admissible. Both the plain language of the rule and the legislative 
history demonstrate that the Rule contemplates that a third party could have created the 
memorandum or record, however. 
The Rule states that the memorandum or record must have been "made or adopted by the 
witness." I.R.E. 803(5)(emphasis added). Although case law in Idaho on this issue is scant, 
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(5) is identical to Idaho's 803(5), and is consequently instructive. 
See and compare I.RE. 803(5) and F.R.E. 803(5). The legislative history to the federal rule 
directly addressed this issue and documented that the added language italicized above was 
intended to broaden the applicability of the Rule: 
The committee accepts the House amendment with the understanding and belief 
that it was not intended to narrow the scope of applicability of the rule. hi fact, we 
understand it to clarify the rule's applicability to a memorandum adopted by the witness 
as well as one made by him .... [T]he Advisory Committee's note to this rule suggests 
that the important thing is the accuracy of the memorandum rather than who made it. 
The committee does not view the House amendment as precluding admissibility 
in situations in which multiple participants were involved. 
When the verifying witness has not prepared the report, but merely examined it 
and found it accurate, he has adopted the report, and it is therefore admissible. 
Advisory Committee Notes to F.R.E. 803(5), 1974 Enactment. 
In this case, the State can demonstrate that the victim adopted the statements in Detective 
Brechwald's report. Although the victim did not provide a written statement, the concept of a 
third party preparing the memorandum of events is entirely within the scope of the Rule. 
Detective Brechwald can best testify to the steps he took to ensure the accuracy of the victim's 
statements in the report and, consequently, the manner in which the victim adopted the 
statements. 
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2) The matter was fresh in her memory when the victim reported the 
attempted strangulation to Detective Brechwald two months after the incident. Neither the 
plain language of the 803(5) nor under case law interpreting the rule require 
contemporaneousness. The Committee Notes to 803(5) specifically state that "[n]o attempt is 
made in the exception to spell out the ... contemporaneity and accuracy of the record, leaving 
them to be dealt with as the circumstances of the particular case might indicate." Advisory 
Committee Notes to F.R.E. 803(5), 1972 Proposed Rules. In United States v. Smith, a 
cooperating witness gave a statement to a detective fifteen months after the incident described in 
the statement. US. v. Smith, 197 F.3d 225 (6th Cir. 1999). The Sixth Circuit ruled that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the statement under 803(5) since 
"contemporaneousness is not required in determining whether an event was sufficiently fresh to 
satisfy F.R.E. 803(5)." Smith, 197 F.3d at 231. See also United States v. Sollars, 979 F.2d 
1294, 1298 (8th Cir. 1992)(holding no error in admitting declarant's statement under 803(5) 
when declarant told a BATF agent two months after the fire that she saw the defendant on the 
building's roof that night); United States v. Lewis, 954 F.2d 1386 (7th Cir. 1992)(holding no 
plain error when FBI agent's report admitted a recorded recollection of defendant's fellow 
inmate when approximately six months passed between defendant's statement to inmate and 
agent's interview with inmate). 
Here, the period of two months between the strangulation and the interview with 
Detective Brechwald satisfy the component of the Rule that mandate that the matter must be 
fresh in the victim's memory. Detective Brechwald can best testify to the circumstances of this 
particular case regarding objective indicators that the incident was fresh in the victim's memo1y 
when she relayed the account of the attempted strangulation to him in late August and again in 
early September 2008. Thus, this requirement is met. 
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II. CRAWFORD DOES NOT APPLY IN THE INSTANT CASE 
Defendant argued in his motion to dismiss pursuant to IC § 19-815A that introducing 
evidence in this case pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(5) violates his right to confront the 
witnesses against him under the Sixth Amendment and Crawford v. Washington. Defendant's 
claim is without merit. 
Crawford v. Washington revitalized the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution. Under Crawford, for a Confrontation Clause violation to occur, a 
witness must make a testimonial statement. The witness who made the testimonial statement 
must then be unavailable at trial, and the defendant must have been deprived of an opportunity to 
cross-examine that witness on that statement. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 
1354; See also State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 142, 176 P.3d 911,914 (Idaho 2007). In 
Crawford, the United States Supreme Court clearly stated that "when the declarant appears for 
cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his 
prior testimonial statements." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 FN9, 124 S.Ct. at 1369 FN9. 
A witness appears for cross-examination if he willingly takes the stand, answers questions 
in whatever manner, and exposes his demeanor to the jury, thus giving the defense an 
opportunity to address the witness's prior testimonial statements. See United States v. Owens, 
484 U.S. 554, 559, 108 S.Ct. 838, 842 (1988). It is well established that a declarant's lack of 
memory does not make her "unavailable." In State v. Banks, defendant was convicted of 
numerous crimes and sentenced to death. Defendant claimed on appeal that he was deprived of 
his right to confront a witness who had a portion of his temporal lobe that controls speech, 
memory, and personality removed as a result of injuries he sustained from the incident about 
which he testified. Due to this temporal lobe removal, the witness was susceptible to seizures 
and had cognitive problems that manifested themselves in the form of speech difficulties and 
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memory problems. Despite the witness's physical impairments, the state's Supreme Court 
determined Defendant's Confrontation Clause violation claim to be "wholly without merit" since 
the witness appeared at trial and Defendant cross-examined him. Banks, 271 S.W.3d 90 (Tem1. 
Nov 07, 2008). See also Reyes v. US., 933 A.2d 785 (D.C. Aug 16, 2007)(holding that witness 
was available for trial "even where the witness has no memory of the prior identification or 
statement that is the subject of cross-examination .... "); People v. Sutton, 874 N.E.2d 212, (Ill. 
App. 1 Dist. Aug 14, 2007)(determining that witness was available for cross-examination despite 
the fact he suffered amnesia regarding the offense and had no memory of his conversation with 
the officer as to non testimonial statements made in an ambulance); People v. Hampton, 899 
N.E.2d 532 (111. App. 1 Dist. Dec 05, 2008) (holding no Confrontation Clause violation in 
admitting witness' previous statement when witness professed that memory loss prevented him 
from recalling the details of the shooting and his prior statements). 
Further, case law is clear that the "opportunity to cross-examine" is neither limitless nor 
defined as an opportunity to cross-examine to the defendant's satisfaction. In Owens, an assault 
victim provided police a statement accusing the defendant, but at trial the victim testified that he 
had no recollection of why he made the accusation. The Court held that the victim's memory loss 
did not deprive the defendant of a constitutionally adequate opportunity for cross-examination, 
stating that the "Confrontation Clause guarantees only 'an opportunity for effective cross-
examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the 
defense might wish."' Owens, 484 U.S. at 559, 108 S.Ct. at 842. The Crawford decision did not 
overrule United States v. Owens. 
In the present case, the victim is available to testify at trial, and Defendant will have an 
opportunity to cross-examine her. The State recognizes that the statements and video 
demonstration it seeks to admit are testimonial, however, in light of the fact that the victim will 
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appear at trial and provide Defendant an opportunity to cross-examine her, no Confrontation 
Clause issue is even presented. The fact that the victim's lack of memory and physical 
challenges may prevent Defendant from cross-examining the victim to the extent he may wish 
does not mean that he has not been afforded or will not be afforded this constitutional right. 
Owens, 484 U.S. at 559. Moreover, as in the cases above, the victim's lack of memory regarding 
her statements to officers and the event itself does not render her unavailable. To the contrary, 
the victim in this case appeared and was available, testified, and was subject to cross examination 
at the preliminary hearing. The State expects that she will similarly be available to testify at trial. 
In light of the fact that the victim will be present at trial and the defense will have an 
opportunity to cross-examine her, the evidence the State seeks to admit does not violate 
Defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him. Consequently, Crawford does not apply 
and there is no Confrontation Clause violation in admitting evidence under Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 803(5). 
For the foregoing reasons, the victim's statements to Detective Brechwald contained in 
DR# 08-826541, and the videotape of the victim demonstrating the strangulation should be 
admitted under Idaho Rules of Evidence 803(5). 
Respectfully submitted this 2 / day of April 2009. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUSTIN BRADLEY DA VIS, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-FE-2009-0003944 
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
The issue in this case is whether or not the alleged victim is "available" for purposes of 
confrontation-clause analysis under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). When she 
testified at the preliminary hearing, she indicated that as a result of severe head trauma from an 
unrelated accident, she no longer has any memory of this alleged incident. 
Under an analysis of Crawford, her previously recorded statements cannot be admitted 
unless she is, or has been, available for meaningful cross-examination. 
In the State's response to the defendant's MOTION TO DISMISS, they essentially take 
the position that although the alleged victim has no memory of the incident due·to an unrelated 
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head trauma, she is nevertheless "available" for cross-examination. Simply put, the State 
contends that her previously recorded description of these events should be admissible because 
she is physically present to be cross-examined. This theory is simply incorrect. 
Crawford does not bar admissions of a prior statement so long as the declarant is present 
at trial to defend or explain it. As the Crawford court stated, "when the declarant appears for 
cross-examination at trial, the confrontation clause places no constraints at all on the use of prior 
testimonial statements." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59. However, as the defendant in our case has 
no recollection of the events at this time, she's not only unavailable, but the defense has never 
had the opportunity to confront her while her memory was intact. 
In support of its position, the State cites a number of cases, all from other jurisdictions. 
These cases are distinguishable from the case at hand. But while they are distinguishable, they 
are in accordance with Crawford, and actually support the defense's position that the alleged 
victim's prior statement in our case should not be admissible. The defense will address the cases 





United States v. Owen, 484 U.S. 554 (1988); 
State v. Banks, 271 S.W.3d 90; 
People v. Sutton, 874 N.E.2d 212 (2007), and; 
People v. Hampton, 899 N.E.2d 532. 
In Owen, the victim was badly beaten by an inmate at a correctional institution. As a 
result of the beating, the victim suffered from some memory loss and confusion. The victim· s 
prior statement to an FBI agent identifying the perpetrator was admitted by the trial court. This 
1988 case is obviously pre-Crawford, but the trial court al.lowed the prior statement because. 
despite the fact that the victim had some memory lapses, he recalled enough of the attack to 
testify at trial. 
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
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At trial, he recounted the attack, described what happened and how, and remembered 
identifying the perpetrator. The trial court properly ruled that the defendant had adequate 
opportunity to cross-examine the victim as to his memory and confusion issues following the 
attack. As a result, the admission of his prior identification of the defendant did not present a 
confrontation-clause problem. 
This decision is not inconsistent with Crawford as the State points out, but it is clearly 
distinguishable from the circumstances we have at hand. Unlike in Owen, the alleged victim in 
our case doesn't just merely have some confusion or memory lapses, she has absolutely no 
recollection of the events and will therefore not be available for meaningful, constitutionally 
sound, confrontation-clause purposes. 
The next case the State refers to is Banks, a case from the state of Tennessee. The victim 
in Banks identified the perpetrator to one of the responding officers. This was admitted at trial. 
The trial court allowed the prior statement and ruled that the statement was non-testimonial. 
Again, this case is consistent with Crawford, but completely distinguishable from our 
case. In Banks the statement was non-testimonial because it was made to an officer trying to 
respond to the emergency of two shooting victims, not for use at later legal proceedings. In our 
case, the statement is clearly testimonial and therefore subject to a Crawford analysis, a point the 
State concedes. 
In Banks, the Tennessee Supreme Court stated that the defendant's Crawford claim was 
totally without merit, not only because the statement was non-testimonial, but also because the 
victim was able to testify at trial. Although he had some memory and speech problems because 
of wounds he received as a result of the shooting, he was able to recall what happened. This is 
distinctly different from our case where the statement is testimonial, and the ;illeged victim has 
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absolutely no recollection of the events; therefore, she will not be able to testify to those events 
at trial. 
The next case the State relies on is Sutton, an Illinois Court of Appeals decision in which 
the trial court· s decision allowing an out-of-court statement to be admitted was upheld. This 
case is similar to Banks in that the statement was non-testimonial (again, a statement to a first 
responder). 
Sutton also is consistent with Crawford, but distinguishable from our case. As in Owen 
and Banks, the statements in question were non-testimonial and the witness could recall the facts 
at trial. This situation is again distinguishable from our case as the statements in question are 
testimonial and the alleged victim does not have the ability to recount the facts, which makes her 
unavailable for trial. 
The State next relies upon Hampton, another Illinois Court of Appeals case. In Hampton, 
the witness claimed to have no memory of the salient facts during a 2006 trial. However, this 
same witness had testified at a co-defendant's prior trial on this matter in 1995, where he had no 
memory problems. The trial court allowed the witness' prior testimony. The Illinois Supreme 
Court upheld that decision holding that the witness was subject to adequate prior cross-
examination. 
The Hampton court cites a number of other similar cases with the same issue. In People 
v. Flores, 128 Ill.2d 66 (1989), a witness testified at a prior proceeding and had no apparent 
memory issues. During the course of proceedings in the case, the witness began to complain of 
having memory problems. The People attempted to admit the witness' prior testimony at trial, 
the defense objected, and the court ruled in favor of the People, allowing the admission of that 
witness' prior testimony during trial. The Illinois Court of Appeals upheld that decision because 
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the witness was sufficiently subjected to cross-examination at the prior proceeding when his 
memory was sound. 
Similarly, in People v. Wheatley, 187 111.App.3d 371 (1989), two brothers were being 
tried in separate proceedings for am1ed robbery. A third brother testified at one brother's trial 
and could recount the facts. At the other brother's trial, however. he claimed to have memory 
problems. The trial court allowed the third brother's testimony at the previous trial to be 
admitted. The Illinois Court of Appeals upheld that decision because the witness had been 
subject to meaningful cross-examination at the previous trial. 
Again. these cases are all distinguishable from the case at hand in that the pnor 
statements were all subject to cross-examination at a prior legal proceeding where there were no 
significant memory-loss issues. This is not the case with our alleged victim whose statements 
were videotaped at CARES. She has no memory of the events and has never been subject to 
cross-examination at a prior proceeding where her memory was intact. 
In the State's response to the defendant's MOTION TO DISMISS, they have copied 
convenient, self-serving, sound-bites from the aforementioned cases in an attempt to support 
their proposition that if the alleged victim is physically present, but without memory, she is 
·'available" for confrontation-clause analysis. Their argument is without merit. 
A thorough reading of the cases the State cites in support of their position actually 
affirms the defense's contention that the alleged victim's previously taped statements should not 
be admitted into evidence at trial. Because of her memory loss, the defense has been denied the 
opportunity at meaningful cross-examination through no fault of the defendant. 
In short, in all of the cases the State cites, the witnesses in question have been cross-
exan1ined at prior proceedings where there were no significant memory problems, or they 
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recalled enough of the event to be able to testify at trail and be subject to meaningful cross-
examination. It is disingenuous to suggest that, although the witness in our case has no memory 
of the event, she is somehow ··available'' just by virtue of the fact that she is physically present to 
sit in the ,vitness chair at trial. 
Furthermore, the State glosses over the one Idaho case that seems to be right on point. In 
Sate v. Hooper, 176 P.3d 911 (2007), the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals· 
decision overturning the trial court's admission of a CARES tape after the six-year-old victim 
was unable to take the oath. Prior to trial, the state served notice of its intent to introduce 
videotaped interviews of the victim and hearsay statements made by the victim to the forensic 
exammer. 
After the child in Hooper could not take the oath, the trial court ruled her unavailable and, 
111 a pre-Crawford analysis, allowed the tape's admission. The Idaho Supreme Court held, 
pursuant to Crawford, that the videotaped statements were testimonial and thus admissible only 
if the child was unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity at cross-examination. 
Since Hooper had no prior opportunity to cross-examine the child, the admission of evidence 
was improper. 
This case virtually mmors Hooper in that we also have an alleged victim that is 
physically present yet unable to testify. It makes no difference that one victim cannot take the 
oath (for whatever reason) and the other does not remember. The result is the same. They are 
both physically present, but unable to testify. The State attempts to make the distinction that the 
alleged victim in this case actually can testify. She can sit on the witness stand and take the oath 
and testify that she doesn't remember anything. That does not provide the defense with 
meaningful cross-examination of the alleged victim for confrontation-clause analysis. Just as the 
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child in Hooper who cannot take the oath, our alleged victim will not be able to testify about any 
facts relevant to the case at hand. The difference the State tries to draw is without distinction. 
As in Hooper, the State in this case is seeking to introduce a prior recorded statement 
pursuant to IRE 80 3 ( 5). The videotaped statements the State seeks to admit are clearly 
testimonial. The alleged victim in this case is unavailable because she no longer has any 
memory of the events in question, nor even any memory of making the allegations. There has 
been no opportunity to cross-examine her at a proceeding when her memory was intact. These 
videotaped statements were improperly admitted at the preliminary hearing and the case should 
be dismissed pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-815A. 
Furthermore, if the Court determines there is otherwise adequate probable cause to bind 
the case over to district court, these videotaped statements, pursuant to the analysis contained in 
Crawford, should nevertheless be excluded at trial. 
DATED, this _/Ji::__ day of May 2009. 
Attorney for Defendant 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this ---+-....__ day of May 2009, I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the within instrument to: 
WHITNEY WELSH 
Deputy Prosecutor, Ada County 
by placing said same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
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Deputy Solicitor General Bryson argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General 
Fried, Assistant Attorney General Weld, Robert H. Klonoff, and John F. De Pue. 
[8] Allan Ides, by invitation of the Court, 480 U.S. 929, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was 
Stanley A. Goldman. 
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Blackmun, Stevens, and O'connor, JJ., 
joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 564. Kennedy, J., took no part in the 
consideration or decision of the case. 
Author: Scalia 
555 
[11] JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. 
(12] This case requires us to determine whether either the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment or Rule 802 of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence bars testimony concerning a prior, out-of-court identification when the identifying witness 
is 
556 
unable, because of memory loss, to explain the basis for the identification. 
(13] I 
(14] On April 12, 1982, John Foster, a correctional counselor at the federal prison in Lompoc, California, was attacked 
and brutally beaten with a metal pipe. His skull was fractured, and he remained hospitalized for almost a month. As a 
result of his injuries, Foster's memory was severely impaired. When Thomas Mansfield, an FBI agent investigating the 
assault, first attempted to interview Foster, on April 19, he found Foster lethargic and unable to remember his attacker's 
name. On May 5, Mansfield again spoke to Foster, who was much improved and able to describe the attack. Foster 
named respondent as his attacker and identified respondent from an array of photographs. 
[ 15] Respondent was tried in Federal District Court for assault with intent to commit murder under 18 U.S.C. § 113(a). At 
trial, Foster recounted his activities just before the attack, and described feeling the blows to his head and seeing blood 
on the floor. He testified that he clearly remembered identifying respondent as his assailant during his May 5th interview 
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with Mansfield. On cross-examination, he admitted that he could not remember seeing his assailant. He also admitted 
that, although there was evidence that he had received numerous visitors in the hospital, he was unable to remember 
any of them except Mansfield, and could not remember whether any of these visitors had suggested that respondent 
was the assailant. Defense counsel unsuccessfully sought to refresh his recollection with hospital records, including one 
indicating that Foster had attributed the assault to someone other than respondent. Respondent was convicted and 
sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment to be served consecutively to a previous sentence. 
[16] On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered challenges based on the 
Confrontation 
557 
Clause and Rule 802 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. *fn 1 By divided vote it upheld both challenges (though finding the 
Rule 802 violation harmless error), and reversed the judgment of the District Court. 789 F.2d 750 (1986). We granted 
certiorari, 479 U.S. 1084 (1987), to resolve the conflict with other Circuits on the significance of a hearsay declarant's 
memory loss both with respect to the Confrontation Clause, see, e. g., United States ex rel. Thomas v. Cuyler, 548 F.2d 
460, 462-463 (CA3 1977), and with respect to Rule 802, see, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 565 F.2d 1248, 1252 (CA2 
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 973 (1978). 
[17] II 
[18] The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment gives the accused the right "to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him." This has long been read as securing an adequate opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses. See, e. 
g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-243 (1895); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415,418 (1965). This Court 
has never held that a Confrontation Clause violation can be founded upon a witness' loss of memory, but in two cases 
has expressly left that possibility open. 
[19] In California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157-164 (1970), we found no constitutional violation in the admission of 
testimony that had been given at a preliminary hearing, relying on (as one of two independent grounds) the proposition 
that the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at trial satisfied the Sixth Amendment's requirements. We declined, 
however, to decide the admissibility of the same witness' out-of-court statement to a police officer concerning events 
that at trial he was unable to recall. In remanding on this point, we 
558 
noted that the state court had not considered, and the parties had not briefed, the possibility that the witness' memory 
loss so affected the petitioner's right to cross-examine as to violate the Confrontation Clause.*fn2 Id., at 168-169. Justice 
Harlan, in a scholarly concurrence, stated that he would have reached the issue of the out-of-court statement, and would 
have held that a witness' inability to "recall either the underlying events that are the subject of an extra-judicial 
statement or previous testimony or recollect the circumstances under which the statement was given, does not have 
Sixth Amendment consequence." Id., at 188. 
[20] In Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985) (per curiam), we determined that there was no Confrontation Clause 
violation when an expert witness testified as to what opinion he had formed, but could not recollect the basis on which 
he had formed it. We said: 
[21] "The Confrontation Clause includes no guarantee that every witness called by the prosecution will refrain from 
giving testimony that is marred by forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion. To the contrary, the Confrontation Clause is 
generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose these infirmities through 
cross-examination, thereby calling to the attention of the factflnder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness' 
testimony." Id., at 21-22. 
(22] Our opinion noted that a defendant seeking to discredit a forgetful expert witness is not without ammunition, since 
the jury may be persuaded that "his opinion is as unreliable as his memory." Id., at 19. We distinguished, however, the 
unresolved issue in Green on the basis that that involved the introduction of an out-of-court statement. 474 U.S., at 18. 
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JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment, suggested that the question at hand was in fact quite close to the 
question left open in Green. 474 U.S., at 23-24. 
[23] Here that question is squarely presented, and we agree with the answer suggested 18 years ago by Justice Harlan. 
"[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees only 'an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that 
is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish."' Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 
(1987), quoting Fensterer, supra, at 20 (emphasis added); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986); Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 73, n. 12 (1980). As Fensterer demonstrates, that opportunity is not denied when a witness 
testifies as to his current belief but is unable to recollect the reason for that belief. It is sufficient that the defendant has 
the opportunity to bring out such matters as the witness' bias, his lack of care and attentiveness, his poor eyesight, and 
even (what is often a prime objective of cross-examination, see 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 995, pp. 931-932 (J. 
Chadbourn rev. 1970)) the very fact that he has a bad memory. If the ability to inquire into these matters suffices to 
establish the constitutionally requisite opportunity for cross-examination when a witness testifies as to his current belief, 
the basis for which he cannot recall, we see no reason why it should not suffice when the witness' past belief is 
introduced and he is unable to recollect the reason for that past belief. In both cases the foundation for the belief 
(current or past) cannot effectively be elicited, but other means of impugning the belief are available. Indeed, if there is 
any difference in persuasive impact between the statement "I believe this to be the man who assaulted me, but can't 
remember why" and the statement "I don't know whether this is the man who assaulted me, but I told the police I 
believed so earlier," the former would seem, if anything, more damaging and hence give rise to a greater need for 
memory-testing, if that is to be considered essential to an opportunity for effective cross-examination. 
560 
We conclude with respect to this latter example, as we did in Fensterer with respect to the former, that it is not. The 
weapons available to impugn the witness' statement when memory loss is asserted will of course not always achieve 
success, but successful cross-examination is not the constitutional guarantee. They are, however, realistic weapons, as is 
demonstrated by defense counsel's summation in this very case, which emphasized Foster's memory loss and argued 
that his identification of respondent was the result of the suggestions of people who visited him in the hospital. 
[24] Our constitutional analysis is not altered by the fact that the testimony here involved an out-of-court identification 
that would traditionally be categorized as hearsay. See Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 801(d)(l)(C), 28 
U.S.C. App., p. 717. This Court has recognized a partial (and somewhat indeterminate) overlap between the 
requirements of the traditional hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause. See Green, 399 U.S., at 155-156; id., at 173 
(Harlan, J., concurring). The dangers associated with hearsay inspired the Court of Appeals in the present case to believe 
that the Constitution required the testimony to be examined for "indicia of reliability," Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 
(1970), or "particularized guarantees of trust-worthiness," Roberts, supra, at 66. We do not think such an inquiry is 
called for when a hearsay declarant is present at trial and subject to unrestricted cross-examination. In that situation, as 
the Court recognized in Green, the traditional protections of the oath, cross-examination, and opportunity for the jury to 
observe the witness' demeanor satisfy the constitutional requirements. 399 U.S., at 158-161. We do not think that a 
constitutional line drawn by the Confrontation Clause falls between a forgetful witness' live testimony that he once 
believed this defendant to be the perpetrator of the crime, and the introduction of the witness' earlier statement to that 
effect. 
561 
Respondent has argued that this Court's jurisprudence concerning suggestive identification procedures shows the special 
dangers of identification testimony, and the special importance of cross-examination when such hearsay is proffered. 
See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). Respondent has not, 
however, argued that the identification procedure used here was in any way suggestive. There does not appear in our 
opinions, and we decline to adopt today, the principle that, because of the mere possibility of suggestive procedures, 
out-of-court statements of identification are inherently less reliable than other out-of-court statements. 
[25] III 
[26] Respondent urges as an alternative basis for affirmance a violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 802, which generally 
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excludes hearsay. Rule 801(d)(l)(C) defines as not hearsay a prior statement "of identification of a person made after 
perceiving the person," if the declarant "testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning 
the statement." The Court of Appeals found that Foster's identification statement did not come within this exclusion 
because his memory loss prevented his being "subject to cross-examination concerning the statement." Although the 
Court of Appeals concluded that the violation of the Rules of Evidence was harmless (applying for purposes of that 
determination a "more-probable-than-not" standard, rather than the "beyond-a-reasonable-doubt" standard applicable to 
the Confrontation Clause violation, see Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S., at 684), respondent argues to the contrary. 
[27] It seems to us that the more natural reading of "subject to cross-examination concerning the statement" includes 
what was available here. Ordinarily a witness is regarded as "subject to cross-examination" when he is placed on the 
stand, under oath, and responds willingly to questions. Just as with the constitutional prohibition, limitations on the 
scope 
562 
of examination by the trial court or assertions of privilege by the witness may undermine the process to such a degree 
that meaningful cross-examination within the intent of the Rule no longer exists. But that effect is not produced by the 
witness' assertion of memory loss -- which, as discussed earlier, is often the very result sought to be produced by cross-
examination, and can be effective in destroying the force of the prior statement. Rule 801(d)( l)(C), which specifies that 
the cross-examination need only "concer[n] the statement," does not on its face require more. 
[28] This reading seems even more compelling when the Rule is compared with Rule 804(a)(3), which defines "[u] 
navailability as a witness" to include situations in which a declarant "testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of 
the declarant's statement." Congress plainly was aware of the recurrent evidentiary problem at issue here -- witness 
forgetfulness of an underlying event -- but chose not to make it an exception to Rule 801(d)(l)(C). 
[29] The reasons for that choice are apparent from the Advisory Committee's Notes on Rule 801 and its legislative 
history. The premise for Rule 801(d)(l)(C) was that, given adequate safeguards against suggestiveness, out-of-court 
identifications were generally preferable to courtroom identifications. Advisory Committee's Notes on Rule 801, 28 U .S.C. 
App., p. 717. Thus, despite the traditional view that such statements were hearsay, the Advisory Committee believed 
that their use was to be fostered rather than discouraged. Similarly, the House Report on the Rule noted that since, "[a]s 
time goes by, a witness' memory will fade and his identification will become less reliable," minimizing the barriers to 
admission of more contemporaneous identification is fairer to defendants and prevents "cases falling through because 
the witness can no longer recall the identity of the person he saw commit the crime." H. R. Rep. No. 94-355, p. 3 (1975). 
See also S. Rep. No. 94-199, p. 2 (1975). To judge from the House and Senate Reports, Rule 801(d)(l)(C) was in part 
directed 
563 
to the very problem here at issue: a memory loss that makes it impossible for the witness to provide an in-court 
identification or testify about details of the events underlying an earlier identification. 
[30] Respondent argues that this reading is impermissible because it creates an internal inconsistency in the Rules, since 
the forgetful witness who is deemed "subject to cross-examination" under 801(d)(l)(C) is simultaneously deemed 
"unavailable" under 804(a)(3). This is the position espoused by a prominent commentary on the Rules, see 4 J. 
Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 801-120 to 801-121, 801-178 (1987). It seems to us, however, that this is 
not a substantive inconsistency, but only a semantic oddity resulting from the fact that Rule 804(a) has for convenience 
of reference in Rule 804(b) chosen to describe the circumstances necessary in order to admit certain categories of 
hearsay testimony under the rubric "Unavailability as a witness." These circumstances include not only absence from the 
hearing, but also claims of privilege, refusals to obey a court's order to testify, and inability to testify based on physical 
or mental illness or memory loss. Had the rubric instead been "unavailability as a witness, memory loss, and other 
special circumstances" there would be no apparent inconsistency with Rule 801, which is a definition section excluding 
certain statements entirely from the category of "hearsay." The semantic inconsistency exists not only with respect to 
Rule 801(d)(l)(C), but also with respect to the other subparagraphs of Rule 801(d)(l). It would seem strange, for 
example, to assert that a witness can avoid introduction of testimony from a prior proceeding that is inconsistent with his 
trial testimony, see Rule B0l(d)(l)(A), by simply asserting lack of memory of the facts to which the prior testimony 
related. See United States v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282, 283-284 (CA4 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983). But that 
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situation, like this one, presents the verbal curiosity that the witness is "subject to cross-examination" under Rule 801 
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while at the same time "unavailable" under Rule 804(a)(3). Quite obviously, the two characterizations are made for two 
entirely different purposes and there is no requirement or expectation that they should coincide. 
[31] For the reasons stated, we hold that neither the Confrontation Clause nor Federal Rule of Evidence 802 is violated 
by admission of an identification statement of a witness who is unable, because of a memory loss, to testify concerning 
the basis for the identification. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
[32] So ordered. 
[33] Disposition 
[34] 789 F.2d 750, reversed and remanded. 
[35] JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, dissenting. 
[36] In an interview during his month-long hospitalization, in what was apparently a singular moment of lucid 
recollection, John Foster selected respondent James Owens' photograph from an array of possible suspects and informed 
FBI Agent Thomas Mansfield that it was respondent who had attacked him with a metal pipe on the morning of April 12, 
1982. Had Foster subsequently died from his injuries, there is no doubt that both the Sixth Amendment and the Federal 
Rules of Evidence would have barred Mansfield from repeating Foster's out-of-court identification at trial. Fortunately, 
Foster survived the beating; his memory, however, did not, and by the time of respondent's trial he could no longer 
recall his assailant or explain why he had previously identified respondent as such. This profound memory loss, 
therefore, rendered Foster no less a conduit for stale and inscrutable evidence than Mansfield would have been, yet the 
Court nevertheless concludes that because defense counsel was afforded an unrestricted opportunity to cross-examine 
him, 
565 
Foster's unadorned reiteration of his earlier statement did not deprive respondent of his constitutional right to confront 
the witness against him. In my view, the Court today reduces the right of confrontation to a purely procedural 
protection, and a markedly hollow one at that. Because I believe the Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants 
the right to engage in cross-examination sufficient to "affor[d] the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the 
truth of [a] prior statement," California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970), and because respondent clearly was not 
afforded such an opportunity here, I dissent. 
[37] I 
[38] On April 12, 1982, Foster was brutally assaulted while on duty as a correctional counselor at the federal prison in 
Lompoc, California. His attacker beat him repeatedly about the head and upper body with a metal pipe, inflicting 
numerous and permanently disabling injuries, one of which was a profound loss of short-term memory. Foster spent 
nearly a month in the hospital recuperating from his injuries, much of that time in a state of semiconsciousness. 
Although numerous people visited him, including his wife who visited daily, Foster remembered none except Agent 
Mansfield. While he had no recollection of Mansfield's first visit on April 19, he testified that his memory of the interview 
Mansfield conducted on May 5 was "vivid." App. 28. In particular, he recalled telling Mansfield: "[A]fter I was hit I looked 
down and saw the blood on the floor, and jammed my finger into Owens' chest, and said, 'That's enough of that,' and hit 
my alarm button." Id., at 31. 
[39] Foster testified that at the time he made these statements, he was certain that his memory was accura~e. In 
addition, he recalled choosing respondent's photograph from those Mansfield showed him. There is no dispute, however, 
that by the time of trial Foster could no longer remember who had assaulted him or even whether he had seen his 
attacker. 
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Nor could he recall whether any of the prison officials or other persons who visited him in the hospital had ever 
suggested that respondent had beaten him. A medical expert who testified on behalf of the prosecution explained that 
Foster's inability to remember most of the details of the assault was attributable to a gradual and selective memory loss 
caused by his head injuries. 
[40] II 
[41] The principal witness against respondent was not the John Foster who took the stand in December 1983 -- that 
witness could recall virtually nothing of the events of April 12, 1982, and candidly admitted that he had no idea whether 
respondent had assaulted him. Instead, respondent's sole accuser was the John Foster who, on May 5, 1982, identified 
respondent as his attacker. This John Foster, however, did not testify at respondent's trial: the profound memory loss he 
suffered during the approximately 18 months following his identification prevented him from affirming, explaining, or 
elaborating upon his out-of-court statement just as surely and completely as his assertion of a testimonial privilege, or 
his death, would have. Thus, while the Court asserts that defense counsel had "realistic weapons" with which to impugn 
Foster's prior statement, ante, at 560, it does not and cannot claim that cross-examination could have elicited any 
information that would have enabled a jury to evaluate the trustworthiness or reliability of the identification. Indeed, 
although the Court suggests that defense counsel was able to explore Foster's "lack of care and attentiveness," his "bad 
memory," and the possibility that hospital visitors suggested respondent's name to him, ante, at 559, 560, Foster's 
memory loss precluded any such inquiries: he simply could not recall whether he had actually seen his assailant or even 
whether he had had an opportunity to see him, nor could he remember any of his visitors, let alone whether any of them 
had suggested that respondent had attacked him. Moreover, by the 
567 
time of trial, Foster was unable to shed any light on the accuracy of his May 1982 recollection of the assault; the most he 
could state was that on the day of the interview he felt certain that his statements were true. As the court below found, 
"[c]learly, two of the three dangers surrounding Foster's out-of-court identifications -- misperception and failure of 
memory -- could not be mitigated in any way by the only cross-examination of Foster that was available to 
[respondent]." 789 F.2d 750, 759 (CA9 1986). 
[ 42] In short, neither Foster nor the prosecution could demonstrate the basis for Foster's prior identification. 
Nevertheless, the Court concludes that the Sixth Amendment presents no obstacle to the introduction of such an 
unsubstantiated out-of-court statement, at least not where the declarant testifies under oath at trial and is subjected to 
unrestricted cross-examination. According to the Court, the Confrontation Clause is simply a procedural trial right that 
"guarantees only an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, 
and to whatever extent, the defense might wish." Ante, at 559 (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted; 
emphasis in original). 
[43] Although the Court suggests that the result it reaches today follows naturally from our earlier cases, we have never 
before held that the Confrontation Clause protects nothing more than a defendant's right to question live witnesses, no 
matter how futile that questioning might be. On the contrary, as the Court's own recitation of our prior case law reveals, 
we have repeatedly affirmed that the right of confrontation ensures "an opportunity for effective cross-examination." 
Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam) (emphasis added); see also Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 
629 (1971) (Confrontation Clause does not bar admission of out-of-court statement where defendant has "the benefit of 
full and effective cross-examination of [declarant]") (emphasis added); California v. Green, 399 U.S., 
568 
at 159 (introduction of out-of-court statement does not violate Confrontation Clause "as long as the defendant is assured 
of full and effective cross-examination at the time of trial") (emphasis added). While we have rejected the notion that 
effectiveness should be measured in terms of a defendant's ultimate success, we have never, until today, equated 
effectiveness with the mere opportunity to pose questions. Rather, consistent with the Confrontation Clause's mission of 
"advanc[ing] a practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials," Dutton v. Evans, 
400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970), we have suggested that the touchstone of effectiveness is whether the cross-examination 
affords "'the trier of fact ... a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement."' Ibid. (quoting California 
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v. Green, supra, at 161). See also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 73 (1980) (introduction of prior testimony where the 
declarant was unavailable at trial did not violate Confrontation Clause where previous cross-examination of declarant 
"afforded the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement" (citation omitted; internal 
quotation marks omitted));*fnl Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972) 
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(same). Where no opportunity for such cross-examination exists, we have recognized that the Sixth Amendment permits 
the introduction of out-of-court statements only when they bear sufficient independent "indicia of reliability." Dutton v. 
Evans, supra, at 89. 
[44] In dispensing with these substantive constitutional requirements today, the Court relies almost exclusively on our 
decision in Delaware v. Fensterer, supra, a case that did not involve the introduction of prior statements. Fensterer 
concerned an expert witness' inability to remember which of three possible scientific theories he had used in formulating 
his opinion. Although Fensterer contended that the witness' forgetfulness made it impossible to impeach the scientific 
validity of his conclusions, we noted that "an expert who cannot recall the basis for his opinion invites the jury to find 
that his opinion is as reliable as his memory." Id., at 19. While the witness' endorsement of a given scientific theory 
might have maximized the effectiveness of cross-examination, the Confrontation Clause guarantees only that level of 
effectiveness necessary to afford the factfinder a satisfactory basis for assessing the validity of the evidence offered. 
Thus, because the expert's inability to remember the basis for his opinion was self-impeaching, the constitutional 
guarantee had clearly been satisfied. 
[45] Fensterer, therefore, worked no change in our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, yet the Court purports to discern 
in it a principle under which all live testimony as to a witness' past belief is constitutionally admissible, provided the 
defendant 
570 
is afforded an opportunity to question the witness. From this the Court derives the corollary that prior statements as to 
past belief are equally admissible, again given the requisite opportunity for questioning the declarant at trial. Accordingly, 
the Court asserts, the Confrontation Clause draws no line "between a forgetful witness' live testimony that he once 
believed this defendant to be the perpetrator of the crime, and the introduction of the witness' earlier statement to that 
effect." Ante, at 560. The obvious shortcoming in this reasoning, of course, is that Fensterer announced no such blanket 
rule: while the expert's memory /apse in that case was self-impeaching, it does not follow -- and we have therefore 
never held -- that all forgetfulness may be so characterized. Certainly in the present case, Foster's inability in December 
1983 to remember the events of April 1982 in no way impugned or otherwise cast doubt upon the accuracy or 
trustworthiness of his memory in May 1982, particularly in light of the uncontradicted medical testimony explaining that 
his forgetfulness was the result of the head injuries he sustained. Under our prior cases, then, the constitutional 
admissibility of Foster's prior statement, and the testimony of the Court's hypothetical witness who cannot recall the 
basis for his past belief, should depend on whether the memory loss so seriously impedes cross-examination that the 
factfinder lacks an adequate basis upon which to assess the truth of the proffered evidence. Whatever may be said of 
the Court's hypothetical, it is clear in the case before us that Foster's near total loss of memory precluded any 
meaningful examination or assessment of his out-of-court statement and thus should have barred the admission of that 
statement. 
[ 46] To the extent the Court's ruling is motivated by the fear that a contrary result will open the door to countless 
Confrontation Clause challenges to the admission of out-of-court statements, that fear is groundless. To begin with, 
cases such as the present one will be rare indeed. More typically, witnesses asserting a memory loss will either not suffer 
(or 
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claim) a total inability to recollect, or will do so under circumstances that suggest bias or ulterior motive; in either case, 
given the threshold of "effectiveness" established by our prior decisions, the witness' partial memory or self-interest in 
claiming a complete memory loss will afford the factfinder an adequate basis upon which to evaluate the reliability and 
trustworthiness of the out-of-court statement. Even in those relatively few cases where no such basis can be elicited, the 
prior statement is still admissible if it bears independent "indicia of reliability." Finally, assessments of "effectiveness" for 
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Confrontation Clause purposes are no different than those undertaken by courts in deciding common evidentiary 
questions, and thus should not prove unduly burdensome. *fn2 In any event, to the extent such assessments prove 
inconvenient or troublesome, those burdens flow from our commitment to a Constitution that places a greater value on 
individual liberty than on efficient judicial administration. 
[47] III 
[ 48] I agree with the Court that the Confrontation Clause does not guarantee defendants the right to confront only those 
witnesses whose testimony is not marred by forgetfulness, 
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confusion, or evasion, and that the right of confrontation "'is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair 
opportunity to probe and expose these infirmities through cross-examination."' Ante, at 558 (quoting Fensterer, 474 
U.S., at 22). But as we stressed just last Term, this right to cross-examination "is essentially a 'functional' right designed 
to promote reliability in the truth-finding functions of a criminal trial." Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 737 (1987). In 
the present case, respondent Owens was afforded no opportunity to probe and expose the infirmities of Foster's May 5, 
1982, recollections, for here cross-examination, the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth," 
California v. Green, 399 U.S., at 158, stood as helpless as current medical technology before Foster's profound memory 
loss. In concluding that respondent's Sixth Amendment rights were satisfied by Foster's mere presence in the courtroom, 
the Court reduces the right of confrontation to a hollow formalism. Because I believe the Confrontation Clause 
guarantees more than the right to ask questions of a live witness, no matter how dead that witness' memory proves to 
be, I dissent. 
Opinion Footnotes 
[49] *fnl This case has been argued, both here and below, as though Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(l)(C) were the 
basis of the challenge. That is substantially but not technically correct. If respondent's arguments are accepted, it is Rule 
802 that would render the out-of-court statement inadmissible as hearsay; but as explained in Part III, it is ultimately 
Rule 801(d)(l)(C) that determines whether Rule 802 Is applicable. 
[50] *fn2 On remand, the California Supreme Court concluded that the Confrontation Clause was not violated by the out-
of-court statement, because the declarant testified under oath, subject to cross-examination, and the jury was able to 
observe his demeanor. People v. Green, 3 Cal. 3d 981,479 P. 2d 998, cert. dism'd, 404 U.S. 801 (1971). 
Dissent Footnotes 
[51] *fnl In Ohio v. Roberts, the Court indicated that, for purposes of determining the constitutional admissibility of prior 
testimony where the declarant is unavailable at trial, it is unnecessary to consider whether defense counsel's questioning 
at the prior hearing "surmount[ed] some inevitably nebulous threshold of 'effectiveness,"' and held that "in all but ... 
extraordinary cases, no inquiry into 'effectiveness' is required." 448 U.S., at 73 n. 12. In so ruling, however, the Court did 
not dispense with the Sixth Amendment's substantive minima of effectiveness, but rather rejected the claim that prior 
testimony should be deemed inherently unreliable where the declarant was cross-examined by an attorney whose 
performance is subsequently deemed ineffective in collateral habeas corpus proceedings. In this context, therefore, 
"effectiveness" obviously refers to the attorney's performance, not the impediments to meaningful cross-examination 
created by a witness ' memory loss. Indeed, the footnote in question is appended to a sentence once again affirming the 
need for affording the factfinder an adequate basis for assessing the truth of prior statements, and the author of Roberts 
has twice since confirmed that the Sixth Amendment guarantees an opportunity for meaningful cross-examination. See 
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739, n. 9 (1987) (BLACKMUN, J.) (a state rule precluding access to certain information 
before trial "may hinder [the] defendant's opportunity for effective cross-examination at trial, and thus ... may violate 
the Confrontation Clause") (emphasis in original); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 63, n. 1 (1987) (BLACKMUN, J., 
concurring) (Fensterer "[did] not imply that concern about ... effectiveness [of cross-examination] has no place in 
analysis under the Confrontation Clause"). 
[52] *fn2 Indeed, in a case such as this one, the inquiry into the constitutional adequacy of defendant's opportunity for 
cross-examination is identical to that required under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(3), which deems a declarant 
"unavailable" if, at trial, he or she "testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's [prior] 
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statement" (emphasis added). The Court today, of course, concludes that notwithstanding Rule 804(a)'s definition of 
unavailability, a prior identification is not hearsay under Rule 801(d)(l)(C), and is therefore admissible, as long as the 
declarant is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement itself, regardless of whether the declarant can recall 
the basis for that statement. See ante, at 561-564. Because I believe such a construction of Rule 801(d)(l)(C) renders it 
unconstitutional under the Confrontation Clause, I would require, consistent with Rule 804(a), that the declarant be 
subject to cross-examination as to the subject matter of the prior statement. See 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's 
Evidence 801-120 to 801-121 (1987) (endorsing such a construction of Rule 801(d)(l)(C)). 
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Kathy Kent and Latonya Burrow, Assistant Public Defenders (at trial); Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Devin 
Banks. 
Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Mark A. Fulks, Senior Counsel; 
Clarence Lutz, Assistant Attorney General (on appeal); William L. Gibbons, District Attorney General; Stac.y McEndree and 
Karen Cook, Assistant District Attorneys General (at trial); Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. 
OPINION 
WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JANICE M. HOLDER, C.J., WILLIAM M. BARKER, 
CORNELIA A. CLARK, and GARY R. WADE, JJ., joined. 
This appeal involves a defendant who shot two persons during a robbery at the home of one of the victims. One of 
the victims died. A Shelby County grand jury indicted the defendant for (1) premeditated and intentional murder, (2) 
murder during the perpetration of a robbery, (3) attempted first degree murder, and (4) especially aggravated robbery. 
A jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury found the presence of the 
aggravating circumstances in Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(1)(6) and (7) (2006) and sentenced the defendant to death. 
In a separate sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty-five years for the attempted first 
degree murder and especially aggravated robbery convictions and ordered these sentences to be served consecutively to 
each other and to the sentence of death. The defendant appealed his convictions and sentences to the Court of Criminal 
Appeals. The Court of Criminal Appeals, after concluding that the trial court's submission of the Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-13-
204(i)(6) aggravating circumstance to the jury was harmless error, affirmed the defendant's convictions and the 
sentences. State v. Banks, No. W2005-02213-CCA-R3-DD, 2007 WL 1966039 (Tenn.Crim.App. July 6, 2007). 
We have concluded that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by holding that the evidence did not support submitting 
,11,nnno 
Cacsemaker - TN - Case Law - rch - Result Page 3 of 57 
the Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-13-204(i)(6) aggravating circumstance to the jury. We also hold as follows: (1) the trial court 
committed no errors with regard to the admission or exclusion of evidence, (2) the trial court did not err with regard to 
its handling of the Arabic language interpreter or the dismissal of one of the jurors, (3) the prosecutor's closing 
arguments did not result in reversible error, (4) the trial court did not commit reversible error with 
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regard to the instructions for lesser-included offenses, (5) the evidence supports the defendant's convictions for 
attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, (6) the sentences of attempted first degree murder 
and especially aggravated robbery are not excessive, and the trial court did not err by ordering them to be served 
consecutively, (7) the evidence supports the defendant's first degree murder convictions, as well as the jury's finding 
that the Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(6) and (7) aggravating circumstances apply in this case, (8) the defendant's 
multiple constitutional challenges to Tennessee's death penalty procedures are without merit, and (9) the defendant's 
constitutional challenge to Tennessee's lethal injection protocol is without merit. We also agree with the Court of Criminal 
Appeals's conclusion with respect to the remaining issues and attach to this opinion as an appendix the relevant portions 
of that court's opinion. Finally, in the discharge of our obligation under Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-306 (2006), we have 
thoroughly reviewed the record in this case and have determined (1) that the defendant's death sentence was not 
imposed in an arbitrary fashion, (2) that the evidence fully supports the aggravating circumstances in Tenn.Code Ann. § 
39-3-204(i)(6) and (7), (3) that these aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances offered by the 
defendant, and (4) that the defendant's death sentence, taking into consideration the nature of the offenses and the 
defendant himself, is neither excessive nor disproportionate to the penalties imposed in similar cases. Accordingly, the 
judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, as corrected by this opinion, is affirmed. 
I. 
THE CRIME, ARREST, AND INVESTIGATION 
Kadhem AI-Maily and Hussain Atilebawi immigrated to the United States from Iraq and eventually settled in 
Memphis, Tennessee. They were acquainted with each other in their home country, and they became close friends in 
Memphis because neither of their families had accompanied them to the United States. Mr. AI-Maily, who was called 
"Uncle" by those who knew him, was widely known and respected among the Iraqi community in Memphis because he 
had a reputation of helping persons in need and of making everybody happy.(fnl) When Mr. Atilebawi first moved to 
Memphis, he worked in a grocery store. Later, he operated a body shop and also ran several other businesses out of his 
home, including selling used automobiles and men's clothing. 
A~er they moved to Memphis, both Mr. AI-Maily and Mr. Atilebawi befriended Devin Banks, who lived near Mr. 
Atilebawi. Mr. Banks, whose nickname was "Boo," was much younger than Mr. AI-Maily and Mr. Atilebawi. Mr. Atilebawi 
was very generous to Mr. Banks. He would hire Mr. Banks to perform "odd jobs," such as constructing a fence around his 
house. Mr. Atilebawi also sold several used cars to Mr. Banks on very favorable terms. Mr. Banks was welcome in Mr. 
Atilebawi's home, and he occasionally spent the night at Mr. Atilebawi's house. 
By September 2002, the relationship between Mr. Banks and Mr. Atilebawi had changed, at least from Mr. Banks's 
point of view. Mr. Banks was apparently upset about an incident that had occurred one 
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year earlier involving a former girlfriend,(fn2) and he also believed that Mr. Atilebawi had cheated him out of a large sum 
of money.(fn3) On Thursday, September 12, 2002, he told his friend, Michael Hilliard, that he "wanted to pay [Mr. 
Atilebawi] back." Mr. Banks asked Mr. Hilliard to obtain a handgun for him and to assist him in killing Mr. Atilebawi. The 
two men discussed dumping Mr. Atilebawi's body in the Wolf River to avoid detection. 
Around 11:00 p.m. on Sunday, September 15, 2002, Mr. Banks drove his white Ford Explorer to Sherry Tomason's 
house to drop off her son. Ms. Tomason lived near Mr. Banks's brother's house where Mr. Banks was staying. The 
Explorer had a flat tire, and Ms. Tomason gave Mr. Banks permission to leave the vehicle in her yard. She also offered to 
give Mr. Banks a ride, but Mr. Banks told her that he was going to see the man who had sold him the vehicle and that 
this man lived nearby. Ms. Tomason noted that it seemed to be late in the evening to do that, but Mr. Banks was 
insistent. 
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After leaving Ms. Tomason's house, Mr. Banks met up with Mr. Hilliard, and the two men proceeded to Mr. 
Atilebawi's house. Mr. Banks was armed with a .22 caliber semi-automatic pistol provided by Mr. Hilliard. They decided 
that Mr. Banks would arrive at Mr. Atilebawi's house alone and that Mr. Hilliard would wait for a telephone call from Mr. 
Banks summoning him to Mr. Atilebawi's house. 
That same evening, Mr. AI-Maily was visiting Mr. Atilebawi. The two men were engaged in conversation and 
watching television when Mr. Banks arrived at Mr. Atilebawi's front door between midnight and 2:00 a.m. on the morning 
of September 16, 2002. Mr. Atilebawi welcomed Mr. Banks into his home, and Mr. Banks was surprised when he saw Mr. 
AI-Maily sitting in Mr. Atilebawi's living room. Mr. Banks and Mr. Atilebawi talked awhile, and their "general conversation" 
touched on Mr. Banks's belief that Mr. Atilebawi owed him money and on Mr. Banks's relationship with Ms. Thompson. At 
some point during the conversation, Mr. Banks asked permission to use Mr. Atilebawi's cordless telephone and stepped 
outside to call Mr. Hilliard. 
Mr. Atilebawi thought that Mr. Banks was acting suspiciously. He joined Mr. Banks outside because he wanted to 
check on the used vehicles that were parked in the front of his house. Mr. Atilebawi walked down his driveway to inspect 
the vehicles, and, as he turned around to walk back to the house, Mr. Banks shot him with the .22 caliber pistol. After 
Mr. Atilebawi fell to the driveway, Mr. Banks shot him three more times. Two bullets struck Mr. Atilebawi in the head, 
one in the shoulder, and one in the leg. Mr. Atilebawi 
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was bleeding profusely, and it became difficult for Mr. Atilebawi to see because his eyes were covered with blood. 
Mr. Banks tried to drag Mr. Atilebawi's body from the driveway but was unable to move Mr. Atilebawi because he 
was too heavy. Mr. Banks later confessed, "I was scared and didn't want nobody to see him," and "I tried to pull him 
away but he was too heavy for me to move." He left Mr. Atilebawi in the driveway and returned to the house. Despite 
the blood covering his face, Mr. Atilebawi saw Mr. Banks enter his house. He was also able to faintly see another person 
with Mr. Banks. This person was Mr. Hilliard who, by that time, had joined Mr. Banks. 
When Mr. Banks re-entered Mr. Atilebawi's house, he confronted Mr. AI-Maily. Mr. AI-Maily turned over three 
hundred dollars in cash to Mr. Banks. Mr. Banks then ordered Mr. AI-Maily into Mr. Atilebawi's bedroom and commanded 
him to lie face down on the floor. Mr. AI-Maily complied. Messrs. Banks and Hilliard then began rummaging through Mr. 
Atilebawi's bedroom and living room looking for items to steal. Eventually, they decided to steal a red Jeep Cherokee and 
a Chevrolet Caprice from among the cars in the front yard. They loaded audio speakers and many shirts and hats in their 
original packaging into the Jeep. Mr. Banks also pocketed several thousand dollars in cash. The cash--mostly one 
hundred dollar bills and possibly in excess of six thousand dollars--was the proceeds from the sale of one of Mr. 
Atilebawi's used cars. 
After all the stolen property had been loaded into the Jeep, Mr. Banks re-entered Mr. Atilebawi's house, and walked 
through the living room and the short hallway to the bedroom where Mr. AI-Maily was still lying face-down on the floor. 
Mr. AI-Maily had cooperated fully with Mr. Atilebawi during the robbery. He had not interfered or resisted in any way, 
and he had quickly surrendered all the cash he had with him to Mr. Banks. 
Nonetheless, Mr. Banks drew his .22 caliber pistol, placed it not more than twenty-four inches from Mr. AI-Maily's 
head, and shot him behind the right ear. The bullet ricocheted into the left portion of Mr. AI-Maily's brain. The force of 
the gunshot caused Mr. AI-Maily to vomit reflexively, and Mr. Banks watched the blood and vomit flow from Mr. AI-Maily's 
mouth. Mr. Banks walked out of the house and returned the pistol to Mr. Hilliard. Messrs. Banks and Hilliard then left the 
scene, Mr. Banks driving the red Jeep and Mr. Hilliard driving the Chevrolet Caprice. They later abandoned the Caprice at 
an apartment complex, and Mr. Banks drove Mr. Hilliard home in the red Jeep. 
Mr. Atilebawi continued to lie bleeding in the driveway where he had fallen after Messrs. Banks and Hilliard entered 
his house. He did not dare move because he was afraid that he would attract Mr. Bank s's attention and that Mr. Banks 
would shoot him again. Mr. Banks later stated that he thought Mr. Atilebawi was still alive when he left because he heard 
Mr. Atilebawi call his nickname, "Boo." 
After dropping off Mr. Hilliard, Mr. Banks picked up his brother in the stolen red Jeep and went on an early morning 
shopping spree with the money he had taken from Mr. Atilebawi. He purchased men's clothing at a nearby K-Mart store, 
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a camera and some hair products at a nearby Walgreens drug store, and some brake pads and an air freshener for the 
white Ford Explorer at an Auto Zone store. Along the way, Mr. Banks and his brother stopped for breakfast at a Waffle 
House, and Mr. Banks even picked up an employment application at Walgreens. Mr. Banks brought his brother home at 
approximately 6:30 a.m. 
110 
At approximately 7:00 a.m., Mr. Banks drove the red Jeep to Ms. Tomason's house. Before driving Ms. Tomason's 
son to school, he talked with Ms. Tomason awhile and retrieved a compact disc from his Ford Explorer that was still 
parked in her front yard. After dropping off Ms. Tomason's son at school, Mr. Banks drove to Maco Tires and Auto Care 
where he purchased custom rims and new tires for the Jeep for approximately $1,500. Mr. Banks paid cash, and the 
manager remembered that he "pulled out quite a bit of money and ... started peeling off one hundred dollar bills." 
When the manager put the old rims and tires in the back of the Jeep, he noticed a significant amount of matching 
shirts and hats in their original packaging. When he asked Mr. Banks about the clothing, Mr. Banks told the manager that 
he sold clothing and that he had just returned from St. Louis. Mr. Banks sold the manager two sets of matching shirts 
and hats for ten dollars each. 
In the meantime, despite multiple gunshot wounds and significant blood loss, Mr. Atilebawi managed to drag himself 
to the telephone in his house. He was apparently able to press the redial button on the telephone and connect with a 
friend in Detroit, Michigan. What Mr. Atilebawi told his friend in Detroit is unclear. However, that call prompted Mr. 
Atilebawi's friend to call some of Mr. Atilebawi's friends in Tennessee, including Mohammed Al-Burkart and Aadel 
Alkhafaji. Mr. Al-Burkart and his wife drove to Mr. Atilebawi's house and telephoned the police as soon as they saw what 
had taken place. 
Officer Steven Jones was the first officer to arrive at Mr. Atilebawi's house at approximately 7:00 a.m. He found Mr. 
Atilebawi lying in a pool of blood on a sofa in the living room and observed that there was blood all over the living room. 
Even though Mr. Atilebawi was disoriented and dazed, he told Officer Jones what had happened and identified "Boo" as 
the person who had shot him. He described "Boo" as an African-American male in his late teens or early twenties. Mr. 
At1lebawi also told Officer Jones that "Uncle" was in the other room. Officer Jones then discovered Mr. AI-Maily dead in 
the bedroom. Officer Jones summoned medical assistance, crime scene investigators, and homicide detectives to the 
scene. The emergency medical responders arrived at Mr. Atilebawi's house a short time later. 
The officers at the scene began to interview neighbors to learn who "Boo" was. They learned quickly that "Boo" was 
Mr. Banks's nickname and that they should be on the lookout for a red Jeep. Sergeant Mark Miller was in the 
neighborhood following up on these leads when he saw a Jeep matching the description of the Jeep stolen from Mr. 
Atilebawi traveling in his direction.(fn4) When the Jeep made an abrupt turn and headed down another street, Sergeant 
Miller gave chase and stopped the Jeep. When Sergeant Miller ascertained that Mr. Banks was driving the Jeep, he 
placed Mr. Banks under arrest at approximately 9:30 a .m. During his search of Mr. Banks and the Jeep, Sergeant Miller 
found $1,253 in cash (including ten one hundred dollar bills), the stolen clothing and audio speakers, and the receipts for 
the purchases Mr. Banks had made during the shopping spree with his brother. 
Mr. Banks did not appear to be injured when he was arrested. He acted in a lackadaisical manner and said nothing 
at 
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the scene of the arrest. Mr. Banks was transported to the Homicide Office of the Memphis Police Department, and the 
Jeep was impounded. At 1:42 p.m., Sergeant Miller and Lieutenant Michael Williams advised Mr. Banks of his Miranda 
rights, and Mr. Banks signed a written waiver of his rights and gave the first of two confessions. 
In his first confession, Mr. Banks admitted that he was present at Mr. Atilebawi's house when Mr. Atilebawi was shot, 
but he claimed that a man named Brian Winters had shot Mr. Atilebawi. Mr. Banks confessed that he had stolen the red 
Jeep, the clothing, and the audio speakers. He also confessed that he had tried to hide Mr. Atilebawi's body. In addition, 
he stated that he and Mr. Atilebawi had discussed his belief that Mr. Atilebawi owed him money and his belief that Mr. 
Atilebawi had molested Ms. Thompson in September 2001. 
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Following Mr. Banks's first confession, the authorities arrested Mr. Winters at his house and also recovered a .25 
caliber pistol and a .22 caliber pistol that later proved to be the pistol that shot both Messrs. Atilebawi and AI-Maily. 
Coincidently, Mr. Hilliard was at Mr. Winters's residence when Mr. Winters was arrested, but he was not a person of 
interest to the authorities at that time. Once in custody, Mr. Winters denied that he had been involved with the shootings 
or the robbery at Mr. Atilebawi's house and provided the authorities with the names and telephone numbers of several 
alibi witnesses. 
On September 17, 2002, while in the process of confirming Mr. Winters's alibi, Sergeant Miller talked with both Mr. 
Winters's girlfriend and Mr. Hilliard on the telephone. He asked Mr. Hilliard to come down to the police station to give a 
statement regarding Mr. Winters's whereabouts when the crimes were committed. 
When Mr. Hilliard stated that he had no means of transportation, Sergeant Miller offered to send a car for him. When 
Mr. Hilliard arrived at the police station, he gave Sergeant Miller what he believed to be an owner's manual for a 
Jennings .22 caliber semi-automatic pistol. 
The same day, after Mr. Banks told the authorities that he wanted to recant portions of the confession he had given 
to Sergeant Miller and Lieutenant Williams on September 16, 2002, Sergeant James L. Fitzpatrick obtained a second 
confession from Mr. Banks. Mr. Banks was brought back to the Homicide Office, and Sergeant Fitzpatrick again informed 
Mr. Banks of his Miranda rights and obtained a signed written waiver of these rights on September 17, 2002, at 4:05 
p.m. Mr. Banks then gave a second confession which was reduced to writing. Mr. Banks was given an opportunity to 
review and to correct his written confession. He made no changes and then initialed each page and signed the 
confession at 5:06 p.m. 
In his second confession, Mr. Banks admitted that he had shot Mr. AI-Maily and Mr. Atilebawi with a black .22 or .25 
caliber automatic pistol that belonged to Mr. Hilliard. He stated that he obtained the pistol from Mr. Hilliard on Sunday 
night before he went to Mr. Atilebawi's house. He told Sergeant Fitzpatrick that he shot Mr. Atilebawi in revenge for Mr. 
Atilebawi's cheating him out of a large sum of money and because of the September 2001 incident involving Ms. 
Thompson. Mr. Banks admitted that he had explained to Mr. Hilliard three days before the shooting why he wanted the 
pistol and that at that time they had discussed disposing of Mr. Atilebawi's body in the Wolf River. 
Mr. Banks provided the details of the crime during his second confession. He admitted arriving at Mr. Atilebawi's 
house alone early on the morning of September 
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16, 2002. He stated that he engaged Mr. Atilebawi in conversation and then called Mr. Hilliard to come to Mr. Atilebawi's 
house. He admitted that he shot Mr. Atilebawi. He admitted robbing Mr. AI-Maily and Mr. Atilebawi and taking more than 
three thousand dollars in cash, two automobiles, men's clothing, and audio speakers. Finally, he admitted returning to 
the house and executing Mr. AI-Maily after he and Mr. Hilliard had filled the Jeep with stolen property. 
The fact that Mr. Banks remained in the area after shooting Messrs. AI-Maily and Atilebawi prompted Sergeant 
Fitzpatrick to ask Mr. Banks about his shopping spree immediately after he committed the crimes. When Sergeant 
Fitzpatrick asked him why he had purchased new rims and tires for the Jeep, Mr. Banks stated simply, "I figured that I 
would keep the Jeep." He offered no explanation for picking up the job application at Walgreens. 
The two head wounds that Mr. Atilebawi received at the hands of Mr. Banks were devastating and serious. Bullet 
and bone fragments were surgically removed from Mr. Atilebawi's brain, and surgeons were required to remove a portion 
of Mr. Atilebawi's temporal lobe that controls speech, memory, and personality. As a result of his injuries, Mr. Atilebawi 
was rendered susceptible to seizures and was left with cognitive problems, which manifest themselves in the form of 
speech difficulties and memory problems. Mr. Atilebawi was hospitalized for approximately one month. When he 
returned home, he discovered that property with an estimated value of forty thousand dollars had been stolen, including 
his furniture, a stereo, and a big screen television. 
II. 
THE INDICTMENT AND TRIAL 
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In March 2003, a grand jury in Shelby County returned a four-count indictment against Mr. Banks. The indictment 
charged Mr. Banks with {l) the premeditated and intentional killing of Mr. AI-Maily;(fn5) (2) the killing of Mr. AI-Maily in 
the perpetration of robbery;(fn6) (3) the attempted first degree murder of Mr. Atilebawi;(fn7) and (4) the especially 
aggravated armed robbery of property over the value of ten thousand dollars from Mr. Atilebawi.(fn8) 
One month later, on April 7, 2003, Mr. Banks filed a motion to require the State of Tennessee to announce whether 
it intended to seek the death penalty or another enhanced punishment. On April 10, 2003, the State announced its 
intention to seek the death penalty. In accordance with Tenn. R.Crim. P. 12.3, the State also notified Mr. Banks that it 
intended to rely upon the following two aggravating circumstances: first, that the murder was committed for the purpose 
of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution,(fn9) and second, that the murder was 
committed while Mr. Banks was engaging in committing a first degree murder or robbery.(fnl0) 
Mr. Banks's trial began on April 4, 2005. After three days of voir dire, the State presented numerous witnesses over 
the 
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course of three days of testimony. These witnesses included Mr. Atilebawi, the neurologist who treated Mr. Atilebawi, 
neighbors and friends who knew the parties, the police officers and forensic witnesses who had been involved in the 
investigation, the pathologist who performed Mr. AI-Maily's autopsy, and the store manager from whom Mr. Banks had 
purchased the rims and tires for the Jeep. After Mr. Banks indicated that he did not desire to testify, the defense rested 
without presenting any evidence. The jury began its deliberations on Friday, April 8, 2005, and on Saturday, April 9, 
2005, returned a verdict finding Mr. Banks guilty on all four counts of the indictment. 
The penalty phase of the trial began on Saturday, April 9, 2005, after the guilt phase of the trial concluded. The 
State called Mr. Atilebawi and his partner, Mary Hughes, to testify regarding the impact of Mr. Banks's crimes on the 
victims. Mr. Banks did not testify during the punishment phase; however, he called eleven mitigation witnesses. These 
witnesses presented a positive and sympathetic image of Mr. Banks. The implicit, and at times explicit, undercurrent of 
their testimony was the youth of Mr. Banks who was only nineteen years old when he murdered Mr. AI-Maily. 
Five employees of the Office of the Shelby County Sheriff testified about his conduct in prison and his efforts to 
rehabilitate himself. They described Mr. Banks as a model prisoner who had two minor blemishes on his disciplinary 
record and reported that he had participated in programs involving religious studies, anger management, drug and 
alcohol abuse, and other skills programs. Three members of the Leewood Baptist Church also testified about Mr. Banks's 
commitment to his church and his church-related activities. Several of these witnesses expressed disbelief that Mr. Banks 
could have committed the crimes for which he had been convicted and pleaded with the jury to spare his life. 
Three members of Mr. Banks's immediate family, his mother, an older sister, and his oldest brother, also testified 
during the sentencing phase of the trial. They described Mr. Banks's home life when he was growing up, including the 
challenges of being one of ten children of a mother who was in and out of prison because of various forgery convictions 
and whose fathers were generally absent. They also portrayed Mr. Banks as a gentle child who enjoyed cooking, playing 
with cars, writing poetry, and drawing pictures. In addition, they described the difficulties that Mr. Banks experienced 
when, at the age of sixteen, he learned that he was HIV positive. These family members testified that they loved and 
missed Mr. Banks and that they intended to continue to correspond with and visit Mr. Banks while he was incarcerated. 
Through cross-examination of Mr. Banks's witnesses, the State established that Mr. Banks had been assigned to a 
prison unit where the prisoners were afforded special privileges and that, while Mr. Banks's disciplinary history compared 
favorably to the general inmate population, the number of his disciplinary offenses was high when compared with the 
offenses of other prisoners on the unit. The State also established that Mr. Banks had been supported during his youth 
by a loving grandmother, older siblings, and members of his church and that his older siblings did not mistreat him. 
The State presented to the jury that Mr. Banks's criminal record included assault, battery, and domestic violence. In 
addition, the State called Ms, Thompson, Mr. Banks's former girlfriend, as a rebuttal witness. Ms. Thompson painted a 
starkly 
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different picture from the one painted by his family and church friends. She testified that Mr. Banks never told her that 
he was HIV-positive and that she learned about his medical condition from another one of his former girlfriends. She also 
testified that Mr. Banks regularly abused her physically and verbally, and she described an incident when Mr. Banks 
pointed a gun to her stomach when she was eight months pregnant. 
The jury returned its verdict on Monday, April 11, 2005. It concluded that the State had proved the existence of both 
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.(fnll) The jury also found unanimously and beyond reasonable 
doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. Accordingly, the jury unanimously 
sentenced Mr. Banks to death. 
At a later sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the first two counts of the indictment--the two capital 
convictions-- and sentenced Mr. Banks to death. It imposed a twenty-five year sentence for the attempt to commit first 
degree murder conviction and a twenty-five year sentence for the especially aggravated robbery conviction and 
determined that Mr. Banks should serve these sentences consecutively to each other and to the merged capital 
conviction. 
Mr. Banks appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, raising numerous challenges to his convictions and sentences. 
On July 6, 2007, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Mr. Banks's convictions for first degree murder and the resulting 
sentence of death. State v. Banks, No. W2005-02213-CCA-R3-DD, 2007 WL 1966039, at *59 (Tenn.Ct.App. July 6, 
2007). The court also affirmed Mr. Banks's convictions for especially aggravated robbery and criminal attempt to commit 
premeditated murder, as well as their resulting sentences. State v. Banks, 2007 WL 1966039, at *59. The affirmance of 
Mr. Banks's capital convictions and death sentence triggered an automatic review by this Court in accordance with 
Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-206(a)(l) (2006 ). Mr. Banks raises numerous arguments related to his convictions and 
sentences which we will address in turn. 
III. 
THE FAILURE TO INCLUDE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE INDICTMENT 
After careful study of the parties' briefs with regard to the issue of the failure to include the aggravating 
circumstances in the indictment, we are persuaded that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals on this issue should 
be affirmed. Moreover, because we find that the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals, State v. Banks, 2007 WL 
1966039, at *38 adequately states the facts and the law on this issue, we adopt this portion of the opinion as the 
opinion of this Court and include it as an appendix to this opinion. 
IV. 
THE ADMISSION OF THE PHOTOGRAPH OF MR. ATILEBAWI 
After careful study of the parties' briefs with regard to the issue of the admission of the photograph of Mr. Atliebawi, 
we are 
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persuaded that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals on this issue should be affirmed. Moreover, because we find 
that the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals, State v. Banks, 2007 WL 1966039, at *14-16 adequately states the 
facts and the law on this issue, we adopt this portion of the opinion as the opinion of this Court and include it as an 
appendix to this opinion. 
v. 
THE ADMISSION OF MR. BANKS'S STATEMENTS TO THE POLICE BEFORE RULING ON HIS MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
After careful study of the parties' briefs with regard to the issue of Mr. Banks's suppression motion, we are 
persuaded that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals on this issue should be affirmed. Moreover, because we find 
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that the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals, State v. Banks, 2007 WL 1966039, at *16-19, adequately states the 
facts and the law on this issue, we adopt this portion of the opinion as the opinion of this Court and include it as an 
appendix to this opinion. 
VI. 
THE ADMISSION OF MR. ATILEBAWl'S STATEMENT TO OFFICER JONES AS AN EXCITED UTrERANCE 
Mr. Banks asserts that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence statements made by Mr. Atilebawi to Officer 
Jones. Mr. Banks specifically takes issue with the following testimony: 
PROSECUTOR: Officer Jones, when you asked Mr. Atilebawi what happened, what did he tell you? 
OFFICER JONES: He told me that a person that he knew as Boo asked to use his phone. As he was talking 
on the phone he was acting very suspicious. And at that time he walked out. He felt a very sharp pain to 
his head and to his shoulder and heard a couple pops and he ran back inside the house. 
PROSECUTOR: ... Who ran back inside the house? 
OFFICER JONES: The ... suspect did .... They were outside talking because he walked back outside 
with the phone. And as they ran back inside the house, he felt another--he heard another pop and he felt 
a sharp pain to his shoulder. 
Mr. Banks objected at trial that this testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay. The trial court, however, concluded 
that the testimony was admissible as an excited utterance and also stated it could possibly be admitted as a dying 
declaration.(fn12) The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the trial court did not err by admitting the statement as 
an excited utterance. Mr. Banks appeals from the Court of Criminal Appeals's conclusion. He contends that the statement 
does not fall within the excited utterance exception because (1) the statement was made in response to a question, (2) 
the statement was given several hours after Mr. Atilebawi was shot, and (3) Mr. Atilebawi was not still under the 
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stress of a startling event. We affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals's determination that the trial court did not err in 
admitting the statement as an excited utterance. 
Decisions regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence are entrusted to the trial court's discretion. Thus, 
reviewing courts will not disturb these decisions on appeal unless the trial court has abused its discretion. State v. 
Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469,490 (Tenn.2004); State v. James, 81 S.W.3d 751, 760 (Tenn.2002). Reviewing courts will 
find an abuse of discretion only when the trial court applied incorrect legal standards, reached an illogical conclusion, 
based its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employed reasoning that causes an injustice to 
the complaining party. Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346, 358 (Tenn.2008). 
Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Tenn. R. Evid. 80l(c). Hearsay evidence is inadmissible unless 
permitted by the rules of evidence or otherwise by law. Tenn. R. Evid. 802. Tennessee law recognizes numerous 
exceptions to the bar on the admission of hearsay evidence. See generally Tenn. R. Evid. 803; Tenn. R. Evid. 804. 
Despite the significant number of exceptions, "it would be a mistake to underestimate the force of the basic rule, which 
especially but by no means only in criminal trials, plainly excludes a substantial amount of otherwise relevant 
evidence."(fn13) 
Well-rooted among the myriad of exceptions to the general rule barring hearsay evidence are excited utterances. 
Excited utterances are statements "relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the 
stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." Tenn. R. Evid. 803(2). To qualify as an excited utterance, three 
criteria must be met: (1) there must be a startling event or condition that causes the stress or excitement; (2) the 
statement must relate to the startling event or condition; and (3) the statement must be made while the declarant was 
under the stress or excitement caused by the startling event or condition. State v. Gordon, 952 S.W.2d 817, 820 
000'79 
.; 11 ') 1')()()0 
Casemaker - TN - Case Law rch - Result Page 10 of 57 
(Tenn.1997); State v. Samuel, 243 S.W.3d 592, 600 (Tenn.Crim.App.2007); see also Tennessee Law of Evidence§ 8.07 
(3][b] to (3][d], at 8-75 to 8-78. 
Mr. Banks contends that Mr. Atilebawi's statements to Officer Jones cannot qualify as excited utterances because 
they were made in response to Officer Jones inquiring into what had happened. We find little merit in this argument 
because "statements made in response to questions may still be admissible if the declarant is under the excitement or 
stress of the event." State v. Gordon, 952 S.W.2d at 820-21; see also State v. Smith, 857 S.W.2d 1, 9 (Tenn.1993). 
Simply stated, "[t]he fact that a question prompted the excited answer is a circumstance relevant to stress, but it does 
not automatically bar the statement's admission" as an excited utterance. Tennessee Law of Evidence§ 8.07[3][d], at 8-
78. 
Mr. Banks also argues that the statements cannot qualify as excited utterances because they were made by Mr. 
Atilebawi to Officer Jones approximately 
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four to six hours after the startling event.(fn14) We find little merit in this argument because the "length of time 
between a startling event and the statement does not automatically preclude the statement's being admissible as an 
excited utterance." Williams v. State, No. W2006-00605-CCA-R3-PC, 2007 WL 2120174, at *7 (Tenn.Crim.App. July 24, 
2007). In fact, "[t]he time interval is material only as a circumstance bearing on the issue of continuing stress." 
Tennessee Law of Evidence§ 8.07[3][d], at 8-77. 
Finally, Mr. Banks argues that Mr. Atilebawi did not make his statement to Officer Jones while still under the stress of 
a startling event. As previously noted, if a statement is not made while the declarant is under the stress of a startling 
event, then it cannot qualify as an excited utterance. State v. Gordon, 952 S.W.2d at 820; State v. Samuel, 243 S.W.3d 
at 600; see also Tennessee Law of Evidence§ 8.07[3][d], at 8-77 to 8-78. While the statements are not per se 
inadmissible because they were made several hours after the startling event in response to Officer Jones's questions, the 
facts that they were responses to questions and that they were made several hours after the shooting are relevant 
matters for the trial court to consider in assessing whether Mr. Atilebawi remained under the stress or excitement caused 
by his being shot four times by Mr. Banks. While not an exclusive list, other relevant factors "include the nature and 
seriousness of the event or condition; the appearance, behavior, outlook, and circumstances of the declarant, including 
such characteristics as age and physical or mental condition; and the contents of the statement itself." State v. Gordon, 
952 S.W.2d at 820; State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561, 574 (Tenn.1993); Tennessee Law of Evidence§ 8.07[3][d], at 8-77. 
The trial court offered a detailed and persuasive analysis for its admission of Mr. Atilebawi's statements to Officer 
Jones as an excited utterance: 
I don't know how much more of a situation you could describe than to have been shot four or five times 
and have your Uncle in the other room shot, blood pouring out of your head and being asked who did 
this. 
I think it's still in the purview of all of the events that were transpiring, the spontaneity of it may certainly 
still be there. This is the first officer on the scene. He's going up to the guy saying what happened, who 
did this. This certainly [is an] excited utterance .... [I]f a person in good health has had 30 minutes to sit 
and ponder it, it may not be an excited utterance. But if an individual who has undergone this sort of 
traumatic event is asked by the first officer on the scene what happened, I think that the spontaneity and 
trustworthiness and reliability [are] there .... 
Although we conclude that the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule is not applicable, the trial court's 
analysis of the applicability of that exception bolsters its finding that this statement constituted an excited utterance. The 
trial court stated the following: 
[T]his guy had just been shot three times in the head. His Uncle had been shot execution style in the 
other room and he had blood gushing out of his head and he was undergoing all of this .... I 
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think the injuries were so severe ... to the brain, to the head, ... and to the skull that it's entirely 
plausible ... that this person was giving this information to a law enforcement officer, contemplating 
[the] likelihood that he may not pull through. 
Officer Jones also offered the following testimony regarding Mr. Atilebawi's condition: 
When we actually got there, he was still on the couch and kind of in a dazed, confused state. And we saw 
all the blood and immediately we went ahead and started the paramedics to get over to treat him .... He 
was just in shock and ... just very, very disoriented and trying to tell us that his Uncle was still in the 
other room .... 
The determination of whether to admit the statements made by Mr. Atilebawi to Officer Jones is a discretionary one. 
Our review is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion regarding that particular inquiry. The 
nature of the event (being shot and left for dead while having a close associate shot and killed in one's home), the 
condition of the Mr. Atilebawi (in shock and requiring urgent medical attention), and the nature of the statement 
(answering an officer's inquiry about what had happened) all strongly support the conclusion that Mr. Atilebawi was still 
under the stress caused by the startling event. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, we cannot conclude that 
the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Mr. Atilebawi's statements to Officer Jones under the excited utterance 
exception to the hearsay rule. 
VII. 
THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND THE ADMISSION OF MR. ATILEBAWI'S STATEMENTS TO OFFICER 
JONES 
Mr. Banks insists that the trial court violated his constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clauses of the state 
and federal constitutions(fn15) by admitting into evidence Mr. Atilebawi's statements to Officer Jones. Mr. Banks argues 
that the statements were testimonial and that Mr. Atilebawi was available to testify, thus the admission thereof violated 
his constitutional right of confrontation as construed in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 
L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The State responds that Mr. Banks's rights to confrontation were not violated because the 
statements were non-testimonial and because Mr. Atilebawi, the declarant, testified at trial. The Court of Criminal 
Appeals found that there was no violation of Mr. Banks's right to confront the witnesses against him. We affirm the 
determination of the Court of Criminal Appeals. 
The United States Supreme Court, interpreting the Sixth Amendment in Crawford v. Washington, noted that "when 
the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of 
his prior testimonial statements." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. at 59 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The Court added that the 
Confrontation Clause "does not bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or 
explain it." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. at 59 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Article I, section 9 of the Tennessee 
Constitution does not require a different conclusion. 
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Mr. Atilebawi was available and in fact was cross-examined by Mr. Banks "face to face." Mr. Banks was not deprived of 
his right to confront Mr. Atilebawi, and his contention otherwise is wholly without merit. 
VIII. 
THE ARABIC LANGUAGE INTERPRETER 
Mr. Banks insists that the trial court's use of a non-credentialed Arabic language interpreter violated his federal and 
state due process rights and his right to confront the witnesses against him.(fn16) Specifically, he asserts that the trial 
court erred by failing to follow the procedures for the use of non-credentialed interpreters required by Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 
42, § 3(e) and (f). Even though Mr. Banks did not object to the interpreter's qualifications at trial and failed to include 
this issue in his motion for new trial, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the trial court did not commit plain 
error with regard to the use of the Arabic language interpreter. We agree. 
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A. 
The guilt phase of the trial began on April 6, 2005, with Mr. Atilebawi as the State's first witness. Before Mr. 
Atilebawi began to testify, the following colloquy occurred between the trial court and Alladin Ghanem, the Arabic 
language interpreter: 
THE COURT: And let me ask a couple of questions of you for the record. Your name is Mr. Ghanem; 
correct? 
THE INTERPRETER: Yes. 
THE COURT: You are certified by the State of Tennessee as a translator/interpreter for court proceedings; 
is that correct? 
THE INTERPRETER: Yes. Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And specifically in Arabic language? 
THE INTERPRETER: Yes. 
THE COURT: And in a variety of dialects of the Arabic language; correct? 
THE INTERPRETER: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Including the Iraqi language and dialect and idioms and related matters? 
THE INTERPRETER: I have record here also in the state of Shelby County of doing this for over 15 years. 
Mr. Banks did not request further voir dire regarding Mr. Ghanem's qualifications, and he did not object to the use of 
Mr. Ghanem as the interpreter during the trial. In addition, Mr. Banks did not take issue with the qualifications or use of 
Mr. Ghanem in his motion for new trial. 
B. 
When a defendant raises an issue for the first time on appeal, the issue will generally be deemed waived and will be 
considered only within the limited parameters of an appellate court's discretionary plain error review. State v. Faulkner, 
154 S.W.3d 48, 58 (Tenn.2005); State v. Maddin, 192 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Tenn.Crim. App.2005); see also Tenn. R.App. P. 
3(e); Tenn. R.App. P. 36(a); Tenn. R.Crim.App. 52(b). The defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court 
that the trial court committed plain error and that the error was of sufficient magnitude that it probably changed the 
outcome of the trial. State v. Bledsoe, 226 S.W.3d 349, 354-55 (Tenn.2007). Under plain error review, 
120 
relief will only be granted when five prerequisites are met: (1) the record clearly establishes what occurred in the trial 
court, (2) a clear and unequivocal rule of law was breached, (3) a substantial right of the accused was adversely 
affected, (4) the accused did not waive the issue for tactical reasons, and (5) consideration of the error is necessary to 
do substantial justice. State v. Gomez, 239 S.W.3d 733, 737 (Tenn.2007). 
C. 
Notwithstanding Mr. Ghanem's statement that he was a certified Arabic language interpreter, Mr. Banks asserts on 
appeal that Mr. Ghanem is not a certified or registered Arabic language interpreter and asks the appellate court to take 
judicial notice of this fact. The Court of Criminal Appeals did not address this argument directly. Instead, the court 
accredited Mr. Ghanem's uncontradicted statement that he was a certified Arabic language interpreter and, therefore, 
held that the trial court was not required to comply with the requirements of Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 42, § 3(e) and (f). 
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The Administrative Office of the Courts issues photographic identification cards to interpreters who are either 
certified or registered in accordance Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 42 and also maintains a current listing of all certified and registered 
interpreters on its website.(fn17) Accordingly, in cases requiring an interpreter, it is advisable for the courts and the 
litigants to verify the interpreter's status by requesting him or her to produce the identification card or by consulting the 
Administrative Office of the Courts's website. In circumstances where an interpreter is either non-credentialed or is 
unable to demonstrate that he or she is credentialed, the court should then follow the procedures mandated by Tenn. 
Sup.Ct. R. 42, § 3(e) and (f). 
Based on the record in this case, we cannot find that the trial court erred, much less committed plain error, by failing 
to follow the procedures set forth in Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 42 § 3( e) and (f). Mr. Ghanem stated that he was certified by the 
State of Tennessee. Mr. Banks did not challenge this assertion or request further voir dire of Mr. Ghanem. The trial court 
believed that Mr. Ghanem was a certified interpreter. Accordingly, based on the information available at the time, Tenn. 
Sup.Ct. R. 42 § 3(e) and (f) were inapplicable. It would be utterly nonsensical to find that a trial court erred by failing to 
follow the procedures required for utilizing a non-credentialed interpreter when the trial court believed, without any 
objection from the defendant, that it was utilizing a certified interpreter.(fn18) 
The use an interpreter who is neither certified nor registered is not reversible error in and of itself. It may rise to the 
level of reversible error only in circumstances where a certified or registered interpreter was readily available and where 
the use of the non-credentialed interpreter undermined the fairness of the proceeding in some way. This record does not 
indicate that a certified or registered Arabic language interpreter was readily available 
121 
or that Mr. Ghanem's translation somehow undermined the fairness of the proceeding. 
It is difficult for this Court to discern whether Mr. Banks is also making the separate argument in his appellate brief 
that the trial court erred by failing to appoint a second interpreter to verify the accuracy of Mr. Ghanem's translation for 
Mr. Banks and his attorney, neither of whom speak Arabic. Nonetheless, we have considered this argument, and we 
conclude that the trial court's failure to appoint a second interpreter for this purpose was not error. While Tenn. Sup.Ct. 
R. 42, § 3(g) permits the use of multiple interpreters, the rule does not explicitly authorize the appointment of a second 
interpreter for the purpose of assessing the accuracy of the first interpreter.(fnl9) Because Mr. Banks never requested a 
second interpreter for this purpose or any other purpose, the trial court did not err, much less commit plain error, by 
failing to appoint a second interpreter to review the translation of the first interpreter. 
IX. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO INTERVIEW THE JURORS TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THEY HAD BEEN 
INFLUENCED BY A FORMER JUROR 
Mr. Banks takes issue with the trial court's handling of a juror who was excused before the jury began its 
deliberations on the penalty phase of the trial. Even though he did not raise this issue in the trial court or the Court of 
Criminal Appeals, he insists that the trial court committed plain error by not immediately removing the juror and by 
failing to question the remaining jurors to ascertain whether they had been influenced by the former juror. We have 
determined that the trial court did not commit plain error by failing to dismiss the juror immediately or by failing to 
intervie.w the jury on its own motion as to the existence of potential prejudice either after it excused the juror or after 
the jury returned its verdict. 
We reiterate that while the decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals and the Court of Appeals may require the 
parties to reframe their issues or to adjust their arguments when they seek review by this Court, litigants are not free 
simply to reserve issues until their case reaches this Court. When a defendant fails to present an issue on appeal to the 
Court of Criminal Appeals, that issue is not properly before this Court and is, instead, waived. See State v. Butler, 108 
S.W.3d 845, 854 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Hall, 8 S.W.3d 593, 596 n. 1 (Tenn.1999); State v. Buggs, 995 S.W.2d 102, 109 
(Tenn.1999). Nonetheless, we have determined that the interests of justice prompt us to address this issue to determine 
whether the trial court committed plain error by not interviewing the jury. 
A. 
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During a break in the trial on April 8, 2005, Mr. Banks's trial counsel informed the trial court that Dorothy Rooks, a 
member of the jury venire for Mr. Banks's trial who had not been seated on the jury, informed one of the defense 
investigators, a friend of Ms. Rooks, that juror William Stroud had made a disturbing comment to her about the case 
prior to the trial. According to Mr. Banks's lawyer, Ms. Rooks told the investigator that Mr. Stroud commented that he 
was "hoping that he would end up on this jury so that he could convince people to find him guilty and we'd be 
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out by the weekend." The trial court expressed concern about the comment and decided to conduct a Jury-out hearing to 
hear directly from Ms. Rooks. 
Later that day, after the State rested its case-in-chief, Ms. Rooks appeared in court and, with the jury excused, 
recounted what she had heard. Ms. Rooks stated that Mr. Stroud expressed disappointment about not having been 
selected as a juror in a different case in which she and Mr. Stroud had both been members of the jury venire. 
Specifically, Ms. Rooks recalled that Mr. Stroud stated "I was going to drive that sucker." Ms. Rooks indicated that Mr. 
Stroud appeared to be adamant, but she was not sure exactly what Mr. Stroud meant. She indicated that the other case 
was also a first degree murder case but not a capital case. Ms. Rooks stated that she became concerned when she 
learned that Mr. Stroud had been selected as a juror in Mr. Banks's case. She volunteered that "l just thought that it 
didn't seem like it was a jury of his peers. I mean, there was only one black lady there." 
After commenting on how it had been impressed with Mr. Stroud based upon his answers during voir dire and his 
attentiveness during the proceedings, the trial court asked the bailiffs whether they had observed anything that 
suggested that Mr. Stroud was interested in railroading Mr. Banks. After the bailiffs responded in the negative, the trial 
court informed the attorneys that it would need to consider how to address this matter. The trial court also stated that 
questioning Mr. Stroud about a "casual statement he made [about another case] on the sidewalk while smoking a 
cigarette" could be counterproductive. 
Later the same day, the court again addressed the matter of Mr. Stroud. The trial court stated: 
I have a little bit of concern, I have to be honest with you, that [Ms. Rooks's] greater concern might be 
the racial make-up of the jury because she let-- she made that statement under oath when she testified 
today. And I don't know why that statement would be relevant to the issue we were discussing and for 
which she came down here, unless it was really bubbling right beneath the surface and it finally came out 
when she took the stand. And that, perhaps, is the overriding reason[] for her lodging the complaint. I'm 
concerned about that. 
Nevertheless, the trial court decided the more prudent course would be to replace Mr. Stroud with an alternate juror. 
This took place when the trial court excused the other alternate jurors before the jury deliberations began. Outside the 
presence of the other jurors, the trial court explained its reasoning directly to Mr. Stroud: 
There was a Juror that was on this larger panel ... [who] overheard a remark that was attributed to you 
outside this building after the close of court or y'all had been excused [from the jury venire for a different 
trial] .... [T]he question having been raised by this juror concerning that remark and how it may affect 
your impartiality in this case was such that after agonizing over whether to remove you from the jury or 
not, I felt that just out of an abundance of caution so that no question could be raised in the event that 
the jury finds Mr. Banks guilty, that I would insert the alternate and remove you from the jury. 
Mr. Stroud was excused prior to and did not participate in the jury deliberations in this case. Essentially, he became 
the equivalent of an excused alternate juror. Mr. Banks did not request the trial court to interview the jury when it 
dismissed Mr. Stroud before deliberations started 
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and, likewise, did not request the trial court to interview the jury after it returned a guilty verdict to ascertain whether 
the verdict had been influenced by Mr. Stroud's presence. Therefore, our review of the process the trial court used to 
excuse Mr. Stroud is for plain error. 
00084 
,.., 
Casemaker - TN - Case Law rch - Result Page 15 of 57 
B. 
Mr. Banks's arguments on this issue provide neither a logically nor a legally supported basis for finding error, much 
less plain error, in the trial court's failure to immediately excuse Mr. Stroud after hearing Ms. Rooks's testimony regarding 
his comments in another, unrelated case. As far as this record shows, the trial court had no basis to be concerned about 
Mr. Stroud's presence on the jury before Mr. Banks's trial counsel expressed concern about statements he had 
purportedly made to Ms. Rooks. 
Because the report of Mr. Stroud's comments was second-hand, the trial court decided to hear directly from Ms. 
Rooks before deciding whether remedial action was warranted. When the trial court questioned Ms. Rooks, it became 
apparent that the statements attributed to Mr. Stroud did not involve Mr. Banks's case, as was originally represented, but 
rather an earlier, unrelated case in another court. Rather than excusing Mr. Stroud immediately, the trial court allowed 
the lawyers to make their final arguments and then charged the jury before it replaced Mr. Stroud with an alternate 
juror. 
We decline to find plain error with regard to the timing of Mr. Stroud being excused from the jury. The presentation 
of the evidence was essentially completed when the defense raised a concern about Mr. Stroud. After the trial court 
interviewed Ms. Rooks, the jury was alone together for only one additional brief break before the trial court completed its 
charge to the jury and replaced Mr. Stroud with an alternate juror. Accordingly, we decline to find the trial court 
committed plain error by waiting to excuse Mr. Stroud until immediately before the jury retired to deliberate. 
By the same token, we decline to find that the trial court committed plain error by not interviewing(fn20) the other 
jurors, either before they retired or following their verdict to ascertain whether they had been influenced by Mr. Stroud's 
presence on the jury. Mr. Banks did not request the trial court to interview the jurors following Ms. Rooks's testimony 
and cites no authority requiring the trial court to do so on its own motion. He has failed to demonstrate that the trial 
court's failure to interview the jurors prior to deliberations violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law or adversely 
affected one of his substantial rights. Accordingly, we decline to find that the trial court committed plain error by failing 
to interview the jurors prior to their deliberations. 
In the same vein, we decline to find that the trial court committed plain error by not interviewing the jurors following 
the verdict to determine whether they had been improperly influenced by Mr. Stroud. Defendants in criminal cases have 
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a statutory right to have the jury polled upon request. Tenn.Code Ann.§ 20-9-508 (1994). However, they waive this 
right if they fail to make a timely request that the jury be polled. Rice v. State, 4 Tenn. Crim.App. 600, 605, 475 S.W.2d 
178, 180 (1971). Mr. Banks has failed to demonstrate that the trial court's failure to interview the jurors regarding Mr. 
Stroud after they returned their verdict violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law or adversely affected one of his 
substantial rights. 
x. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO CHARGE CERTAIN LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSES 
Mr. Banks argues that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by failing to charge certain lesser-included 
offenses. Mr. Banks requested some, but not all, of these charges at trial. The State asserts that these arguments have 
either been waived or are not meritorious. The Court of Criminal Appeals found no reversible error. We affirm that 
decision. 
A. 
Mr. Banks was indicted on four counts. He requested the trial court to charge the jury regarding forty-five lesser-
included offenses of these offenses. In addition to charging the jury regarding the four offenses for which Mr. Banks was 
indicted, the trial court charged the jury with nineteen of the forty-five requested lesser-included offense instructions. 
The jury convicted Mr. Banks of the greatest charge for each count of the four-count indictment. On appeal, Mr. Banks 
insists that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to give instructions regarding twenty-six lesser-included 
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offenses. Mr. Banks requested ten of these instructions at trial. He no longer takes issue on appeal with the trial court's 
failure to charge sixteen lesser-included offenses he requested at trial. However, for the first time on appeal, he insists 
that the trial court should have charged sixteen other lesser-included offenses that he had not requested at trial. Our 
review of the trial court's failure to charge the latter sixteen instructions is for plain error. 
Neither the State nor Mr. Banks have offered detailed legal arguments regarding whether each of the purported 
lesser-included offenses qualify as lesser-included offenses under the Burns test. Thus, we will assume for purposes of 
this opinion that the offenses enumerated by Mr. Banks meet the requirements to qualify as lesser-included offenses. 
Nevertheless, we find that the trial court did not commit reversible error by failing to charge the jury regarding the 
twenty-six lesser-included offenses referenced in Mr. Banks's brief. 
B. 
Whether a particular instruction regarding a lesser-included offense should have been given is a mixed question of 
law and fact. State v. Hatfield, 130 S.W.3d 40, 41 (Tenn.2004). We review mixed questions of law and fact de novo with 
no presumption of correctness. Carpenter v. State, 126 S.W.3d 879, 892 (Tenn. 2004). When called upon to address a 
purported failure to charge lesser-included offenses, the reviewing court considers the following three questions: (1) 
whether the offense is a lesser-included offense; (2) whether the evidence supports a lesser-included offense instruction; 
and (3) whether the failure to give the instruction is harmless error. State v. Allen, 69 S.W.3d 181, 187 (Tenn.2002). 
This Court fashioned the test for determining whether an offense is a lesser-included 
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offense in State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn.1999). 
An offense is a lesser-included offense if: 
(a) all of its statutory elements are included within the statutory elements of the offense charged; or 
(b) it fails to meet the definition in part (a) only in the respect that it contains a statutory element or 
elements establishing 
(1) a different mental state indicating a lesser kind of culpability; and/or 
(2) a less serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property or public interest; or 
( c) it consists of 
(1) facilitation of the offense charged or of an offense that otherwise meets the definition of lesser-
included offense in part (a) or (b); or 
(2) an attempt to commit the offense charged or an offense that otherwise meets the definition of lesser-
included offense in part (a) or (b); or 
(3) solicitation to commit the offense charged or an offense that otherwise meets the definition of lesser-
included offense in part (a) or (b). 
State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 466-67. Where "a lesser offense is not included in the offense charged, then an instruction 
should not be given, regardless of whether evidence supports it." State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 467. Thus, if the purported 
lesser-included offense is not actually a lesser-included offense, then the court's inquiry ends. 
If, however, "a lesser offense is included in the charged offense, the question remains whether the evidence justifies 
a jury instruction on such lesser offense." State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 467. As for the standard for assessing whether the 
evidence is sufficient to require an instruction on a lesser-included offense, Tenn. Code Ann.§ 40-18-ll0(a) (2006) 
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provides that 
the trial Judge shall not instruct the jury as to any lesser included offense unless the judge determines that 
the record contains any evidence which reasonable minds could accept as to the lesser included offense. 
In making this determination, the trial judge shall view the evidence liberally in the light most favorable to 
the existence of the lesser included offense without making any judgment on the credibility of evidence. 
The trial judge shall also determine whether the evidence, viewed in this light, is legally sufficient to 
support a conviction for the lesser included offense. 
As a general matter, evidence that is sufficient "to warrant an instruction on the greater offense also will support an 
instruction on a lesser offense under Part (a) of the Bums test." State v. Allen, 69 S.W.3d at 188. 
In subsequent decisions, this Court has narrowed the application of Part (c) of the Bums test by clarifying that 
instructions are unnecessary where the evidence clearly establishes completion of the criminal act(fn21) or simply does 
not involve proof of solicitation or facilitation. State v. Wilson, 211 S.W.3d 714, 721 n. 2 (2007); State v. Robinson, 146 
S.W.3d at 487 n. 7; see also State v. Marcum, 109 S.W.3d 300, 303-04 (Tenn.2003); State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710, 719 
(Tenn.2001). This result follows because for the "lesser offenses under part (c), proof of the greater offense will not 
necessarily prove the lesser offense." State v. Allen, 69 S.W.3d at 188. 
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The failure to give an instruction on an offense that is, in fact, a lesser-included offense and is supported by the 
evidence is a non-structural constitutional error. State v. Page, 184 S.W.3d 223, 230 (Tenn.2006). When such a failure 
occurs, a new trial must be granted unless the reviewing court determines that error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d at 379; see also State v. Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d 361, 371 (Tenn.2008). When 
undertaking a harmless error analysis in this context, the reviewing court "should conduct a thorough examination of the 
record, including the evidence presented at trial, the defendant's theory of defense, and the verdict returned by the 
jury." State v. Allen, 69 S.W.3d at 191. 
There are two approaches for demonstrating that a failure to give an instruction on a lesser-included offense is 
harmless error. State v. Locke, 90 S.W.3d 663,675 (Tenn.2002). The first approach is implicated where the trial court 
instructs the jury as to the charged offense as well as other lesser-included offenses thereof but does not instruct the 
jury regarding all of the lesser-included offenses supported by the evidence. When the jury convicts the defendant of the 
greater charged offense rather than the lesser-included offense or offenses, the jury necessarily rejects all of the other 
lesser offenses. State v. Locke, 90 S.W.3d at 672; State v. Allen, 69 S.W.3d at 191; State v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101, 
106 (Tenn. 1998). Where one of the charged but rejected lesser-included offenses is an intermediate or buffer offense 
standing between the errantly omitted lesser-included offense and the offense for which the defendant was convicted, 
the charging error is shown to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Locke, 90 S.W.3d at 675; State v. Allen, 
69 S.W.3d at 190. 
The second approach requires the reviewing court to consider the evidence and then to decide "whether a 
reasonable jury would have convicted the defendant of the lesser-included offense instead of the charged offense." State 
v. Richmond, 90 S.W.3d 648, 662 (Tenn.2002) (emphasis in original). If no reasonable jury would have convicted the 
defendant of the uncharged lesser-included offense rather than the offense for which the defendant was convicted, then 
the failure to charge is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Locke, 90 S.W.3d at 675. 
For all trials conducted on or after January 1, 2002,(fn22) the defendant must file a written request for an instruction 
on a lesser-included offense as a prerequisite to taking issue on appeal with the failure to give an instruction on the 
offense. Failure to request in writing an instruction on a lesser-included offense results in a waiver of a right to take issue 
on appeal with the omission of the charge. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-18-ll0(c). 
However, because defendants have a constitutional right to a correct and complete charge of the law applicable to 
their case,(fn23) a reviewing court may review the instructions to determine whether the trial court committed plain error 
by failing to instruct on a lesser-included offense, even if an instruction on the offense was not requested in writing. 
State v. Wilson, 211 S.W.3d at 720-21; State v. Page, 184 S.W.3d at 230-31. Under plain error review, relief will be 
granted only where five prerequisites are met: (1) the record clearly establishes what occurred in the trial court; (2) a 
clear and unequivocal rule 
00087 
htt ns: 1 ldcmo.lawritcr.net/states/TN/books!Case I.aw/result')ni ,m ht~r='J , 11 1 n nno 
Casemaker - TN - Case Law ch - Result Pagel8of57 
127 
of law was breached; (3) a substantial right of the accused was adversely affected; ( 4) the accused did not waive the 
issue for tactical reasons; and (5) consideration of the error is necessary to do substantial justice. State v. Gomez, 239 
S.W.3d at 737. Furthermore, on a review for plain error, the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate 
court that the error was of sufficient magnitude that its commission probably changed the outcome of the trial. State v. 
Bledsoe, 226 S.W.3d at 354-55. To rise to the level of plain error, "[a]n error would have to [be] especially egregious in 
nature, striking at the very heart of the fairness of the judicial proceeding." State v. Page, 184 S.W.3d at 231. 
c. 
The Attempt or Solicitation Offenses 
Mr. Banks contends that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to charge ten attempt or solicitation 
offenses as lesser-included offenses of premeditated first degree murder, first degree murder in the perpetration of a 
robbery, and especially aggravated robbery. With regard to his first degree premeditated murder conviction, Mr. Banks 
asserts that the jury should have been instructed regarding attempted first degree murder, attempted second degree 
murder, and attempted voluntary manslaughter. As to his first degree murder in the perpetration of a robbery conviction, 
Mr. Banks claims error in failing to charge the "requisite attempt offenses." In relation to his especially aggravated 
robbery conviction, Mr. Banks argues that the trial court should have charged the jury as to solicitation to commit 
attempted especially aggravated robbery, solicitation to commit attempted aggravated robbery, solicitation to commit 
attempted robbery, attempted especially aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, and attempted robbery. He 
requested instructions for three of these ten offenses: attempted especially aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated 
robbery, and attempted robbery. Our review of the remaining seven attempt/solicitation charges will be limited to a 
review for plain error. 
In our post-Burns decisions, this Court has narrowed the circumstances when it is error to not charge attempt, 
solicitation, and facilitation offenses which qualify as lesser-included offenses under Part (c) of the Burns test. With 
regard to attempt and solicitation,(fn24) both of which are inchoate offenses, where the evidence clearly establishes the 
completion of the crime, it is unnecessary for the trial court to charge the jury as to attempt or solicitation. State v. 
Robinson, 146 S.W.3d at 487 n. 7 (noting that "instructions are not required on either solicitation or attempt where the 
evidence clearly establishes completion of the charged offense"); see also State v. Wilson, 211 S.W.3d at 721 n. 2; State 
v. Marcum, 109 S.W.3d at 303-04; State v. EIY, 48 S.W.3d at 719. 
The State presented evidence that clearly established the completion of all four of the charged offenses. Mr. AI-Maily 
was dead. Mr. Atilebawi sustained serious bodily injuries. Messrs. AI-Maily's and Atilebawi's property was taken. Mr. 
Banks neither presented evidence nor elicited testimony on cross-examination suggesting the applicability of attempt or 
solicitation to the premeditated first degree 
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murder, first degree murder in the perpetration of a robbery, or especially aggravated robbery counts. In other words, 
the evidence did not involve crimes that were attempted or solicited but were not completed. Accordingly, we find no 
error, much less plain error, in the trial court's failure to give the ten attempt and solicitation charges referenced by Mr. 
Banks on appeal as lesser-included offenses of premeditated first degree murder, first degree murder in the perpetration 
of a robbery, and especially aggravated robbery, respectively. 
D. 
The Omission of Lesser-Included Offenses Rendered Harmless by the Conviction of the Greater Offense 
Mr. Banks also contends that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to charge the jury regarding (1) 
criminally negligent homicide and reckless endangerment, (2) facilitation to commit second degree murder, reckless 
homicide, and criminally negligent homicide as well as reckless endangerment and criminally negligent homicide, (3) 
aggravated assault, facilitation of aggravated assault, attempted aggravated assault, assault, and reckless 
endangerment, and (4) theft, as lesser-included offenses of first degree premeditated murder, first degree murder in the 
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perpetration of a robbery, criminal attempt to commit first degree murder, or especially aggravated assault. Mr. Banks 
requested instructions regarding six of these thirteen offenses. Specifically, he requested the trial court to instruct the 
jury regarding criminally negligent homicide and reckless endangerment with regard to the first degree premeditated 
murder count, facilitation to commit second degree murder and criminally negligent homicide in relation to the first 
degree murder in the perpetration of a robbery count, reckless endangerment with regard to the criminal attempt to 
commit first degree murder count, and the~ as a lesser-included offense of especially aggravated assault. Because Mr. 
Banks did not request the trial court to charge the other lesser-included offenses, our review regarding these offenses 
will be for plain error. 
For each of the four counts charged in the indictment, the trial court charged the jury with lesser-included offenses 
including intermediate offenses, buffer offenses standing between the charge Mr. Banks asserts the trial court erred by 
failing to instruct the jury upon and the charge for which Mr. Banks was convicted.(fn25) Accordingly, any potential error 
in failing to charge the eleven above-referenced lesser-included offenses was shown to be harmless error beyond a 
reasonable doubt through the jury's finding that Mr. Banks was guilty of the greater offense and rejection 
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of the intermediate lesser-included offenses. State v. Locke, 90 S.W.3d at 675; State v. Allen, 69 S.W.3d at 190; State v. 
Williams, 977 S.W.2d at 106. 
E. 
The Omission of Lesser-Included Offenses For Which No Reasonable Jury Would Have Convicted Mr. Banks 
Mr. Banks also contends that the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury regarding voluntary manslaughter and 
facilitation to commit voluntary manslaughter as lesser-included offenses of first degree murder in the perpetration of a 
robbery. He did not request either instruction. Thus, our review of the failure to charge these offenses is limited to plain 
error review. 
Mr. Banks bears the burden of demonstrating the failure to give the voluntary manslaughter and facilitation to 
commit voluntary manslaughter charges was an error of sufficient magnitude that it probably changed the outcome of 
trial. State v. Bledsoe, 226 S.W.3d at 354-55. He has not carried this burden, and, in fact, the record demonstrates 
conclusively that these instructions would have been of no consequence. 
The trial court charged the jury regarding the lesser-included offense charges of voluntary manslaughter and 
facilitation of voluntary manslaughter in connection with the premeditated first degree murder count. The jury rejected 
these lesser-included offenses in favor of finding Mr. Banks guilty of premeditated first degree murder. Thus, the jury 
concluded that Mr. Banks was "sufficiently free from excitement and passion as to be capable of premeditation,"(fn26) 
when he shot Mr. AI-Maily rather than acting with "adequate provocation sufficient to lead a reasonable person to act in 
an irrational manner. "(fn27) Accordingly, the trial court did not commit plain error in failing to instruct the jury as to 
voluntary manslaughter and facilitation to commit voluntary manslaughter as lesser-included offenses of first degree 
murder in the perpetration of a robbery. 
Finally, Mr. Banks argues that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury regarding aggravated assault as a 
lesser-included offense of especially aggravated robbery. He requested this instruction. Therefore, our review assesses 
whether a reasonable jury would have convicted Mr. Banks of aggravated assault instead of especially aggravated 
robbery. On this question, the State bears the burden of demonstrating that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
The trial court instructed the jury regarding several underlying offenses related to robbery which the jury rejected in 
favor of the greater charge, especially aggravated robbery. The variation between these lesser-included offenses, the 
offense for which Mr. Banks was convicted, and the offense to which Mr. Banks assigns error in the trial court's failure to 
charge the jury is the robbery component. Robbery, under Tennessee law, "is the intentional or knowing the~· of 
property from the person of another by violence or putting the person in fear." Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-13-401(a) (1997). 
Based on the overwhelming evidence of Mr. Banks's deprivation of Mr. Atilebawi of his property through violence 
including Mr. Atilebawi's testimony, both of Mr. Banks's confessions, the police recovering Mr. Atilebawi's property in Mr. 
Banks's possession, and the absence of countervailing evidence, we 
00089 
httns: 11ckmn. L1 \\Ti t,•r n,'T '.:t-1 t,~,_1Tl\l 'h"" L- ·r'.'"··· r ,, " -·- .... · 1.-) ..... · ·• 1- •• - " 
Casemaker - TN - Case Law ch - Result Page 20 of 57 
130 
conclude that no reasonable jury would have found Mr. Banks guilty of aggravated assault rather than especially 
aggravated robbery. Accordingly, we conclude that any error in failing to charge this lesser-included offense was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
XI. 
THE JURY INSTRUCTION WITH REGARD TO VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE 
After careful study of the parties' briefs with regard to the issue of the coercive effect of the instruction regarding 
the consideration of victim impact evidence, we are persuaded that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals on this 
issue should be affirmed. Moreover, because we find that the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals, State v. Banks, 
2007 WL 1966039, at *38-40 adequately states the facts and the law on this issue, we adopt this portion of the opinion 
as the opinion of this Court and include it as an appendix to this opinion. 
XII. 
THE PROSECUTORS' CLOSING ARGUMENTS DURING THE GUILT PHASE OF THE TRIAL 
Mr. Banks claims that the prosecutors made six statements during their closing arguments that require a reversal of 
his convictions. The State responds that Mr. Banks did not object to several of these statements during trial and that Mr. 
Banks did not mention any of these statements in his motion for new trial.(fn28) The Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed 
each of these statements and determined either (1) that they were not error, (2) that the trial court gave appropriate 
curative instructions, or (3) that the instruction was not so prejudicial as to require reversal of the conviction. 
A. 
Closing arguments have special importance in the adversarial process. Their purpose is to sharpen and to clarify the 
issues that must be resolved in a criminal case. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 45 L.Ed.2d 593 
(1975). They accomplish this purpose by enabling the opposing lawyers to present their theory of the case and to point 
out the strengths and weaknesses in the evidence to the jury. Christian v. State, 555 S.W.2d 863,866 (Tenn.1977); 11 
David L. Raybin, Tennessee Practice: Criminal Practice and Procedure§ 29.01, at 72 (1985) (" Tennessee Criminal 
Practice and Procedure'). Thus, both the State and the defendant have an ancient right(fn29) to make closing 
arguments. SeeTenn. R.Crim. P. 29. 
The lawyers representing the defendant and the State in a criminal trial are expected to be zealous advocates. 
Burlison v. State, 501 S.W.2d 801, 806 (Tenn.1973) (noting that "the State is entitled to advocacy, as well as the 
defendant"). Their closing arguments provide 
131 
them with an opportunity to persuade the jury, Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure§ 29.2, at 73, and thus they 
should be given great latitude in both the style and the substance of their arguments. Post v. State, 580 S.W.2d 801, 
808 (Tenn.Crim.App.1978); 6 Wayne R. Lafave et al. Criminal Procedure§ 24.7(b), at 456 (3d ed. 2007) ("Criminal 
Procedure'). Closing arguments in criminal cases have a "rough and tumble quality" about them, State v. Skakel, 276 
Conn. 633, 888 A.2d 985, 1060-61 (2006), because they are traditionally the one place in the trial where the lawyers are 
given the greatest leeway in their manner of expression. Criminal Procedure§ 24.7(b), at 456-57. 
Prosecutors are expected to pursue their cases with thoroughness and vigor within the bounds of the law and 
professional conduct. State v. Culbreath, 30 S.W.3d 309, 314 (Tenn.2OOO); Judge v. State, 539 S.W.2d 340, 344 
(Tenn.Crim. App.1976). While the interests of the State are their paramount concern, their actions must be tempered by 
their impartial search for justice and their obligation to see to it that the defendant receives a fair trial. State v. White, 
114 S.W.3d 469, 477 (Tenn.2OO3); Burlison v. State, 501 S.W.2d at 806; Watkins v. State, 140 Tenn. 1, 5, 203 S.W. 
344,345 (1918). In the words of Justice Sutherland, while prosecutors "may strike hard blows, ... [they are] not at 
liberty to strike foul ones." Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). 
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A prosecutor's closing arguments have great weight on jurors. Knight v. State, 190 Tenn. 326, 332, 229 S.W.2d 501, 
503 (1950); Turner v. State, 72 Tenn. 206, 210 (1879). Accordingly, a prosecutor's closing argument must be temperate, 
must be based on the evidence introduced at trial, and must be pertinent to the issues in the case. State v. 
Middlebrooks, 995 S.W.2d 550,557 (Tenn.1999); Russell v. State, 532 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Tenn.1976). However, even 
though the scope and tenor of their arguments may be limited, State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361, 413 (Tenn.2OO5) 
(appendix), prosecutors, no less than defense counsel, may use colorful and forceful language in their closing 
arguments, as long as they do not stray from the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence, United States v. Mullins, 446 F.3d 750, 759 (8th Cir.2OO6), or make derogatory remarks or appeal to the 
jurors' prejudices, State v. Reid, 164 S.W.3d at 320-21. 
A criminal conviction should not be lightly overturned solely on the basis of the prosecutor's closing argument. 
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11-13, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985); State v. Bane, 57 S.W.3d 411, 425 
(Tenn.2OO1) (holding that a prosecutor's improper closing argument does not automatically warrant reversal). An 
improper closing argument will not constitute reversible error unless it is so inflammatory or improper that if affected the 
outcome of the trial to the defendant's prejudice. State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d 208, 244 (Tenn.2OO5) (appendix); State 
v. Cribbs, 967 S.W.2d 773, 786 (Tenn. 1998); see also State v. Reid, 164 S.W.3d at 321. When called upon to review the 
propriety of a prosecutor's closing argument, the court should consider: (1) the conduct at issue in light of the facts and 
circumstances of the case, (2) the curative measures undertaken by the trial court and the prosecution, (3) the intent of 
the prosecutor in making the improper argument, (4) the cumulative effect of the improper argument and any other 
errors in the record, and (5) the relative strengths and weaknesses of the case. State v. Reid, 164 S.W.3d at 321; State 
v. Middlebrooks, 995 S.W.2d at 559-60; see 
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also Tennessee Criminal Practice and Procedure§ 29.61, at 112. 
Trial courts have significant discretion to control closing arguments. State v. Stephenson, 195 S.W.3d 574, 603 
(Tenn.2OO6) (appendix); Terry v. State, 46 S.W.3d 147, 156 (Tenn.2OO1). Ordinarily, counsel must object 
contemporaneously to a perceived improper argument. State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d at 413 (appendix); State v. Keen, 
926 S.W.2d 727, 736 (Tenn. 1994). However, when flagrantly improper arguments are made, the trial court, with or 
without objection, should step in and take proper curative action. Watkins v. State, 140 Tenn. at 9, 203 S.W. at 346 
(holding that the trial court should have given a "stern rebuke" "promptly and voluntarily" to a prosecutor who made a 
grossly improper argument); Turner v. State, 72 Tenn. at 210; Sparks v. State, 563 S.W.2d 564, 569 
(Tenn.Crim.App.1978). Some arguments may be so exceptionally flagrant that they constitute plain error and provide 
grounds for reversal even if they were not objected to. State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d at 283-84.(fn3O) 
B. 
The Prosecutor's Argument Regarding the Jury's Role with Regard to Mitigating Circumstances 
The first statement challenged by Mr. Banks relates to the jury's role with regard to mitigating circumstances. The 
prosecutor argued the following to the jury: 
[Y]ou're going to get a whole list of 17 or 18 of them [(mitigating circumstances)], a whole slew of them. 
But the Court is not telling you that any of those are mitigating circumstances. The Court can't do that 
because that's your job. That's your function. And you get to decide whether any of these 17 or 18 
decisions are mitigating circumstances. 
Mr. Banks objected to this statement and requested a curative instruction. During a bench conference, the trial court 
explained that this statement was incorrect and permitted the prosecutor to correct her own error. Following the bench 
conference, the prosecutor argued to the jury that: 
In a few moments, the Court will present you with a list of things that are labeled · mitigating 
circumstances.' And it is up to you to accept or reject which ones apply in this case, if any. And after you 
determine whether any of these are to be considered, during your determination you also have to assess 
the weight to give each and every single one of these mitigating circumstances, if any. 
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Mr. Banks did not object to this description of the jury's role with regard to mitigating circumstances. 
Following the closing arguments, the trial court gave the following instruction with regard to assessing mitigating 
circumstances as part of its general instructions: 
Mitigating circumstances. Tennessee law provides that in arriving at the punishment, the jury shall 
consider as previously indicated any mitigating circumstances raised by the evidence which shall include 
but are not limited to the following: ... [O]ne, the defendant has 
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no significant history of prior criminal activity. Convictions for the crimes of aggravated assault, 
aggravated burglary, domestic violence assault, and attempted aggravated burglary are not aggravating 
circumstances to be considered in determining the penalty but a conviction of that crime may be 
considered ... in determining whether or not the defendant has a significant history of prior criminal 
activity. 
Two, the youth of the defendant at the time of the crime. 
Three, the defendant was an accomplice in the murder committed by another person and the defendant's 
conduct was relatively minor. 
Four, the defendant is HIV positive and as a result of his illness, the defendant has attempted to take his 
own life. 
Five, the defendant has held several jobs in spite of his illness. 
Six, the defendant transferred from school to school and was unable to maintain friendships established at 
school and did not complete high school. 
Seven, the defendant was one of ten children and he received only limited support from his mother and 
father. 
Eight, the defendant's family moved around from place to place and were never really together. 
Additionally, some of the children were removed from the home. 
Nine, the defendant's two younger sisters were raped. 
Ten, the defendant's mother is currently incarcerated and has been incarcerated for the majority of the 
defendant's life. In addition, the defendant's brother Robert Hill was incarcerated during a majority of the 
defendant's life. 
Eleven, ... the defendant was the youngest of seven brothers and the brothers beat the defendant and 
picked on him to the point that others had to intervene. 
Twelve, despite lack of family support, the defendant was an active member of Leewood Church and 
participated in the youth activities. 
Thirteen, the defendant cared for his pets, tried to improve his domestic skills by learning to cook and has 
a talent for drawing. 
Fourteen, the defendant has been a good inmate. 
Fifteen, while incarcerated the defendant has completed numerous programs aimed at rehabilitation. 
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Sixteen, the defendant has touched the lives of others in a positive way. 
Seventeen, both the defendant's family and friends from church will continue to keep in contact wrth the 
defendant and support him while he is incarcerated. 
And [eighteen], any other mitigating factor which is raised by the evidence produced either by the 
prosecution or the defense at either the guilt or the sentencing hearing. That is, you shall consider any 
aspect of defendant's character or record or any aspect of the circumstances of the offense favorable to 
the defendant which is supported by the evidence. 
No distinction shall be made between mitigating circumstances listed and those otherwise raised by the 
evidence. The defendant does not have the burden of proving mitigating circumstances. There is no 
requirement of jury unanimity as to any particular mitigating circumstance or that you agree on the same 
mitigating circumstance. 
Tennessee law provides that the jury shall consider any mitigating circumstances which may include, but are not 
limited to, those specified in Tenn.Code 
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Ann. § 39-13-204(j) (2006 ). While the jury must consider these circumstances, the ultimate determination of whether 
"mitigating evidence exists and the weight to be given to aggravating and mitigating circumstances are issues for the 
jury." State v. Morris, 24 S.W.3d 788, 799 (Tenn. 2000); see also, e.g., State v. Pike, 978 S.W.2d 904, 918 (Tenn.1998); 
State v. Mann, 959 S.W.2d 503, 512 (Tenn.1997). 
In accordance with the catch-all provision in Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204U)(9), the defendant may identify any 
other mitigation raised by the evidence as a mitigating circumstance. However, the jury is then free to determine 
whether the suggested circumstance is applicable to the case and the weight that should be given to that particular 
circumstance. For example, Mr. Banks asserted that the fact that he can cook should be considered as a mitigating 
circumstance. Accordingly, the trial court instructed the jury that Mr. Banks offered his ability to cook as a mitigating 
circumstance and that they were required to consider it. However, the jury remained free to determine whether, in fact, 
Mr. Banks had learned to cook and, if so, whether being able to cook has any particular mitigation value. 
We have found statements similar to the prosecutor's original statement in this case to fall within the realm of 
permissible forms of argument. State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75, 85 (Tenn.1994) (declining to find that arguing that 
"there were no mitigating statements in the case" was reversible error). In addition, the prosecutor immediately 
corrected her statement, and the trial court gave the jury a complete and proper instruction regarding its role when 
considering the mitigating evidence. Juries are presumed to follow the trial court's instructions. State v. Young, 196 
S.W.3d 85, 111 (Tenn.2006); State v. Shaw, 37 S.W.3d 900, 904 (Tenn. 2001). With the trial court's instructions 
requiring the jury to consider the mitigating circumstances, there is no basis to conclude that the prosecutor's original 
statement rises to level of being reversible error. 
c. 
The Prosecutor's Reference to a Prior Conviction for Theft of Property 
In her argument challenging Mr. Banks's assertion that he had no significant criminal history, the prosecutor 
mentioned an incident involving a theft of property that occurred when Mr. Banks was a juvenile. Mr. Banks objected, 
and during a bench conference, the trial court instructed the prosecutor to explain to the jury that it could not consider 
this incident. Following the bench conference, the prosecutor stated to the jury: 
I apologize. I mis[- ]spoke. The theft of property that you heard about was one that wasn't sustained or 
handled non-judicially, which means it did not stay on the defendant's criminal background. 
Without further objection by Mr. Banks, the prosecutor detailed other criminal offenses committed by Mr. Banks, 
including aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, criminal attempt to commit aggravated burglary, and domestic 
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assault. 
Mr. Banks insists that the prosecutor's correction of her improper statement regarding the juvenile theft of property 
offense did not cure the error. We disagree. The trial court did not list the juvenile theft conviction among the offenses 
that the jury could consider in ascertaining the applicability and weight of the claimed mitigating circumstance that Mr. 
Banks did not have a significant criminal history. In light of the number of and seriousness of the other offenses that Mr. 
Banks had committed, as well as the fact that the trial 
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court did not include the juvenile theft offense among those that the jury could consider, we decline to find that the 
prosecutor's original erroneous statement requires a reversal of Mr. Banks's conviction. 
D. 
The Prosecutor's Reference to Giving Weight to Other Mitigating Circumstances 
Mr. Banks also argues that the prosecutor committed reversible error when she argued: 
[W]hen you look at those mitigating circumstances and when you think about whether or not to give 
them any weight, I want you to each ask yourself if I give this one weight, what else do I have to give 
weight? If I give weight to the fact that he's HIV [positive], what else do I give weight to those that have 
cancer and other diseases and tumors and high blood pressure? That's what I want you to ask yourself. 
Even though he did not object to this argument or include it in his motion for new trial, Mr. Banks now insists that 
this argument "violated ... [his] state and federal constitutional rights to due process, to a fair jury trial and protections 
against cruel and unusual punishment." We will review this issue using the plain error analysis. 
The State is permitted to argue that mitigating circumstances(fn31) are not applicable based upon the evidence or 
that a circumstance is of little or no weight in terms of actual mitigation value. See, e.g., State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 
170 (Tenn. 1998); State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d at 85; State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 258 (Tenn. 1993). The State's 
argument here is neither inflammatory nor improper, thus we find no error, much less plain error. 
E. 
The Prosecutor's Reference to Mitigating Circumstances as Special Treatment 
Mr. Banks contends that his constitutional rights were also violated by the prosecutor's argument that application of 
the mitigating factors would give the defendant special treatment. The prosecutor stated the following: 
It's sad but with your everyday common lifetime experiences, you know that it is common for some kids 
to pick on others, especially in sibling situations. Does it set him apart from any other defendant who 
commits murder? Does it make him special? Does it make him different? Because a mitigating 
circumstance, ladies and gentlemen, is one that sets it apart, something that makes this offense 
something that deserves this defendant--this defendant deserved to be treated differently than everybody 
else, special consideration. 
Mr. Banks objected to this statement on the ground that the prosecutor was suggesting that consideration of 
mitigating factors constituted special treatment. The trial court responded as follows: 
[I]t's not so much that he's going to be given special treatment. He's going to be treated like anybody 
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I'll simply state that you should--since you do have your argument yet to come, that you should respond 
to it in your argument. That would be a better course. 
The prosecutor then continued with her argument by stating: 
So whether you've been bullied or picked on, you didn't hear any proof of torture. You didn't hear any 
proof that he had to go a hospital. You didn't hear any proof that it was anything outside the norm of 
anybody else's childhood growing up experiences. So do you set that apart? Is that anything different 
from what anybody else has had to endure? Is it anything different than what any of you have had to 
endure? Does it justify or excuse or should it be given less culpability for execution because you had that 
lifetime childhood experience? 
The prosecutor's argument was not that consideration of the mitigating circumstances would afford Mr. Banks 
special treatment. Rather, the prosecutor was describing mitigating circumstances as those that render a particular 
offender less culpable than the average person. Regardless of how these arguments are characterized, they fall safely 
within the domain of legitimate argument that the jury should afford little or no weight to a particular mitigating 
circumstance asserted by Mr. Banks, specifically that Mr. Banks was picked on and beaten by his brothers. See, e.g., 
State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d at 170; State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d at 85; State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d at 258. 
F. 
The Prosecutor's Statement that the Wrong Punishment Would Negate a Guilty Verdict 
Mr. Banks also takes issue with the prosecutor's argument that the wrong punishment would negate a guilty verdict 
and insists that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to grant a mistrial. While he concedes that the trial 
court gave a curative instruction, he insists that the instruction did not remove the taint of the prosecutor's implication 
that the statutorily authorized punishments were wrong. 
During her closing argument, the prosecutor argued: 
Now we're ... wrapping up what is ... the penalty phase. And it is considerably shorter than the first 
phase or the rest of the trial. But make no mistake, it is no less important. And in fact, it's more important 
because the wrong punishment negates the proper verdict. And the wrong punishment negates a guilty 
verdict. 
Mr. Banks objected to the assertion that the verdict would be negated. The trial court responded to Mr. Banks's 
objection as follows: 
I agree .... Whatever the verdict is, whatever sentence the jury imposes, whichever one of the three 
options, that will be the proper verdict because the jury's consideration and ultimate decision is the proper 
decision .... It will not negate what they've done thus far. So I do think that went beyond what is 
appropriate. Would you like me to offer a curative instruction? 
The prosecutor then sought clarification of how she had erred. The trial court reiterated its explanation and indicated 
that it would provide a curative instruction. The trial court then stated to the jury the following: 
Ladies and gentlemen, let me instruct you that the last comment made by [the prosecutor] is not to be 
considered, tha_t whatever your decision is ultimately will be the right decision. And it will not in 
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any way negate the verdict you've reached or the decision you've made thus far. 
Mr. Banks offered no further objection and did not request a mistrial. 
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Juries are presumed to follow the trial court's instructions. State v. Young, 196 S.W.3d at 111; State v. Shaw, 37 
S.W.3d at 904. The trial court's curative instruction adequately remedied the potential prejudice caused by the 
prosecutor's erroneous argument. 
Mr. Banks never requested a mistrial following this comment and did not include the trial court's failure to grant a 
mistrial as one of the grounds of his motion for new trial. Accordingly, he has waived this issue. We will, nevertheless, 
review this issue using the plain error analysis. 
The decision of whether to grant or deny a mistrial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Smith, 
871 S.W.2d 667,672 (Tenn.1994). A mistrial should be declared only upon a showing of manifest necessity. State v. 
Saylor, 117 S.W.3d 239, 250 (Tenn.2003). Accordingly, a mistrial is an appropriate remedy when a trial cannot continue 
or a miscarriage of justice would result if it did. State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d at 494. An appellate court should not 
reverse a trial court's decision denying a request for a mistrial absent a clear showing that the trial court abused its 
discretion. State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d at 279. The burden of establishing the necessity of a mistrial lies with the party 
seeking it. State v. Reid, 164 S.W.3d at 342. We find no error, much less plain error in the trial court utilizing a curative 
instruction instead of declaring a mistrial. The instruction adequately addressed any concerns regarding the impact on 
the jury of the prosecutor's statement. 
G. 
The Prosecutor's Reference to Facts Not in Evidence 
In his final challenge to the prosecutor's closing arguments, Mr. Banks contends that the prosecutor committed 
reversible error by stating that Mr. AI-Maily had witnessed the robbery and had begged for his life. He did not object to 
these statements at trial, and he did not cite these statements in his motion for new trial. Accordingly, he has waived 
this issue. We will, nevertheless, review this issue using the plain error analysis. 
There is nothing improper in the prosecution's argument that Mr. AI-Maily witnessed the robbery. The evidence fully 
supports this contention. However, there is no evidence that Mr. AI-Maily begged for his life. The jury was instructed that 
the arguments of counsel are not evidence and are to be disregarded if not supported by the evidence. We presume that 
the jurors follow their instructions. State v. Young, 196 S.W.3d at 111; State v. Shaw, 37 S.W.3d at 904. Reviewed in its 
context in the prosecution's closing argument, this comment had no effect on the verdict in this case. We decline to 
conclude the prosecutor's statement rises to the level of plain error. 
XIII. 
THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
Mr. Banks challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. Tenn. R.App. P. 13(e) provides that 
"[f]indings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court or jury shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to 
support the findings by the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." When assessing whether there is sufficient 
evidence to support a criminal conviction, a jury's verdict of guilt removes the presumption 
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of innocence replacing it with a presumption of guilt. State v. Wilson, 211 S.W.3d at 718; State v. Scarborough, 201 
S.W.3d 607, 624 (Tenn.2006). Thus, a defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the evidence is insufficient to 
sustain a guilty verdict. State v. Dotson, 254 S.W.3d 378, 395 (Tenn.2008); State v. Campbell, 245 S.W.3d 331, 335 
(Tenn. 2008). 
When reviewing the evidence in a criminal case, appellate courts must afford the State the strongest legitimate view 
of the evidence as well as give the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. State v. 
McGouey, 229 S.W.3d 668,671 (Tenn.2007); State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 521 (Tenn.2007). The responsibility for 
determining the weight and credibility to be given witnesses' testimony and the responsibility to reconcile conflicts in the 
testimony are entrusted to the triers of fact. State v. Campbell, 245 S.W.3d at 335; State v. Langford, 994 S.W.2d 126, 
127 (Tenn.1999). With this framework firmly in mind, the ultimate question for an appellate court "is whether, after 
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viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 
L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); see also State v. Dotson, 254 S.W.3d at 395; State v. Campbell, 245 S.W.3d at 335; State v. Berry, 
141 S.W.3d at 564. 
A. 
The Premeditated First Degree Murder Conviction 
Mr. Banks argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for the premeditated first degree murder 
of Mr. AI-Maily. He argues that the State failed to prove that he acted with premeditation. Instead, Mr. Banks contends 
that he shot Mr. Al-Mally in "the heat of passion" and that he was not aware prior to arriving at Mr. Atilebawi's residence 
that Mr. AI-Maily would be there. Mr. Banks also argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that 
he was the shooter. The State insists that the evidence is sufficient to prove that Mr. Banks shot Mr. AI-Maily and that he 
acted with premeditation. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support Mr. Banks 
conviction for first degree premeditated murder. We concur with the determination of the Court of Criminal Appeals. 
Mr. Banks was convicted on the first count of the indictment, a charge of first degree murder for the premeditated 
killing of Mr. AI-Maily. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann.§ 39-13-202(a)(l), first degree murder includes the "premeditated 
and intentional killing of another." The Tennessee General Assembly has defined premeditation for purposes of first 
degree murder as follows: 
"[P]remeditation" is an act done after the exercise of reflection and judgment. "Premeditation" means that 
the intent to kill must have been formed prior to the act itself. It is not necessary that the purpose to kill 
pre-exist in the mind of the accused for any definite period of time. The mental state of the accused at the 
time the accused allegedly decided to kill must be carefully considered in order to determine whether the 
accused was sufficiently free from excitement and passion as to be capable of premeditation. 
Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-13-202(d). 
"Premeditation may be inferred from the manner and circumstances of the killing." Finch v. State, 226 S.W.3d 307, 
318 (Tenn.2007). Tennessee courts 
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have identified a number of factors that tend to demonstrate a homicide was premeditated. These factors include, but 
are not limited to, (1) the use of a deadly weapon to kill an unarmed victim, (2) the procurement of weapons used to 
commit a murder, (3) declarations of intent to kill the victim, (4) preparations for the concealment of a crime, (5) lack of 
provocation by the victim, (6) failure to provide aid or assistance to the victim, and (7) calmness after the killing. State v. 
Brooks 249 S.W.3d 323, 329 (Tenn.2008). 
Mr. Banks used a deadly weapon, killed an unarmed victim who gave no provocation, provided no aid or assistance 
to his victim, and was calm afterwards. Furthermore, Mr. AI-Maily had fully cooperated with Mr. Banks during the 
robbery. Instead of resisting, Mr. AI-Maily handed over three hundred dollars to Mr. Banks. He also remained in the 
bedroom lying facedown on the floor as ordered while Messrs. Banks and Hilliard stole clothing, audio speakers, and cash 
from Mr. Atilebawi's home. 
Mr. Banks took the time to search the living room and bedroom for items to steal and then to load the Jeep with 
speakers and clothes. With Mr. Al-Maily lying facedown on the floor, having fully complied with his directions, Mr. Banks 
could simply have left the premises with his ill-gotten gains. Instead, he returned to the house, walked up to a person 
whom he considered a friend who was lying on the floor, and shot him in the back of the head from close range. Viewing 
the facts in a light most favorable to the State, a reasonable jury could have easily have found beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Mr. Banks acted with premeditation when he shot Mr. AI-Maily. 
We now turn to the question of whether the State presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mr. Banks shot 
Mr. AI-Maily. We conclude that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the State, the testimony of Mr. Atilebawi, 
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the physical evidence, the fact that Mr. Banks was found driving the stolen Jeep containing the property stolen from Mr. 
Atilebawi, and Mr. Banks's confession that he shot Mr. AI-Maily provide sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Banks shot Mr. AI-Maily. 
B. 
The Murder in the Perpetration of a Robbery Conviction 
Mr. Banks also contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for murder in the perpetration of a 
robbery. He argues that any robbery that occurred was a separate and distinct event from the shooting of Mr. AI-Maily. 
Additionally, Mr. Banks argues there was no evidence that he intended to rob Mr. AI-Maily and that ownership of the 
money and the red Jeep that were found in his possession was not conclusively established. Citing State v. Smith, 24 
S.W.3d 274 (Tenn.2000), Mr. Banks also points out that a conviction cannot be founded solely on a defendant's 
confession. The State contends that it presented sufficient evidence to support the conviction. The Court of Criminal 
Appeals concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for murder in the perpetration of a robbery. 
We agree. 
Under Tennessee law, first degree murder includes "[a] killing of another committed in the perpetration of or 
attempt to perpetrate any ... robbery." Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-13-202(a)(2). Robbery, under Tennessee law, "is the 
intentional or knowing theft of property from the person of another by violence or putting the person in fear." Tenn.Code 
Ann.§ 39-13-401(a). 
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The Tennessee General Assembly has expressly provided that "[n]o culpable mental state is required for conviction 
under subdivision (a)(2) ... except the intent to commit the enumerated offenses or acts" in that subdivision. 
Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-202(b). 
It is a long-standing rule of Tennessee law that to fall within the definition of felony murder, a killing must have 
been "done in pursuance of the unlawful act, and not collateral to it. ... [In other words,] [t]he killing must have had an 
intimate relation and close connection with the felony ... and not be separate, distinct, and independent from it." State 
v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646,663 (Tenn.2006) (quoting Farmer v. State, 201 Tenn. 107, 115-16, 296 S.W.2d 879,883 
(1956)). In applying this requirement, this Court has concluded that "[t]he killing 'may precede, coincide with, or follow 
the felony and still be considered as occurring · in the perpetration of the felony offense, so long as there is a connection 
in time, place, and continuity of action."' State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d at 223 (quoting State v. Buggs, 995 S.W.2d at 
106). The defendant must have the intent to commit the underlying felony either prior to or concurrent with the act 
causing the victim's death. State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d at 223; State v. Buggs, 995 S.W.2d at 107. A defendant's 
actions immediately after the killing can provide a basis from which the jury may reasonably infer that the defendant, 
either prior to or concurrent with committing the act that caused the victim's death, had an intent to commit the 
underlying felony. State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d at 223; State v. Buggs, 995 S.W.2d at 108. 
We have long recognized that a conviction cannot be based solely on a defendant's confession and, therefore, that 
the State must present some corroborating evidence to establish the corpus delicti. State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d at 281. 
The "corpus delicti" refers to the "body of the crime--evidence that a crime was committed at the place alleged in the 
indictment." Van Zandt v. State, 218 Tenn. 187, 202, 402 S.W.2d 130, 136 (1966).(fn32) The threshold for establishing 
the corpus delicti is "low" and requires only "slight evidence," which can be met through reliance upon circumstantial 
evidence. State v. Housler, 193 S.W.3d 476, 490-91 (Tenn.2006). Thus, "[a] confession may sustain a conviction where 
there is other evidence sufficient to show the commission of the crime by someone." State v. Jones, 15 S.W.3d 880, 891 
(Tenn.Crim.App.1999) (quoting Taylor v. State, 479 S.W.2d 659, 661-62 (Tenn.Crim.App.1972)). 
After shooting Mr. Atilebawi, Mr. Banks entered Mr. Atilebawi's house and, along with Mr. Hilliard, searched through 
Mr. Atilebawi's living room and bedroom looking for items to steal. Having just shot Mr. Atilebawi and with the gun still in 
his possession, Mr. Banks took three hundred dollars in cash from Mr. AI-Maily. Messrs. Banks and Hilliard gathered 
packaged clothing, audio speakers, and cash and loaded them into the red Jeep. Mr. Banks then shot Mr. AI-Maily before 
leaving. Mr. Banks used violence and fear to rob Messrs. Atilebawi and AI-Maily. Viewing the facts in the light most 
favorable to the State, there is sufficient evidence 
00098 
~/12/7.009 
c;semaker - TN - Case Law - Result Page 29 of 57 
141 
from which a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a connection in time, place, 
and continuity of action between the shooting of Mr. AI-Maily and the robbery. 
As for ownership of the property, Mr. Atilebawi testified that Mr. Banks stole his cash, silver key rings, and his red 
Jeep. Mr. Banks confessed that he stole the cash from Messrs. Atilebawi and AI-Maily as well as audio speakers, clothing, 
and a red Jeep. He was found in possession of all of the above when arrested by the police. Viewing the facts in the light 
most favorable to the State, this evidence provides a sufficient basis from which a reasonable juror could conclude 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the property was owned by Messrs. Atilebawi and AI-Maily. 
As for Mr. Banks's argument that a confession alone is insufficient evidence upon which to convict a defendant, he is 
correct insofar as there must be some slight evidence in addition to a confession in order to establish the corpus delicti. 
In this case, the discovery of Mr. AI-Maily's dead body with a gunshot wound in the back of his head and no firearm next 
to him would adequately meet this standard by providing evidence that a homicide occurred in a manner other than by 
accident. The evidence bolstering Mr. Banks's confession, however, extends significantly beyond the discovery of the 
body with a gunshot wound--as does the evidence of his guilt in general. By way of illustration, Mr. Banks was arrested 
aijer the shootings in a vehicle stolen from Mr. Atilebawi with Mr. Atilebawi's property inside. 
c. 
The Criminal Attempt to Commit First Degree Murder Conviction 
Mr. Banks asserts that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction for criminal attempt to 
commit first degree murder. He argues that the shooting occurred following provocation during an argument regarding 
Mr. Banks having been cheated out of a large sum of money and the alleged sexual assault on his former girlfriend. He 
asserts that the evidence supports only an intent to cause bodily injury because he left the scene without "finish[ing] the 
victim off." The State argues that the evidence presented was sufficient. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that a 
reasonable jury could have found that Mr. Banks acted with premeditation and intended to kill Mr. Atilebawi. We agree. 
The Tennessee General Assembly has defined criminal attempt as follows: 
(a) A person commits criminal attempt who, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the 
offense: 
( 1) Intentionally engages in action or causes a result that would constitute an offense, if the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct were as the person believes them to be; 
(2) Acts with intent to cause a result that is an element of the offense, and believes the conduct will cause 
the result without further conduct on the person's part; or 
(3) Acts with intent to complete a course of action or cause a result that would constitute the offense, 
under the circumstances surrounding the conduct as the person believes them to be, and the conduct 
constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of the offense. 
(b) Conduct does not constitute a substantial step under subdivision (a)(3), unless the person's entire 
course of action is corroborative of the intent to commit the offense. 
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(c) It is no defense to prosecution for criminal attempt that the offense attempted was actually 
committed. 
Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-12-101. As noted above, first degree murder includes the "premeditated and intentional killing 
of another," Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(l), and premeditation for purposes of first degree murder has been defined 
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as follows: 
"[P]remeditation" is an act done after the exercise of reflection anq judgment. "Premeditation" means that 
the intent to kill must have been formed prior to the act itself. It is not necessary that the purpose to kill 
pre-exist in the mind of the accused for any definite period of time. The mental state of the accused at 
the time the accused allegedly decided to kill must be carefully considered in order to determine whether 
the accused was sufficiently free from excitement and passion as to be capable of premeditation. 
Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-13-202(d). 
The evidence establishes that several days before the murder Mr. Banks began quite deliberately plotting his 
revenge upon Mr. Atilebawi. Because the firearm that he kept in his Ford Explorer was not working, Mr. Banks obtained 
another firearm from Mr. Hilliard. Messrs. Hilliard and Banks discussed disposing of Mr. Atilebawi's dead body in the Wolf 
River. Mr. Banks shot Mr. Atilebawi four times, including twice in the head. He tried to conceal the body, but Mr. 
Atilebawi was too heavy to move. 
Mr. Banks offers no legal support for his argument that his decision to leave Mr. Atilebawi on the driveway, covered 
in blood and still bleeding from four different gunshot wounds, including two shots to his head, negates his intent to kill 
Mr. Atilebawi. Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the State, there is sufficient evidence from which a 
reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Banks acted with premeditation in shooting Mr. Atilebawi. 
D. 
The Especially Aggravated Robbery Conviction 
Finally, Mr. Banks contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove that he committed an especially 
aggravated robbery. Specifically, he takes issue with the sufficiency of the evidence that the Jeep was stolen or that the 
shooting of Mr. Atilebawi was related to robbery. Mr. Banks asserts that the robbery and the shooting were not 
connected. The State responds that the record contains ample evidence to support Mr. Banks's conviction for the 
especially aggravated robbery of Mr. Atilebawi. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the evidence presented was 
sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that the elements of especially aggravated robbery had been proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt. We agree. 
Robbery "is the intentional or knowing theft of property from the person of another by violence or putting the person 
In fear." Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-13-401(a). Especially aggravated robbery is a robbery that is "(1) [a]ccomplished with a 
deadly weapon; and (2)[w ]here the victim suffers serious bodily injury." Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-403(a). 
With regard to evidence of the Jeep belonging to Mr. Atilebawi, Mr. Atilebawi testified that Mr. Banks stole his Jeep. 
Mr. Banks admitted in both of his confessions to stealing Mr. Atilebawi's Jeep, and a neighbor of Mr. Banks testified that 
she had never seen him in a red Jeep until the morning after the shootings. 
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Mr. Banks came to Mr. Atilebaw1's house with a loaded semi-automatic pistol. He shot Mr. Atilebawi with that pistol 
four times. As a result, part of Mr. Atilebawi's brain had to be removed, and he spent a month in the hospital. Mr. 
Atilebawi suffered permanent cognitive impairments. This shooting of Mr. Atilebawi was closely connected in time, place, 
and continuity of action with the robbery. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the State, a reasonable jury 
could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Banks committed especially aggravated robbery. 
XIV. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT MR. BANKS TO CALL OFFICER MIKE BARTLETT AS A WITNESS 
DURING THE PENALTY PHASE 
Mr. Banks takes issue with the trial court's refusal to allow him to call one of its own court officers to testify during 
the penalty phase of the trial regarding his good conduct as a prisoner. Even though he concedes that he did not include 
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this perceived error in his motion for new trial or raise it before the Court of Criminal Appeals, Mr. Banks asserts that the 
denial of his request to call the court officer constituted plain error because it infringed on his right to call witnesses 
under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and violated his constitutional due process of law 
protections. We have determined that the trial court did not commit plain error by denying Mr. Banks's request to call 
one of its court officers to testify about Mr. Banks's good conduct. 
Before the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase of the trial began, the trial court announced that Officer 
Mike Bartlett, one of the four deputies assigned to safeguard and attend the jury while it was sequestered, had reported 
to him that the defense had asked him to testify as a mitigation witness. The trial court stated on the record that 
Absent extraordinary circumstances, I'm not going to allow that to happen. I don't think it's appropriate. 
I think for bailiffs who have been sworn and charged with the responsibility of guarding the jurors and 
establishing a rapport with them all week long, to then be called to testify for either side is inappropriate. 
I think there are many other jailers and law enforcement personnel that have had contact with this 
defendant over the past two and a half years and over the past week that could testify to the same thing 
that Officer Bartlett would be available to testify on. And it's almost a betrayal of the trust between the 
deputy and the Jurors to then start calling those deputies to the stand to testify . 
. . . It's just not appropriate. And so if there were some extraordinary circumstance, if some phenomenal 
event occurred, then that might be different. But if it's just to generally testify to the good conduct of the 
defendant as he came and went from the courtroom each day, no, that's not appropriate. And it would be 
cumulative and for all those reasons. 
Mr. Banks's lawyer thanked the court "for putting that on the record" but did not object or take exception to the trial 
court's decision. During the penalty phase, Mr. Banks called multiple witnesses who addressed his conduct while in jail 
pending trial including Officer Michael Conner, Officer Charlene Compton, Officer Wayman Thomas, Officer Latosha 
Nadia, and Commander Roy L. Rogers. Because Mr. Banks did not make an offer of proof regarding what Officer 
Bartlett's testimony would have been, the record contains no indication that Officer Bartlett had any additional testimony 
that would be anything 
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more than cumulative to that of the other witnesses. 
The trial court's decision not to allow the bailiff charged with safeguarding the jury to testify during the sentencing 
phase of the trial was entirely correct. In parallel circumstances this Court has previously disapproved of the practice of 
an officer who has testified in a criminal case having charge of the jury. Ellis v. State, 218 Tenn. 297, 306, 403 S.W.2d 
293, 297 (1966). We find no error, plain or otherwise, in the trial court's decision to exclude Officer Bartlett as a penalty 
phase witness. 
xv. 
THE SENTENCES FOR ATTEMPTED FIRST DEGREE MURDER AND ESPECIALLY AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
Mr. Banks challenges his consecutive twenty-five year sentences for attempted first degree murder and especially 
aggravated robbery on three grounds. First, he asserts that these sentences violate Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 
124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) and that he was entitled to a presumptive sentence in the absence of a finding 
of enhancement factors by the jury. Second, he asserts that each of these sentences was excessive. Third, he asserts 
that the trial court erred by ordering these sentences to be served consecutively. The Court of Criminal Appeals found 
each of these claims to be without merit. We agree. 
A. 
In Blakely v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment required sentences in 
criminal cases to be based on the facts either admitted by the defendant or found by the jury. Blakely v. Washington, 
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542 U.S. at 303-04. Therefore, the Court held that trial courts could not impose a sentence higher than the statutory 
maximum sentence if their decision was based on facts that were neither admitted by the defendant nor found by the 
jury. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. at 304, 124 S.Ct. 2531. However, in the remedial portion of its decision in Umted 
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-68, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), the United States concluded that judicial 
fact-finding in sentencing was permissible so long as sentencing guidelines were advisory rather than mandatory.(fn33) 
As they existed prior to 2005, Tennessee criminal sentencing statutes established a sentencing range and a 
"presumptive sentence" for each class of felonies other than capital murder.(fn34) Under the sentencing procedures 
required by these statutes, a trial court could not increase a defendant's sentence above the presumptive sentence 
unless it found that enhancement factors existed. If the trial court determined that enhancement factors existed, it then 
had the authority to increase a defendant's sentence up to the maximum sentence provided for that range.(fn35) 
The decision in Blakely v. Washington placed a constitutional cloud over the power of trial courts in Tennessee to 
sentence defendants beyond the statutory presumptive sentence based on facts not reflected in the jury's verdict. 
Accordingly, in 2005,(fn36) the Tennessee General Assembly amended the sentencing statutes to make 
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the statutory sentencing guidelines advisory and to remove the presumptive sentences for each class of felonies other 
than capital murder. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-210(c) (2006); State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 343. The removal of the 
presumptive sentences and rendering the guidelines advisory cured the Sixth Amendment defect noted in Blakely v. 
Washington using the United States v. Booker remedy and enabled Tennessee's trial courts to sentence a defendant to 
any sentence within the applicable range as long as the length of the sentence is "consistent with the purposes and 
principles of the sentencing statutes." See Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-210(d).(fn37) 
Mr. Banks knowingly exercised his right to be sentenced under the sentencing laws as amended in 2005.(fn38) As a 
result of this decision, he did not have the right to a presumptive sentence.(fn39) Accordingly, Mr. Banks's objections to 
his sentences for attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery based on Blakely v. Washington and 
his purported right to be sentenced at the presumptive sentence are without merit. 
B. 
Mr. Banks also takes issue with the length of his sentences for attempted first degree murder and especially 
aggravated robbery. He asserts (1) that these sentences are excessive, (2) that the trial court relied on enhancement 
factors that were not supported by the evidence, (3) that the trial court "erred in his treatment of the mitigating factors," 
and (4) that the trial court violated Blakely v. Washington by considering "enhancement factors [that] were not 
determined by a jury." The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the length of these sentences was not excessive. We 
agree. 
Mr. Banks has a statutory right to take issue on appeal with the length of his sentences on the ground that they are 
excessive. Tenn.Code Ann.§ 40-35-401(b)(2) (2006). When reviewing a sentence, an appellate court must review the 
record de nova and must presume that the determinations made by the court from which the appeal is taken--in this 
case the Court of Criminal Appeals--are correct. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d). We have interpreted this statutory 
standard of review to mean that an appellate court is "bound by a trial court's decision as to the length of the sentence 
imposed so long as it is imposed in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles set out in sections 
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-102 and -103 of the Sentencing Act." State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 346. Mere disagreement with how the trial court 
weighed enhancing and mitigating factors is not an adequate basis for reversing a sentence. State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 
at 345-46. 
The twenty-five year sentences imposed on Mr. Banks by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Criminal 
Appeals are the maximum sentences for convictions for attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated 
robbery. As the Court of Criminal Appeals noted, the trial court's sentencing decision with regard to Mr. Banks's 
convictions for attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery were based on the following six 
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enhancement factors: (1) Mr. Banks had a previous history of criminal convictions or criminal behavior in addition to 
those necessary to establish the appropriate range,(fn40) (2) Mr. Banks was the leader in the commission of the offense, 
(fn41) (3) the personal injuries inflicted upon and the amount of damage to property sustained by or taken from Mr. 
Atilebawi were particularly great,(fn42) (4) Mr. Banks failed to comply with the conditions of a sentence involving release 
into the community,(fn43) (5) the felony was committed while Mr. Banks was released on probation,(fn44) and (6) Mr. 
Banks abused a position of private trust.(fn45) State v. Banks, 2007 WL 1966039, at *45-46. The trial court also 
considered Mr. Banks's apparent lack of remorse and his dangerousness. 
Before the Court of Criminal Appeals, Mr. Banks took issue with the trial court's reliance on the three enhancement 
factors in Tenn.Code Ann.§ 40-35-114(2), (6), (14). He also asserted that the trial court had erred by disregarding all 
his mitigating factors solely because of his lack of remorse. The State conceded that the evidence did not support the 
trial court's reliance on the enhancement factors in Tenn.Code Ann.§ 40-35-114(6), (14)(fn46) but insisted that the 
evidence fully supported the trial court's reliance on the enhancement factor in Tenn.Code Ann.§ 40-35-114(2) and that 
the trial court had not improperly disregarded Mr. Banks's mitigating factors. 
The trial court focused its analysis on the nature and characteristics of Mr. Banks's criminal conduct in this case, the 
weight of the evidence supporting the enhancement factors, and the relative lack of weight of Mr. Banks's mitigation 
evidence. The trial court considered all of the criteria set out in Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-210(b) and then imposed a 
sentence within the applicable range. The trial court explained its reasons for imposing the sentences, and most of the 
trial court's relevant findings are adequately supported by 
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the record. See State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 346. 
The trial court's sentencing discretion was broadened when the Tennessee General Assembly enacted the 2005 
amendments to the sentencing statutes. State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 345. We have conducted a detailed, de novo 
review of the record with regard to the twenty-five year sentences Mr. Banks received for attempted first degree murder 
and especially aggravated robbery, and we have determined that the evidence supports the trial court's finding of the 
enhancement factors in Tenn.Code Ann.§ 40-35-114(1), (2), (8), and (13)(c). Accordingly, despite the trial court's 
reliance on two inapplicable enhancement factors, we, like the Court of Criminal Appeals, have concluded that the trial 
court considered and weighed all the matters that Tenn.Code Ann.§ 40-35-210 required it to consider and that the four 
remaining enhancement factors more than adequately support the trial court's discretionary decision to impose twenty-
five year sentences for these two crimes. 
C. 
In his final challenge to his non-capital sentences, Mr. Banks argues that the trial court erred by ordering these 
sentences to be served consecutively. Specifically, he insists that his criminal history after he became eighteen years old 
was not extensive enough to influence whether he should serve his non-capital sentences concurrently or consecutively. 
The Tennessee General Assembly has provided the courts with the factors to consider when determining whether 
sentences should be served concurrently or consecutively. Tenn.Code Ann.§ 40-35-115(b) (2006). A trial court may 
order multiple sentences to be served consecutively upon finding that any one of the seven factors contained in 
Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b) apply. However, if the trial court bases its decision to require sentences to be served 
consecutively on its finding that the defendant is a dangerous offender, it must make additional findings regarding the 
severity of the crimes committed and the necessity to protect the public from further criminal acts by the defendant. 
State v. Allen, 259 S.W.3d 671,689 (Tenn.2008); State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d at 524 (appendix); State v. Lane, 3 
S.W.3d 456, 460-61 (Tenn.1999). 
Although it is only necessary for the trial court to find one of the factors in Tenn.Code Ann.§ 40-35-115(b) in order 
to require Mr. Banks to serve his non-capital sentences consecutively, the trial court found that three factors were 
applicable. In accordance with Tenn.Code Ann.§ 40-35-115(b)(2), the trial court found that Mr. Banks's record of 
criminal activity was extensive, particularly for someone so young. The trial court also found, in accordance with 
Tenn.Code Ann.§ 40-35-115(b)(4), that Mr. Banks was a dangerous offender. Finally, the trial court had already 
determined that Mr. Banks had committed his crimes while on probation. See Tenn.Code Ann.§ 40-35-115(b)(6). 
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Mr. Banks argues that the trial court should not have considered his juvenile record and that he did not have a 
particularly extensive criminal record a~er his eighteenth birthday. Neither the law nor the facts support this argument. 
When determining whether sentences should run consecutively or concurrently, trial courts are not limited to considering 
the defendant's criminal activity or conduct that occurred a~er the defendant's eighteenth birthday. State v. Stockton, 
733 S.W.2d 111,112 (Tenn.Crim.App.1986); see also Tenn.Code Ann.§ 37-1-133(b) (2005) (authorizing the use of 
juvenile records 
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in the preparation of pre-sentence reports). 
Mr. Banks's presentence report and other evidence in this case provides ample evidence of his extensive criminal 
record and of his dangerousness. He has prior convictions on two counts of assault, one of which involved bodily harm. 
He has been convicted of aggravated burglary. His criminal conduct in this case demonstrates a lack of regard for human 
life and a lack of hesitation to resort to violence to commit crimes that create a high risk to human life. Based on our de 
nova review of the record, we have concluded, like the Court of Criminal Appeals, that the trial court, in accordance with 
Tenn.Code Ann.§ 40-35-115, did not err by ordering Mr. Banks to serve his sentences for attempted first degree murder 
and especially aggravated robbery consecutively. 
XVI. 
THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE REGARDING THE STATUTORY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
REQUIRED BY TENN.CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(1) (2006) 
The death penalty cannot be imposed unless the jury determines unanimously that the State has proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt one or more of the aggravating circumstances in Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i) (2006). In Mr. 
Banks's case, the jury determined that the State had proved the existence of two aggravating circumstances--Tenn. 
Code Ann.§ 39-13-204(i)(6)(fn47) and Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-13-204(i)(7).(fn48) 
In the Court of Criminal Appeals, Mr. Banks challenged the adequacy of the evidence with regard to both of these 
aggravating circumstances. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the evidence supported the jury's finding with 
regard to the aggravating circumstance in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(7) but not the aggravating circumstance in 
Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(6). However, the Court of Criminal Appeals also determined that the trial court's error in 
submitting the aggravating circumstance in Tenn. Code Ann.§ 39-13-204(i)(6) to the jury was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
In this Court, Mr. Banks asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the finding of an aggravating 
circumstance under either Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(6) or Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(7) and that the trial 
court's error with regard to the aggravating circumstance in Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(6) was not harmless. The 
State argues that the evidence supports both aggravating circumstances and, in the alternative, that the error, if any, 
with regard to the aggravating circumstance in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(6) was harmless. We have determined 
that the evidence fully supports the jury's finding with regard to both aggravating circumstances. Therefore, we reverse 
the Court of Criminal Appeals's decision that the evidence does not support the finding of an aggravating circumstance 
under Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-13-204(i)(6). 
A. 
In addressing whether the evidence is sufficient to support a jury's finding 
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of the existence of an aggravating circumstance, our standard of review is framed by taking the facts in a light most 
favorable to the State and by considering whether a rational trier of fact could have found the existence of an 
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Reid, 164 S.W.3d at 314; Terry v. State, 46 S.W.3d at 
160-61. Even if a defendant has not expressly challenged the sufficiency of an aggravating circumstance found by the 
jury, it is, nevertheless, the duty of this Court to determine whether "[t]he evidence supports the jury's finding of 
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statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances." Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-13-206(c)(l)(B); see also State v. Reid, 164 
S.W.3d at 314. 
B. 
The Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(6) Aggravating Circumstance 
The jury found unanimously that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that "[t]he murder was 
committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or 
another." Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-13-204(i)(6). This aggravating circumstance arises where one of the defendant's 
motivations for killing the victim was to avoid arrest or prosecution. State v. Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 132, 149 (Tenn.2006). 
While this aggravating orcumstance is not limited to killing of eyewitnesses or those who could identify the defendant, 
State v. Reid, 164 S.W.3d at 315, the killing of a witness to a crime because that person witnessed a crime may, 
depending on the circumstances, constitute a killing for purpose of avoiding arrest or prosecution. State v. Reid, 213 
S.W.3d 792, 818 (Tenn.2006); State v. Rollins, 188 S.W.3d 553, 572 (Tenn.2006); State v. Davis, 141 S.W.3d 600, 618-
19 (Tenn.2004). 
The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support the Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-
204(i)(6) aggravating circumstance. It reasoned as follows: 
The proof establishes that the victim, Kadhem AI-Maily, observed or overheard the shooting and robbery 
of his friend, Hussain Atilebawi. After review, it is apparent that the proof, relevant to this issue, fails to 
support application of the (i)(6) factor. We are unable to conclude that the Appellant's course of action, 
before and after the homicide of the victim, is consistent with or corroborative of the motive that he killed 
the victim to prevent his arrest. Indeed, as asserted by the Appellant, after the perpetration of the crime, 
he did not flee the area, but, rather, he remained in the community. Moreover, the Appellant made no 
effort to move his victims or to conceal evidence of the crimes. The Appellant argues that, to apply the (i) 
(6) factor in this case, without more proof, would make the factor inherent in any murder involving the 
perpetration of a robbery. We agree. The only other possible theory supporting the existence of the (i)(6) 
aggravating circumstance is the argument that, because the Appellant knew the victim, it could be 
inferred that the victim might recognize him. The evidence, however, does not support this inference 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, the evidence shows that the Appellant left a witness who could 
identify him, Atilebawi, and that he knew when he left that Atilebawi was alive. Accordingly, we conclude 
that the jury's finding of the (i)(6) aggravating factor must be vacated. 
State v. Banks, 2007 WL 1966039, at *53. We respectfully disagree with this finding. Viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the State, we have concluded 
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that the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Banks killed Mr. AI-Maily to eliminate him as a witness to 
his crimes. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals's finding that Mr. Banks "made no effort to move his victims" is not supported by the 
record. Mr. Banks confessed to attempting to move Mr. Atilebawi's body. He stated in his first confession that he "was 
scared and didn't want nobody to see [Mr. Atilebawi]." Mr. Banks also told the police that he had tried to conceal Mr. 
Atilebawi's body but that Mr. Atilebawi was too heavy to move.(fn49) In addition to his admission that he tried to conceal 
Mr. Atilebawi's body after shooting him, Mr. Banks also admitted that he and Mr. Hilliard had actually discussed throwing 
Mr. Atilebawi's body in the Wolf River to conceal their crime. This evidence is more than sufficient to enable a reasonable 
juror to conclude that Mr. Banks was planning the ways that he would conceal his crimes several days before he 
committed them and that he was intent on concealing his crimes after he arrived at Mr. Atilebawi's house. 
As evidence that he was not attempting to conceal his crimes when he killed Mr. Atilebawi, Mr. Banks points to the 
fact that Mr. Atilebawi was still alive when he left the scene. However, the facts of this case would also enable a 
reasonable juror to conclude that Mr. Banks believed that Mr. Atilebawi was either dead or dying when he left the scene. 
He had shot Mr. Atilebawi four times, twice in the head. Mr. Atilebawi was lying bleeding in his driveway. Mr. Atilebawi 
was consciously trying to avoid moving or attracting Mr. Banks's attention because he was afraid that Mr. Banks would 
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shoot him again. Mr. Banks offered no aid or assistance to Mr. Atilebawi. On these facts, a reasonable juror could easily 
conclude that Mr. Banks left Mr. Atilebawi for dead. 
Mr. Banks also points to the fact that he stayed in the neighborhood of the crime and did not attempt to flee as 
further evidence that he was not attempting to conceal what he and Mr. Hilliard had done the night before. If anything, 
this evidence would prompt a reasonable juror to conclude that Mr. Banks did not attempt to flee because he believed 
that he had killed the only two eyewitnesses to the crime. This conclusion is buttressed by Mr. Banks's own confession. 
When asked to explain his early morning spending spree alter leaving Mr. Atilebawi's house, Mr. Banks's answers 
reflected his belief that he was under no danger of being arrested because he assumed that Messrs. Atilebawi and AI-
Maily were dead or would die before they had a chance to talk with the police. When asked why he purchased new rims 
and tires for the stolen red Jeep, Mr. Banks replied that he purchased these items because he planned to keep the Jeep. 
He also volunteered that he had picked up a job application at Walgreens. 
Most importantly, however, the circumstances surrounding Mr. AI-Maily's death provide persuasive evidence 
regarding Mr. Banks's motivation for shooting him. From Mr. Banks's point of view, the only remaining witness who could 
identify him was his friend, Mr. AI-Maily. Mr. AI-Maily had handed over his money without resistance, had not interfered 
in any way with Messrs. Banks and Hilliard, and had complied with the order to lie face down on the floor of Mr. 
Atilebawi's bedroom. Alter Messrs. Banks and Hilliard loaded the stolen property in the Jeep, they could have simply left 
the scene. Instead, Mr. Banks walked back into Mr. Atilebawi's house, went into Mr. Atilebawi's bedroom, and calmly and 
deliberately shot Mr. AI-Maily 
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in the head. Mr. Banks had no personal animus toward Mr. AI-Maily. The manner in which he shot Mr. AI-Maily would 
prompt any reasonable juror to conclude that Mr. Banks shot his friend not to complete the crimes but to cover them up. 
Simply stated, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the State, a reasonable juror could have found beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Mr. Banks killed Mr. AI-Maily to eliminate a witness to his crimes. Accordingly, we reverse the 
Court of Criminal Appeals's conclusion that the Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-13-204(i)(6) aggravating circumstance was not 
sufficiently supported by the evidence. Furthermore, because the aggravating circumstance was sufficiently supported by 
the evidence, we pretermit any discussion of whether an error in charging this circumstance would have been harmless. 
C. 
The Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(7) Aggravating Circumstance 
Mr. Banks challenges the finding of the Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(7) aggravating circumstance on three fronts. 
First, he argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support the application of this aggravating 
circumstance. Second, he claims that it is impossible to determine whether this aggravating circumstance applied to his 
premeditated murder conviction or his felony murder conviction. Third, he insists that applying the aggravating factor to 
his felony murder conviction violates State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317 (Tenn.1992) because the factor is already 
inherent in any conviction for murder in the perpetration of a robbery. The Court of Criminal Appeals found Mr. Banks's 
challenge to the Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-13-204(i)(7) aggravating factor to be without merit. State v. Banks, 2007 WL 
1966039, at *55. We agree. 
We need not tarry long with Mr. Banks's claim that the record contains insufficient evidence to support the 
invocation of the Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(7) aggravating factor. The jury concluded unanimously that the State 
had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that "[t]he murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the 
defendant, while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, or was fleeing alter having 
a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, any robbery." For the reasons discussed in affirming Mr. 
Banks's conviction for first degree murder in the perpetration of a robbery and premeditated murder, we find that this 
aggravating circumstance is sufficiently supported by the evidence. 
Mr. Banks's arguments regarding the ambiguity of the application of the Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(7) 
aggravating circumstance and the violation of State v. Middlebrooks are likewise without merit. The jurors addressed one 
murder in this case--the killing of Mr. AI-Maily by Mr. Banks. The jurors were asked to determine whether the State 
proved its two asserted aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. They unanimously found that the State 
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had proved both the Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(6) aggravating circumstance and the Tenn. Code Ann.§ 39-13-204 
(i)(?) aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. It is neither rational nor conceivable that the jurors 
concluded that these facts were true as to one of the counts of Mr. Banks murdering Mr. AI-Maily but not the other. Mr. 
Banks either killed Mr. AI-Maily to avoid arrest or prosecution or he did not. He either knowingly killed Mr. AI-Maily in the 
perpetration of a robbery or he did not. 
In 1992, this Court held that Tennessee's broad definition of felony murder 
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and the duplicative language of the felony murder aggravating circumstance required it to hold that Tennessee's first 
degree murder statute, as it existed at that time, did not sufficiently narrow the class of persons eligible for the death 
penalty to comply with the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d at 
346. The Tennessee General Assembly responded to this decision in 1995 by amending the aggravating circumstance in 
Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(7) to require that the murder "was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by 
the defendant, while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit" one of the enumerated 
felonies.(fnS0) This amendment narrowed the class of offenders to whom the death penalty could be applied sufficiently 
so as to leave no State v. Middlebrooks problem even in cases where Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(7) was the only 
aggravating circumstance established and the conviction was for felony murder. State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d at 306 n. 13 
(appendix).(fn51) 
XVII. 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TENNESSEE'S DEATH PENALTY STATUTORY SCHEME 
Mr. Banks also makes nine other general arguments that Tennessee's death penalty statutes violate various 
provisions of the Constitution of the United States(fn52) and the Constitution of Tennessee.(fn53) We will address each 
of these arguments in turn. 
A. 
The Vagueness and Overbreadth of the Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-13-204(i)(6) Aggravating Circumstance 
Mr. Banks insists that the Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(6) aggravating circumstance is vague or overbroad. This 
Court has consistently recognized that this aggravating circumstance requires that a motive for the killing must have 
been avoiding, interfering with, or preventing an arrest or prosecution. See, e.g., State v. Ivy, 188 S.W.3d at 149. There 
is nothing vague or overbroad about this aggravating circumstance. 
B. 
The Duplication Between the Aggravating Circumstances in Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-13-204(i)(6) and Tenn. 
Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(7) 
Mr. Banks argues that the aggravating circumstances in Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(6) and Tenn.Code Ann. § 
39-13-204(i)(7) are unconstitutional because they 
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duplicate each other. These aggravating circumstances have the potential to overlap, particularly when a defendant kills 
a person in order to eliminate a witness to one of the enumerated felonies set forth in Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(7) 
where there exists connection in time, place, and continuity of action between the felony and the murder. 
Notwithstanding the fact that these two aggravating circumstances could conceivably apply to the same event, it 
does not necessarily follow that they are duplicates. It is not difficult to conceive of numerous factual circumstances in 
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example, a defendant who murders a witness shortly before trial or murders a witness to a crime not included among 
those enumerated in Tenn. Code Ann.§ 39-13-204(i)(7) would fall under the Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-13-204(i)(6) 
aggravating circumstance but not the Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(7) aggravating circumstance. Similarly, a 
defendant who kills a person whom he or she was robbing either because the victim refused to hand-over cash or 
because of some personal animus would fall under the Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-13-204(i)(7) aggravating circumstance but 
not the Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-13-204(i)(6) aggravating circumstance. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the 
aggravating circumstances are duplicative, Mr. Banks has failed to demonstrate or explain why this duplication would 
undermine their constitutionality. 
C. 
The Vagueness and Overbreadth of the Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5) Aggravating Circumstance 
Mr. Banks also insists that the Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5) aggravating circumstance is unconstitutionally 
vague and overbroad. However, the State never attempted to invoke this aggravating circumstance in this case, and the 
jury certainly never addressed it. Accordingly, Mr. Banks has not demonstrated that he has standing to challenge this 
aggravating circumstance. 
D. 
Tennessee's Aggravating Circumstances' Compliance with the Narrowing Requirements of the Eighth 
Amendment 
In addition to the death penalty not being applicable to any crime that does not result in death, Tennessee narrowly 
circumscribes the homicide offenses to which the death penalty is applicable. A conviction for vehicular homicide, 
aggravated vehicular homicide, assisted suicide, reckless homicide, criminally negligent homicide, voluntary 
manslaughter, or second degree murder does not render a defendant death penalty eligible. Even persons convicted of 
first degree murder cannot become death penalty eligible until a jury finds unanimously that the State had proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of one of the fifteen aggravating circumstances enumerated in Tenn.Code Ann. 
§ 39-13-204(i). 
Mr. Banks argues, despite his concession that he has no evidence to support his argument, that most homicides that 
occur in Tennessee fall within the aggravating circumstances in Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5), (6), & (7). He also 
argues that the concentration of capital cases in three aggravating factors proves that Tennessee's death penalty 
statutes fail to meaningfully narrow the class of defendants who are death penalty eligible as required by the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
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The United States Supreme Court has held that "an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of 
persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the 
defendant compared to others found guilty of murder." Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 
235 (1983). In addition to providing a public declaration of the state's policies regarding the offenses deemed to warrant 
the use of the death penalty, legislatively created guidelines can also serve to channel the discretion of jurors in 
determining whether the death penalty is appropriate in a particular case. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. at 876-78, 103 
S.Ct. 2733. Thus, they prevent the wanton and freakish imposition of the death penalty. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. at 
876, 103 S.Ct. 2 733. 
Through its statutory definition of first degree murder and its statutory enumeration of aggravating circumstances, 
the Tennessee General Assembly has narrowed the class of defendants to whom the death penalty may be applied. We 
have repeatedly found that these aggravating circumstances meet the constitutional requirements of narrowing the class 
of death penalty eligible persons and channeling juror discretion. See, e.g., State v. Bane, 57 S.W.3d at 426-27; Terry v. 
State, 46 S.W.3d at 161-62; State v. Keen, 926 S.W.2d at 742. Mr. Banks's argument has not persuaded us that this 
determination is in error. 
E. 
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Prosecutorial Discretion to Seek the Death Penalty 
Mr. Banks asserts that Tennessee's death penalty statutes are unconstitutional because they confer unlimited 
discretion upon Tennessee's district attorneys general to decide whether to seek the death penalty. He argues that the 
different values, motivations, and influences of these prosecutors, as well as an absence of clear guidelines to direct their 
decision-making process, renders Tennessee's death penalty statutes unconstitutionally arbitrary and capricious. 
While Tennessee's district attorneys general have been entrusted with broad discretion in making charging decisions, 
it would be inaccurate to characterize their discretion as entirely unfettered. The Tennessee General Assembly has 
defined the elements of the offense of first degree murder and has provided that it is the only offense for which the 
death penalty may be sought. In addition, the General Assembly has prescribed fifteen aggravating circumstances--at 
least one of which must be established beyond a reasonable doubt-- before the death penalty can be considered. When 
deciding whether to pursue the death penalty, a district attorney general must take these statutory requirements into 
account. In addition to these statutory requirements, a district attorney general may not pursue the death penalty 
without probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense. The district attorney general must also 
make sure that all charging decisions fully comply with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Umted 
States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464-65, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996). 
Tennessee's district attorneys general are elected by the voters of their districts. Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 5; 
Tenn.Code Ann.§ 8-7-102 (2002). Local control over prosecutors is a core component of the American criminal justice 
system because prosecutors reflect the values of their local communities. The fact that they are elected by the voters of 
their districts assures 
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their accountability.(fn54) Simply stated, "no one else is in a better position to make charging decisions which reflect 
community values as accurately and effectively as the prosecutor."(fn55) 
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that prosecutorial discretion provides a vehicle for 
individualized justice. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311-12, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987). District 
attorneys general are officers of the executive branch of government. Accordingly, in the absence of a violation of law, 
the courts may not interfere with the free exercise of their discretionary authority over the criminal prosecutions in their 
respective districts. State v. Gilliam, 901 S.W.2d 385,389 (Tenn.Crim.App.1995). 
The constitutionality of Tennessee's death penalty statutes is not undermined because local elected district attorneys 
general may make discretionary charging decisions with the statutory framework established by the General Assembly. 
We have repeatedly rejected the argument that such discretion raises a constitutional problem. State v. Hines, 919 
S.W.2d 573, 582 (Tenn.1995); State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d at 86; State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253,268 (Tenn.1994); 
see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 311-12, 107 S.Ct. 1756; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 
L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). Mr. Banks has not provided any argument that persuades us that these decisions are in error. 
F. 
The Allegedly Discriminatory Imposition of the Death Penalty 
Mr. Banks asserts for the first time on appeal that the death penalty in Tennessee is being imposed in a 
discriminatory manner based on race, gender, and geography. While the record contains no evidence of discrimination 
specific to his own case, Mr. Banks relies on various statistical studies to support his belated discrimination claims. We 
find that these claims came too late and that Mr. Banks's evidence proves too little. 
A defendant in a criminal proceeding who asserts an equal protection violation must prove (1) the existence of 
purposeful discrimination and (2) that this purposeful discrimination had a discriminatory effect on him or her. McCleskey 
v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 292, 107 S.Ct. 1756; see also State v. Irick, 762 S.W.2d 121, 129 (Tenn.1988). A discriminatory 
purpose "implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker . 
. . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part · because of,' not merely · in spite of,' its adverse 
effects upon an identifiable group." McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 298, 107 S.Ct. 1756 (quoting Personnel Adm'rof 
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discriminatory purpose was one of the factors that motivated the decision maker. Arlington Heights v. Metro. 
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Haus. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). 
Statistical proof may be used to prove the existence of a discriminatory purpose in limited circumstances. In rare 
cases, it can provide the sole evidence of discriminatory purpose, but to do so, it must depict a stark pattern of 
discrimination that is unexplainable on other grounds. McC/eskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 293-94, 107 S.Ct. 1756; Arlington 
Heights v. Metro. Haus. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. at 266. The United States Supreme Court has also permitted the use of 
statistical evidence to prove discriminatory intent in jury selection(fn56) and in Title VII cases.(fn57) 
However, in McC/eskey v. Kemp, the United States Supreme Court determined that two particular statistical studies 
(fn58) of murder cases in Georgia were insufficient to prove discriminatory intent in the context of decisions relating to 
the imposition of the death penalty in Georgia. The Court gave four reasons for its conclusion. First, the Court 
determined that inferences drawn from general statistics are not applicable to unique juries whose decisions rest on a 
consideration of innumerable factors that vary according to the characteristics of the defendant and the facts of the 
particular offense. McC/eskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 294, 107 S.Ct. 1756. Second, the Court pointed out that the State 
had no practical opportunity to explain any of the statistical disparities suggested by the studies. McC/eskey v. Kemp, 481 
U.S. at 296, 107 S.Ct. 1756. Third, emphasizing the essential role that discretion plays in the criminal justice process, the 
Court determined that "exceptionally clear proof' of discriminatory purpose is required before the courts will infer that 
this discretion has been abused. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 297, 107 S.Ct. 1756. Fourth, a state legislature, 
exercising its broad discretion with regard to criminal penalties, has legitimate reasons to maintain capital punishment, 
and there was no showing that the legislature maintained capital punishment because of a racially disproportionate 
impact. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 298-99, 107 S.Ct. 1756. 
1. 
Discrimination Based on Race 
Mr. Banks argues that the very same statistical study discredited in McCleskey v. Kemp and several other general 
studies(fn59) "demonstrate the existence of racial discrimination in the imposition of the sentence 
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of death" and that "Tennessee lacks any means of ensuring that discrimination does not infest the death sentencing 
process." However, he presents no evidence of improper discriminatory purpose with regard to his prosecution on the 
part of the District Attorney General, the trial court, or the jury that convicted him, and he provides no statistical 
information specifically regarding racial discrimination in connection with the imposition of the death penalty in 
Tennessee. 
In the absence of other, more direct evidence of a racially discriminatory intent, the evidence offered by Mr. Banks 
falls far short of the sort of exceptionally clear proof that would enable the courts to conclude that the actions of the 
decision-makers in his case were motivated by an improper discriminatory purpose based on Mr. Banks's race or the race 
of Mr. Banks's victim. Accordingly, we concur with the conclusion of the Court of Criminal Appeals that Mr. Banks failed 
to prove that the imposition of the death penalty in his case was the result of a racially discriminatory purpose. 
2. 
Discrimination Based on Gender 
Mr. Banks's argument regarding discrimination based on gender consists of three sentences and includes no citations 
to authority. He asserts that Tennessee must discriminate against men in the imposition of the death penalty because 
"[t]here are 92 men on death row [in Tennessee], but there are only two women." This evidence, by itself, does not 
provide the sort of exceptionally clear proof upon which to conclude that the decision-makers in Mr. Banks's case were 
motivated by an improper desire to discriminate against Mr. Banks because he is a male. The difference between the 
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number of men and the number of women on death row can readily be attributed to the fact that fewer women commit 
crimes that are death penalty eligible.(fn60) 
3. 
Discrimination Based on Location of the Offense 
Mr. Banks also insists that Tennessee's death penalty is unconstitutional because of the variance in its application 
among different counties in the State of Tennessee. He specifically notes that although only 15% of the State's 
population resides in Shelby County, 40% of the population on death row results from Shelby County prosecutions. 
Additionally, Mr. Banks asserts 
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that Shelby, Davidson, Knox, Madison, Hamilton, and Sullivan Counties, though representing only 42% of the State's 
population, are responsible for approximately 69% of the death sentences. 
Mr. Banks's argument on this point erroneously assumes that variance from a random demographic result is 
necessarily arbitrary. However, a clearer inspection of the geographic variance in the application of the death penalty in 
Tennessee suggests that Mr. Banks's statistical argument is misleading. While approximately 16% of the State's 
population resides in Shelby County,(fn61) consistently more than 30% of all the murders reported in Tennessee 
between 2001 and 2007 are committed in Shelby County.(fn62) In fact, the number of murders reported in Shelby 
County each year averaged over 35% of the murders reported in the entire State during that period. Thus, the actual 
number of murders reported in Shelby County corresponds with the 39% of death row inmates from Shelby County. 
Similarly, while only approximately 42% of the State's population resides in Davidson, Hamilton, Knox, Madison, 
Shelby, and Sullivan Counties, these counties consistently account for more than 60% of the murders reported in the 
State of Tennessee between 2001 and 2007.(fn63) They have occasionally accounted for more than 70% of the murders 
reported in Tennessee.(fn64) Mr. Banks estimates the number of death row inmates from these counties as 69%. If that 
is the case, the percentage of murders reported in these counties closely approximates the percentage of defendants on 
death row from these counties.(fn65) 
Mr. Banks's arguments based on the location of the offense fail to factor in the influence of prosecutorial discretion. 
As can be seen, they also suffer from a lack of factual support. Accordingly, Mr. Banks has failed to present sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that he received the death penalty because he was from Shelby County. To the contrary, the 
jury sentenced Mr. Banks to death because he murdered Mr. AI-Maily in the perpetration of a robbery and for the 
purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution. 
G. 
The Requirement that the Jury Agree Unanimously to a Life Verdict 
Mr. Banks argues that requiring the jury to agree unanimously upon a life verdict violates the United States Supreme 
Court's rulings in McKoy v. North Carolina, 
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494 U.S. 433, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 108 L.Ed.2d 369 (1990) and Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 
384 (1988). This Court fully addressed and rejected this argument in State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d at 87. Mr. Banks has 
not offered a persuasive argument showing that this decision was in error. 
H. 
The Pattern Jury Instruction Regarding the Jury's Determination of the Existence of a Mitigating 
Circumstance 
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Mr. Banks asserts that the Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions are inconsistent with the United States Supreme 
Court's ruling in McKay v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 108 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990) and Mills v. Maryland, 
486 U.S. 367, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988). He argues that these instructions lead jurors to believe 
erroneously that they must unanimously agree on any mitigating circumstance. While conceding that this argument was 
rejected generally in State v. Thompson, 768 S.W.2d 239, 251-52 (Tenn.1989), he insists that this case differs from 
State v. Thompson because the trial court did not give the special additional instruction that "[b]ecause different people 
may have different views about what tends to ameliorate or mitigate ... you may weigh and consider any and all 
circumstances which you feel tend to mitigate the offense or defendant in question." See State v. Thompson, 768 
S.W.2d at 251. 
In this case, the trial court instructed the jurors that "[t]he defendant does not have the burden of proving 
mitigating circumstances. There is no requirement of jury unanimity as to any particular mitigating circumstance or that 
you agree on the same mitigating circumstance." We find that this instruction does not lead jurors to believe that they 
must unanimously agree on the existence of a mitigating circumstance. See, e.g., State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d at 718 
(appendix). 
I. 
The Process for Ensuring Proportionality 
Mr. Banks correctly asserts that states should provide meaningful appellate proportionality review of death sentences 
to ensure that the death penalty is not being arbitrarily and capriciously imposed. He argues that the review process 
currently being used by Tennessee's appellate courts is inadequate because (1) the jury is not required to make written 
findings concerning mitigating circumstances, (2) the informational base for comparative review of first degree murder 
convictions is inadequate and incomplete, (3) the courts' methodology for conducting comparative review is flawed, and 
(4) the courts allow defendants to waive presentation of mitigating evidence without requiring an offer of proof as to 
what mitigation is available. He also insists that the process fails to meet the standards required for due process. 
While comparative proportionality review provides an important safeguard against arbitrary and capricious 
sentencing, it is not constitutionally required. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 663 (Tenn. 1997). The Tennessee General 
Assembly has directed the appellate courts to determine whether "[t]he sentence of death is excessive or 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the nature of the crime and the defendant." 
Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-13-206(c)(l)(D). We have noted that the automatic review by this Court of every death sentence is 
an integral part of Tennessee's death penalty process. State v. Pritchett, 621 S.W.2d 127, 140 (Tenn.1981). 
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There are no more serious cases that arrive at this Court's doorstep than death penalty cases. They involve crimes of 
the most serious impact, and they involve a penalty that is the most severe that can be imposed. Reviewing any death 
penalty appeal is given the utmost attention and highest priority by each of the members of this Court. Mr. Banks's 
challenges to this Court's means and methods of reviewing the proportionality of a death sentence have been repeatedly 
rejected. See, e.g., State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d at 286 n. 9; State v. Rimmer, 250 S.W.3d 12, 43 (Tenn.2008) (appendix); 
State v. Vann, 976 S.W.2d 93, 118-19 (Tenn.1998) (appendix); State v. Keen, 926 S.W.2d at 743-44; State v. Barber, 
753 S.W.2d 659, 663-668 (Tenn.1988). 
The Tennessee General Assembly has provided that "[t]he Tennessee Supreme Court may promulgate rules as it 
deems appropriate to establish such procedures as are necessary to enable the reviewing courts to properly review the 
death sentence." Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(2). We continue to find the review process to be a significant 
contributor to safeguarding against the arbitrary and capricious application of the death penalty. We also continue to find 
the existing procedures to be adequate to enable this Court to properly carry out its review in death penalty cases. 
XVIII. 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TENNESSEE'S LETHAL INJECTION PROTOCOL 
Mr. Banks contends that the State's lethal injection protocol violates his constitutional rights against the infliction of 
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically, Mr. Banks 
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asserts that his federal and state constitutional rights would be violated through the use of Tennessee's execution 
method because the injections are not prepared, administered or monitored by medical professionals and because of the 
use of certain drugs in Tennessee's current execution protocol. This Court recently upheld Tennessee's lethal injection 
protocol in Abdur'Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292 (Tenn.2005).(fn66) Both of these features of the drug protocol--
the use of the three drug protocol and the absence of medical professionals--were present in 2005 and remained when 
the protocol was further refined in 2007.(fn67) Mr. Banks has failed to persuade this Court that we should reconsider our 
earlier decision in Abdur'Rahman v. Bredesen. 
XIX. 
THE PENOLOGICAL OBJECTIVE OF THE DEATH PENALTY 
Mr. Banks contends that the death penalty is unconstitutional because it fails to serve any legitimate penological 
objective. The death penalty serves the valid and legitimate penological objectives of deterrence and retribution. Roper 
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319, 122 S.Ct. 
2242, 
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153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). Thus, we reject Mr. Banks's argument that the death penalty is unconstitutional because ,t fails 
to serve any legitimate penological objective. 
xx. 
CONSIDERATION OF THE MANDATORY REVIEW FACTORS IN TENN.CODE ANN. § 39-13-206 WITH 
REGARD TO MR. BANKS'S SENTENCE 
When reviewing a conviction for first degree murder and an accompanying sentence of death, Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-
13-206(c)(l) requires the courts to review the record to determine whether 
(A) The sentence of death was imposed in any arbitrary fashion; 
(B) The evidence supports the jury's finding of statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances; 
(C) The evidence supports the jury's finding that the aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh 
any mitigating circumstances; and 
(D) The sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, 
considering both the nature of the crime and the defendant. 
We have carefully reviewed the record in this case, and, as we will discuss more fully, we have determined that Mr. 
Banks's sentence was not imposed in any arbitrary fashion. We have also determined that the evidence supports the 
jury's findings that the State proved the aggravating circumstances in Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(6) and Tenn.Code 
Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(7) beyond a reasonable doubt and that these aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances offered by Mr. Banks. Finally, we have considered the nature of Mr. Banks's crime and all the evidence in 
the record concerning Mr. Banks as a person, and we have concluded that the sentence of death imposed by the jury in 
this case is neither excessive nor disproportionate to the penalties imposed for similar offenses. 
A. 
The Manner in which Mr. Banks's Sentence was Imposed 
The jury that imposed Mr. Banks's sentence of death unanimously found that the State proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Mr. Banks was guilty of premeditated first degree murder and first degree murder in the perpetration of a 
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murder occurred supported the application of the aggravating circumstances in Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(6) and 
Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(7). Our review of the record satisfies each of us that the trial, and particularly the 
sentencing hearing, was conducted in a manner consistent with the applicable statutory provisions and the rules of 
criminal procedure. Accordingly, we conclude that Mr. Banks's sentence of death was not imposed in an arbitrary 
fashion. See, e.g., State v. Young, 196 S.W.3d at 115; State v. Hugueley, 185 S.W.3d 356, 380 (Tenn.2006); State v. 
Hall, 958 S.W.2d at 702. 
B. 
The Evidentiary Support for the Aggravating Circumstances 
We have already discussed in detail the evidentiary support for the two aggravating circumstances that the jury 
found to exist in this case. These aggravating circumstances are fully supported by the record. 
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c. 
The Relative Weight of the Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances 
In carrying out our obligation under Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-13-206(c)(l)(C), we must determine whether a 
reasonable juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances established by the State 
outweigh the mitigating circumstances presented by the defendant. State v. Rimmer, 250 S.W.3d at 34; State v. 
Stephenson, 195 S.W.3d 574, 593-94 (Tenn.2006). Following a detailed review of this record, we find that a reasonable 
jury could find, based on the evidence in this case, that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances. 
Mr. Banks presented and established numerous mitigating circumstances that were intended to present him in a 
sympathetic light. The eleven witnesses testifying on his behalf pointed out (1) that Mr. Banks was only nineteen years 
old when he killed Mr. AI-Maily, (2) that Mr. Banks developed HIV when he was sixteen years old, (3) that Mr. Banks had 
remained employed, (4) that Mr. Banks frequently transferred from one school to another during his childhood, (5) that 
Mr. Banks's mother was often absent during his childhood because she was either in prison or in a halfway house, (6) 
that Mr. Banks's parents did not provide him adequate support, (7) that Mr. Banks had nine siblings and that he was the 
youngest of seven brothers, (8) that Mr. Banks was picked on by his older siblings when he was a child, (9) that Mr. 
Banks was an active member of the Leewood Baptist Church, (10) that Mr. Banks's artistic and culinary skills included 
drawing pictures and cooking, (11) that Mr. Banks had been a model prisoner, (12) that while incarcerated, Mr. Banks 
had participated in and completed numerous rehabilitation certificate programs, (13) that members of Mr. Banks's church 
and family wished to remain in contact with him, (14) that two of Mr. Banks's sisters were raped, (15) that Mr. Banks 
loved animals, particularly dogs, and (16) that Mr. Banks was a positive member of his church and a gentle person. 
The State presented evidence that undermined Mr. Banks's mitigation evidence. This evidence showed that, despite 
the confinement of Mr. Banks's mother, Mr. Banks and his mother had a close relationship. It also showed that Mr. Banks 
had a loving and supportive relationship with his grandmother before her death and that he was also cared for by his 
older siblings and members of the Leewood Baptist Church. In other words, Mr. Banks actually had a great deal of 
support during his childhood from his extended family and his church community. 
The mitigation evidence regarding his kind, gentle nature was also undermined by evidence of his criminal history 
which included assault, battery, and domestic violence. In contrast to the testimony regarding Mr. Banks's gentle nature, 
his former girlfriend described how Mr. Banks could be extremely cruel and violent. She recounted numerous incidents of 
domestic violence, including one incident in which Mr. Banks pulled a gun and pointed it at her stomach when she was 
eight months pregnant. 
Based on this evidence, a rational juror could easily have concluded that the aggravating circumstances--killing a 
witness to avoid arrest and prosecution and killing in the perpetration of a robbery--outweighed the various mitigating 
circumstances presented by Mr. Banks, particularly his youth, his health, his difficult family circumstances, his active 
involvement in his church community, and his active involvement 
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in rehabilitation certificate programs in prison. 
D. 
The Proportionality of Mr. Banks's Sentence 
When this Court conducts the proportionality review required by Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-13-206(c)(l)(D), we do not 
function as a "super jury" that simply substitutes our judgment for the sentencing jury. State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759, 
782 (Tenn.2001). Rather, our task is to take a broader perspective than the jurors who sentenced Mr. Banks in order to 
determine whether his death sentence "is disproportionate to the sentences imposed for similar crimes and similar 
defendants." State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d at 232 (quoting State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 664). In doing so, the pool of 
cases upon which we draw in conducting this analysis are "first degree murder cases in which the State sought the death 
penalty, a capital sentencing hearing was held, and the jury determined whether the sentence should be life 
imprisonment, life imprisonment without possibility of parole, or death." State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d at 679. 
No two defendants or their crimes are ever identical. Accordingly, the purpose of our review of other capital cases is 
not to identify cases that correspond precisely with the particulars of the one being analyzed. State v. Copeland, 226 
S.W.3d 287, 306 (Tenn.2007); State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d at 233. Instead, our task is to "identify and invalidate the 
aberrant death sentence." State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d at 233 (quoting State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 665). A sentence 
Is not disproportionate because other defendants have received a life sentence under similar circumstances. State v. 
Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 569 (Tenn.2000). Rather, a death sentence will be excessive or disproportionate where "the 
case taken as a whole is plainly lacking in circumstances consistent with those in cases where the death penalty has 
been imposed." State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d at 233 (quoting State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 668); State v. Godsey, 60 
5.W.3d at 782. 
This Court uses "the precedent-seeking method of comparative proportionality review, in which we compare a case 
with cases involving similar defendants and similar crimes." State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d at 305 (quoting State v. 
Davis, 141 S.W.3d at 619 -620). We examine "the facts and circumstances of the crime, the characteristics of the 
defendant, and the aggravating and mitigating circumstances involved, and we compare this case with other cases in 
which the defendants were convicted of the same or similar crimes." State v. Stevens, 78 S.W.3d at 842. Our approach 
does not employ a rigid, objective test. Rather, each member of the Court draws upon his or her experience and 
Judgment in comparing the case being reviewed with other cases. See State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 668. 
When we conduct this comparison with regard to the nature of the crime, we generally consider "(1) the means of 
death; (2) the manner of death; (3) the motivation for the killing; (4) the place of death; (5) the victim's age, physical 
condition, and psychological condition; (6) the absence or presence of premeditation; (7) the absence or presence of 
provocation; (8) the absence or presence of justification; and (9) the injury to and effect upon non-decedent victims." 
State v. Rimmer, 250 S.W.3d at 35; see also State v. Rollins, 188 S.W.3d at 575. With regard to the defendant, we 
generally compare the defendant's "(1) prior criminal record, if any; (2) age, race, and gender; (3) mental, emotional, 
and physical condition; 
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(4) role in the murder; (5) cooperation with authorities; (6) level of remorse; (7) knowledge of the victim's helplessness; 
and (8) potential for rehabilitation." State v. Rimmer, 250 S.W.3d at 35; see also State v. Rollins, 188 S.W.3d at 575. 
We turn first to the nature of Mr. Banks's offense. Several days before Mr. Banks shot Mr. Atilebawi and then shot 
and killed Mr. AI-Maily, he formulated a plan with Mr. Hilliard to extract revenge on Mr. Atilebawi for conduct that had 
allegedly occurred almost one year earlier. He obtained a firearm from Mr. Hilliard and then waited for the opportunity to 
strike. 
This opportunity came during the early morning hours of September 16, 2002 when Mr. Banks went to Mr. 
Atilebawi's home for the purpose of seeking revenge. The fact that Mr. AI-Maily was visiting Mr. Atilebawi did not deter 
Mr. Banks. Carrying out the plan he had devised with Mr. Hilliard, Mr. Banks shot Mr. Atilebawi four times and then tried 
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to conceal his body. After shooting Mr. Atilebawi, Mr. Banks robbed Mr. AI-Maily and then ordered him to lie face down 
on the floor of Mr. Atilebawi's bedroom. Mr. AI-Maily did not resist. After looting Mr. Atilebawi's house and loading the 
stolen personal property into a stolen Jeep Cherokee, Mr. Banks calmly and deliberately returned to Mr. Atilebawi's 
house, walked to Mr. Atilebawi's bedroom where Mr. AI-Maily was lying on the floor, and fatally shot Mr. AI-Maily in the 
back of the head. Mr. Banks and Mr. Hilliard then left the scene of their crimes with the stolen property and the stolen 
automobiles. Later that morning, apparently believing that both Mr. Atilebawi and Mr. AI-Maily were dead, Mr. Banks 
went on a spending spree with the money he had stolen from Messrs. Atilebawi and AI-Maily. 
Mr. Banks had no personal animosity towards Mr. AI-Maily. In fact, he characterized their relationship as friendly. 
Shooting Mr. AI-Maily was not part of Mr. Banks's plan of revenge against Mr. Atilebawi. Neither was it necessary to 
commit the offense, because Mr. AI-Maily cooperated fully with Mr. Banks during the robbery and offered no resistence 
whatsoever to either Mr. Banks or Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Banks shot Mr. AI-Maily in the back of the head because he did not 
want to leave behind any live witnesses to his crimes. 
We now turn to Mr. Banks himself. While he opted not to testify on his own behalf during the sentencing phase, he 
called eleven mitigation witnesses. These witnesses presented a positive and sympathetic image of Mr. Banks. An 
implicit, and at times explicit, undercurrent of much of the testimony focused on the fact that Mr. Banks was only 
nineteen years old when he murdered Mr. AI-Maily. 
Mr. Banks was part of a large family that faced significant social and financial challenges. Despite the lengthy periods 
when his mother was in custody, he had a close relationship with his mother and received support from his 
grandmother, his older siblings, and members of his church. While many of his family and friends saw Mr. Banks's soft-
hearted and gentle side, Mr. Banks became capable of resorting to cruelty and violence. By the time he murdered Mr. AI-
Maily, he had been convicted of assault, battery, and domestic violence. He did not tell his former girlfriend that he was 
HIV-positive, and he pointed a gun to her stomach when she was eight months pregnant. 
We find that the death sentence, as applied to Mr. Banks in this case, is neither excessive nor disproportionate when 
compared to defendants in other cases. For example, in State v. Thackerthis Court expressly noted that "[w]e have 
upheld the 
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death penalty in several similar cases where the defendant stole from the victims and committed murder to avoid arrest 
or prosecution." State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d at 233. Additionally, in State v. Davis we observed that we have 
"frequently upheld the death penalty in first degree murder cases involving shooting offenses committed in the course of 
a robbery or other felony." State v. Davis, 141 S.W.3d at 621. 
The following are among the cases in which this Court determined that application of the death penalty was not 
disproportionate in light of other similar circumstances. In State v. Thacker, the defendant stabbed a wrecker driver who 
discovered that the defendant was using a stolen credit card. The defendant later returned to conceal the body and to 
steal the victim's credit cards and cash. State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d at 233. In State v. Reid, the defendant shot and 
killed two unresisting employees while they were lying face down on the floor as part of a planned and premeditated 
robbery in order to avoid arrest or prosecution. State v. Reid, 91 S.W .3d at 287. In State v. Sims, the defendant shot the 
victim in the back of head during a burglary of the victim's home in order to prevent identification. State v. Sims, 45 
S.W.3d 1, 19 (Tenn.2001). In State v. Chalmers, the Court upheld a death sentence where a defendant shot the victim 
five times as part of a robbery. State v. Chalmers, 28 S.W.3d 913,915,919 (Tenn. 2000). Finally, in State v. King, the 
Court upheld the conviction of a defendant who fatally shot a tavern owner who was not resisting at the time. State v. 
King, 694 S.W.2d 941,943,947 (Tenn. 1985). 
We have also concluded that the mitigating circumstances in this case do not carry a disproportionately heavier 
weight than the mitigating circumstances in other cases in which the death penalty has been approved. The deat.h 
penalty has been found proportional in a number of cases involving defendants who were as young as or younger than 
Mr. Banks when they murdered their victims. State v. Davis, 141 S.W.3d at 621-22 (eighteen-year-old defendant); State 
v. Berry, 141 S.W.3d at 571-72 (nineteen-year-old defendant); State v. Pike, 978 S.W.2d at 922-23 (eighteen-year-old 
defendant). Application of the death penalty has also been found not to be excessive in cases where the defendant 
experienced a difficult family life with parents in prison or otherwise absent, resulting in being raised with and by siblings 
and a grandmother. State v. Davis, 141 S.W.3d at 621-22; State v. Berry, 141 S.W.3d at 571. In terms of being a model 
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prisoner, this Court has found evidence of being a model inmate, including being a positive uplifting member to the 
prisoner community, not to render application of the death penalty disproportionate. State v. Austin, 87 S.W.3d 447, 
457-58 (Tenn. 2002). Nor has suffering from disease or maintaining close contact with family members been sufficient to 
render a death sentence excessive. State v. Austin, 87 S.W.3d at 458. 
Considering the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in this case in light of all the evidence in this case, we find 
that Mr. Banks's conviction and sentence are not "plainly lacking in circumstances consistent with those in cases where 
the death penalty has been imposed." State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d at 233 (quoting State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 668); 
State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d at 782. Accordingly, we find the application of the death sentence in this case to be neither 
disproportionate nor excessive. 
XXI. 
In summary, we have concluded that the Court of Criminal Appeals dealt correctly 
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with regard to all the issues raised by Mr. Banks on this appeal except the trial court's submission of the Tenn.Code Ann. 
§ 39-13-204(i)(6) aggravating factor to the jury. We have determined that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by 
concluding that Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-13-204(i)(6) was not supported by sufficient evidence. Therefore, we reverse the 
Court of Criminal Appeals's disposition of that issue, but affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals in all other 
respects. 
Mr. Banks's sentence of death shall be carried out on December 9, 2009, unless otherwise ordered by this Court or 
other proper authority. It appearing that Mr. Banks is indigent, the costs of this appeal are taxed to the State of 
Tennessee. 
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OPINION 
[Section III] 
Failure to Charge Aggravating Circumstances in Indictment 
The Appellant asserts that the "imposition of the death penalty ... violated due process of law because the 
aggravating circumstances were not set forth in the indictment." In this regard, he contends that "[a]ny fact that 
increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt in order to satisfy the 5th Amendment's Due Process Clause and the 6th Amendment's notice and jury 
trial guarantees." With reliance upon Apprendi v. New Jersey and Ring v. Arizona, the Appellant submits that he was 
denied due process of law because the indictment returned by the grand jury did not include facts that would qualify him 
for the death penalty. In other words, he maintains that first degree murder is not a capital offense unless accompanied 
by aggravating factors. In order to elevate the crime to capital murder, he alleges that the indictment must include 
language of the statutory aggravating circumstance(s). 
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The Tennessee Supreme Court has consistently rejected this argument by holding that aggravating mcumstances 
need not be pied in the indictment. State v. Reid, 164 S.W.3d 286, 312 (2005); Leach, 148 S.W.3d at 59; Berry, 141 
S.W.3d at 562; State v. Holton, 126 S.W.3d 845,863 (Tenn.2004); State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458,467 (Tenn.2002). 
Our supreme court explained, "[t]he focus in Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely was on the Sixth Amendment right to trial by 
Jury," and "the Court expressly declined to impose the Fifth Amendment right to presentment or grand jury indictment 
upon the States." Berry, 141 S. W .3d at 560. The Appellant is not entitled to relief on this issue. 
[Section IV] 
Introduction of Photograph of the Victim 
During the testimony of Leonard Porter, a criminal investigator for the District Attorney General's Office, the 
prosecutor moved to admit a photograph of Atilebawi's injuries. The photograph, taken the week of the trial, depicted 
the right side of the victim's head and showed a large scar beginning at his forehead and continuing to the back of his 
head. The prosecutor stated that introduction of the photograph was relevant to "show all of these elements of the 
criminal attempt murder in the first degree .... " She further explained that no photographs of Atilebawi's injuries were 
taken at either "the crime scene or the hospital because they were trying to save his life .... " The Appellant objected 
stating that the victim had testified in person and that the photograph failed to prove any element of the crime. The trial 
court made the following ruling regarding the admission of the photograph: 
Well, my response to all of what all of you have said would be that as to relevance, it's very relevant. I 
mean, there is no question it was relevant. It shows the horrific nature of the severe injury that this man 
sustained, and it tends to corroborate what he testified to and what the doctor from The Med testified to. 
It's not prejudicial in that it doesn't show--it's not gory or bloody, and the jury saw him when he was in 
here yesterday and saw essentially the same injury. The only--! think the only plausible argument against 
allowing it in would be that it would be cumulative. The victim was in here yesterday. 
But I think that the State's burden to prove their case, I think gives them the right to introduce one 
photograph. They're not asking to introduce ten or [twenty] but to introduce one photograph that can be 
shown to the jury to corroborate the injuries that were testified to by the victim himself and by the doctor 
from The Med ... [t]o show the injuries in general. To show that this man was severely injured by the 
gunshot wounds to the back of the head, that half his head was blown off to show all of those things of 
course. 
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The trial court continued: 
... It is relevant and it's not prejudicial. It is perhaps somewhat cumulative but that--for example, had 
the State offered it into evidence when this victim was on the stand, I would have let them introduce it at 
that time because I think it's fair to allow at least one photograph of injuries, even though the person is 
sitting here live at this point in time, to document the record, to remind the jury later in the trial, at 
closing argument, during deliberations, that this is what this man looks like so that there is an actual 
photograph of it. 
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Photographs are always by their nature cumulative to some extent. By definition, a photograph is going to 
be cumulative of something else. You can always have a person come in and testify to what a photograph 
otherwise depicts .... 
. . . And a photograph will provide [the jury] with that documented evidence that they can look at of 
inJuries that they saw in person four or five days earlier .... 
On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred in permitting the introduction of the photograph of the 
surviving victim, arguing that the trial court should have excluded the photograph because of the inevitable danger of 
unfair prejudice. Additionally, he asserts that the photograph exaggerated the victim's injuries and was irrelevant, as the 
photograph was taken years after the incident. Finally, the Appellant contends that, since the jury had already seen 
Atilebawi's injuries during his testimony at trial, the admission of the photograph was prejudicially cumulative. The State 
responds that the trial court's ruling was proper. Specifically, the State contends that the photograph was relevant to 
establish the Appellant's intent to murder Atilebawi and that it establishes that Atilebawi suffered serious bodily injury. 
Both elements are necessary to support convictions of attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. 
SeeT.C.A. § 39-13-202, -403. The State also contends that the photograph illustrated the testimony of Dr. Timmons and 
Atilebawi. 
The admission of photographs is generally discretionary with the trial court and, absent an abuse of that discretion, 
will not result in the grant of a new trial. State v. Banks, 564 S.W.2d 947, 949 (Tenn.1978). However, a photograph 
must be relevant to an issue that the jury must decide before it may be admitted into evidence. State v. Vann, 976 
S.W.2d 93, 102 (Tenn.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1071, 119 S.Ct. 1467, 143 L.Ed.2d 551 (1999); State v. Braden, 867 
S.W.2d 750, 758 (Tenn.Crim.App.1993); see also Tenn. R. Evid. 401, 402. Evidence that is not relevant to prove some 
part of the prosecution's case should not be admitted solely to inflame the JUry and prejudice the defendant. Additionally, 
the probative value of the photograph must outweigh any unfair prejudicial effect that it may have upon the trier of fact. 
Vann, 976 S.W.2d at 102-03; see also Tenn. R. Evid. 403 ("[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice"). 
While it can be said that photographs of crime victims who suffer serious bodily injury are prejudicial by their very 
nature, a prejudicial photograph is not per se excludable. What is excluded is evidence which is unfairly prejudicial, in 
other words, evidence which has an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis, frequently, though not 
necessarily, an emotional one. Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 951. 
The trial court determined that the photograph was relevant and not prejudicial. We agree that the photograph was 
relevant to supplement the testimony of Dr. Timmons, as well as that of the victim himself. See State v. Cole, 155 
S.W.3d 885, 913 (Tenn.2005) (Appendix), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 829, 126 S.Ct. 47, 163 L.Ed.2d 79 (2005). We also 
agree that the trial court's acknowledgment of the need to preserve a record for the jury is accurate. Additionally, the 
photograph in question is not particularly gruesome. Thus, we conclude that the probative value of the photograph is not 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect, and the trial court did 
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not abuse its discretion in allowing its admission. Further, it does not affirmatively appear that the "admission of the 
photograph[] has affected the results of the trial." See Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 953. The Appellant is not entitled to relief 
on this issue. 
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[Section V] 
Admission of the Appellant's Statement 
The Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in permitting introduction of statements made by the Appellant 
without first ruling on the Appellant's motion to suppress those statements. The State responds that the issue is waived 
because the Appellant failed to pursue the motion to suppress. 
The record before this court reflects that the Appellant filed a motion to suppress his statements on July 16, 2003, 
alleging that his statements were involuntarily given as he was under duress at the time the statements were made. A 
hearing was conducted on July 25, 2003, during which time the Appellant requested and was granted a continuance until 
October 31, 2003. As the State correctly asserts, the record is silent as to whether the Appellant actively pursued the 
motion to suppress alter this point. The record does indicate that on April 4, 2005, before voir dire of the jury panel 
commenced, the Appellant's counsel made the following remarks: 
Judge, I looked through the court jacket this morning, making sure since I was not on this case originally 
or at the time the motions were heard and I believe that all motions that have been filed have been 
discussed and ruled upon except for the 608, 609 motion that Your Honor took under advisement.(fn2) 
During the State's case-in-chief, the Appellant's statements to law enforcement officers were admitted without any 
objection by the Appellant. Additionally, the Appellant, in his motion for new trial, raised the issue of whether the trial 
court erred in denying the motion to suppress, supporting the conclusion that the motion was in fact denied. 
It is clear from the record before this court that, at the trial level, the Appellant proceeded under the assumption 
that the trial court had denied his motion to suppress. The Appellant, however, now maintains on appeal that he did not 
abandon the suppression issue. He adds that the fact that the trial court failed to state its findings on the record violated 
his constitutional rights to due process and to a fair jury trial, in addition to violating Tenn. R.Crim. P. 12(e). 
From the actions of the parties and the trial court during the trial, including the failure of the Appellant to object to 
the introduction of the statements, it appears that all parties believed that the motion to suppress had been denied. Most 
notably, the trial court's admission of the statements during the trial suggests that the trial court was under the 
assumption that it had overruled the Appellant's motion. While the record presently before this court does not contain an 
order of the trial court reflecting its ruling upon the motion, we cannot conclude that its absence is dispositive. It is the 
burden of the Appellant to prepare a full and complete record for appellate review. See 
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Tenn. R.App. P. 24(b). Moreover, the record clearly reflects that no objection was made by the Appellant to the 
admission of his statements at trial. 
Even assuming for argument's sake that no ruling was ever made by the trial court, it was the Appellant who failed 
to obtain a ruling on that motion and failed to object when the evidence was introduced at trial. Accordingly, we agree 
with the State that the Appellant has abandoned the motion by failing to call to the trial court's attention the lack of a 
ruling on his suppression motion and by failing to object to the admission of the statements at tria I. See Tenn. R.App. P. 
36(a). If a motion is not acted upon, the litigant should renew it. "He may not lull the judge into thinking that it has been 
abandoned and then, alter he has lost, pull a rabbit out of his pocket in the form of a forgotten motion." United States v. 
Taglia, 922 F.2d 413, 416-17 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 927, 111 S.Ct. 2040, 114 L.Ed.2d 125 (1991). As noted, 
the Appellant failed to renew his motion or ask for a ruling prior to voir dire. Later, when the State sought introduction of 
his statements, the Appellant remained silent and made no objection. 
A similar issue was addressed by the Court of Appeals in Grandstaffv. Hawks, 36 S.W.3d 482 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000). 
In Grandstaff, the trial court did not unequivocally overrule a motion in limine. The Court of Appeals determined that the 
motion in limine should have been renewed by objection and that the failure to renew the motion in limine had waived 
the issue. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals held: 
Objections to the introduction of evidence must be timely and specific. See Overstreet v. Shoney's, Inc., 4 
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S.W.3d 694, 702 (Tenn.Ct.App.1999). An evidentiary objection will be considered timely either if it is 
made in a motion in limine or if it is made at the time the objectionable evidence is about to be 
introduced. See Wright v. United Servs. Auto. Assn, 789 S.W.2d 911, 914 (Tenn. Ct.App.1990). A party 
who files an unsuccessful motion in limine need not renew the motion when the evidence is introduced as 
long as the trial court "clearly and definitively" overruled the motion in limine when it was made. See 
State v. Brobeck, 751 S.W.2d 828, 833-34 (Tenn.1988); State v. McGhee, 746 S.W.2d 460,462 
(Tenn.1988); Wright v. United Servs. Auto. Assn, 789 S.W.2d at 914. If, however, the trial court has not 
"clearly and definitively" acted on the motion, the moving party must renew the motion 
contemporaneously with the introduction of the objectionable evidence. Failure to renew the motion will 
preclude the moving party from taking issue on appeal with the admission of the evidence. 
Grandstaff, 36 S.W.3d at 488. 
Tennessee law is well-established that a party who invites or waives error, or who fails to take reasonable steps to 
cure an error, is not entitled to relief on appeal. See Tenn. R.App. P. 36(a). Moreover, if waived, this court will not 
consider the issue on appeal unless it is clear from the record that plain error was committed. 
The motion to suppress filed by the Appellant on July 15, 2003, presented two allegations in support of his 
contention that the statements were taken in violation of his constitutional rights, namely that: 
1. The [Appellant] did not freely, knowingly and voluntarily give said statements. 
2. The [Appellant] made said statements while under duress. 
No additional facts or argument were presented in support of the motion. At 
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the July 25, 2003 motion to suppress hearing, Sergeant Mark Miller testified that the Appellant was advised of his rights 
and signed a waiver of rights form. The Appellant informed Sergeant Miller that he had an eleventh grade education. 
Sergeant Miller stated that the Appellant understood English and could read and write. In addition to the written waiver, 
the Appellant verbally indicated that he understood and waived his constitutional rights. Sergeant Miller testified that, at 
no time, did he threaten, coerce, or make promises to the Appellant. 
Sergeant James Fitzpatrick testified that, one day after the Appellant's initial statement, the Appellant informed law 
enforcement officials that he wanted to change some facts related in his initial statement. Sergeant Fitzpatrick permitted 
the Appellant to make corrections to the statement. Sergeant Fitzpatrick observed that the Appellant had no problems 
communicating and appeared to be of sound mind. The Appellant never requested an attorney. Sergeant Fitzpatrick 
testified that, at no time, did he threaten, coerce, or make promises to the Appellant. He also recalled that the Appellant 
was permitted to use the restroom during the interview and that the Appellant stopped to eat on two occasions. 
Inherent in the admissibility of the written statement is that the statement was voluntarily given by a defendant 
knowledgeable of his constitutional rights and accompanied by a valid and knowing waiver of those rights. State v. Berry, 
141 S.W.3d 549, 577 (Tenn.2004) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,467, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1624, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 
(1966); State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317,326 (Tenn.1992), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 124, 114 S.Ct. 651, 126 
L.Ed.2d 555 (1993)). In determining the admissibility of a confession, the particular circumstances of each case must be 
examined as a whole. Berry, 141 S.W.3d at 577 (citing State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450,455 (Tenn.1996)). A defendant's 
subjective perception alone is not sufficient to justify a conclusion of involuntariness in the constitutional sense. Id. 
( citations omitted). The primary consideration in determining the admissibility of the evidence is whether the confession 
is an act of free will. Id. at 578 (citing State v. Chandler, 547 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Tenn. 1977)). A confession is not 
voluntary when "the behavior of the state's law enforcement officials was such as to overbear" the will of an accused and 
"bring about confessions not freely self-determined." Id. (citing State v. Kelly, 603 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tenn.1980)). 
The testimony revealed that the Appellant's communication skills appeared adequate and that he was capable of 
reading, writing, and comprehension. The Appellant was advised of his constitutional rights and, without coercion or 
force, voluntarily waived his rights and provided an inculpatory statement. Neither officer indicated that the Appellant 
was under duress at the time he made his two statements. The officers provided the Appellant with food and restroom 
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breaks during the interview process, and the Appellant never asked for an attorney. Therefore, we conclude that the 
Appellant knowingly waived his Miranda rights and voluntarily provided the statements to the police. Thus, the Appellant 
is not entitled to relief on this issue. 
[Section XJ] 
Victim Impact Jury Instruction was Coercive 
The Appellant next contends that "[t]he jury instructions given by the trial judge with respect to the jury's 
consideration of victim impact evidence constituted a coercive instruction." In instructing the 
172 
jury, the trial court provided the following instruction as to victim impact evidence: 
The prosecution has introduced what is known as victim impact evidence. This evidence has been 
introduced to show the financial, emotional, psychological or physical effects of the victim's death on the 
members of the victim's immediate family and close friends. You may consider this evidence in 
determining an appropriate punishment. 
However, your consideration must be limited to a rational inquiry into the culpability of the [Appellant], 
not an emotional response to the evidence. Victim impact evidence is not the same as an aggravating 
circumstance. Proof of an adverse impact on the victim's family or close friends is not proof of an 
aggravating circumstance. Introduction of victim impact evidence in no way relieves the State of its 
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to you at least one aggravating circumstance which has been 
alleged. 
You may consider this victim impact evidence in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty 
only if you first find the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances has been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt by evidence independent from the victim impact evidence and find that the aggravating 
circumstance or circumstances found outweigh the finding of one or more mitigating circumstances 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Appellant, relying upon Johnson v. Hardin, 926 S.W.2d 236, 242 (Tenn.1996), asserts that the trial court's 
instruction "amounts to an undue intrusion into the exclusive province of the jury." He adds that "there is a reasonable 
probability that the instruction coerced a finding by the jury that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the 
mitigating circumstances because to find otherwise would require the jury to ignore the emotional victim impact evidence 
presented by the State." The Appellant's reliance upon Johnson is misplaced because in Johnson our supreme court 
addressed the issue of the trial court's deliverance of a "dynamite charge" to a deadlocked jury. The instruction in 
Johnson "raised [to the deadlocked jury] the specter of the time, effort, and money that a new trial would entail." 
Johnson, 926 S.W.2d at 243. The charge suggested that the jurors had a duty to agree. In this regard, our supreme 
court held "[n]othing should be done or said to a juror which can in any manner be taken by that juror to indicate that 
he or she should abandon an honestly held conviction in order to reach a verdict so that time and money will be saved." 
Id. (quoting Bass v. Barksdale, 671 S.W.2d 476,486 (Tenn.Ct. App.1984)). Such a situation is not presently before the 
court, as the factual circumstances in Johnson are clearly distinguishable from those in the present case. 
In fact, the instruction provided to the jury in the present case was recommended by our supreme court in State v. 
Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872,892 (Tenn.1998), and was again approved in State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247, 283 (Tenn.2002). 
See also State v. Riels, 216 S.W.3d 737 (Tenn.2007); Reid, 164 S.W.3d at 336-37 (Appendix); Cole, 155 S.W.3d at 914 
(approving Nesbit victim impact instruction). Moreover, in Reid, our supreme court specifically noted that any 
contradiction arising between the instruction and the statute inured to the benefit of the defendant and, thus, should not 
entitle a defendant to relief. Reid, 91 S.W.3d at 283. Accordingly, the Appellant is not entitled to relief on t.his issue. 
Footnotes: 
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FNl. Mary Hughes, Mr. Atilebawi's girlfriend and caretaker, explained that Mr. AI-Maily was nicknamed "Uncle" "[b] 
ecause he was ... the Uncle of the whole group. If they needed something, he'll help them. He was a real good guy like 
that. If you're hungry, he'll ... get you something to eat. ... [H]e was a real good person." 
FN2. Mr. Banks was dating Sondra Thompson in September 2001. One night, during a visit to Mr. Atilebawi's home, 
Mr. Banks, Ms. Thompson, and Mr. Atilebawi fell asleep in Mr. Atilebawi's living room. All of them ended up spending the 
night in the living room. When she awoke, Ms. Thompson discovered that the side of the shorts she was wearing had 
been cut while she was sleeping, and she decided that Mr. Atilebawi must have done it. When Mr. Banks awakened, Ms. 
Thompson showed him her shorts and told him that she thought Mr. Atilebawi had cut them. Mr. Banks did not appear to 
be surprised or concerned. He simply continued walking Ms. Thompson to her car and then returned to the house to go 
back to sleep. The police were never called, and, at least as far as this record shows, Mr. Banks never confronted Mr. 
Atilebawi about the incident. Ms. Thompson broke up with Mr. Banks in December 2001 because of the verbal and 
physical abuse she received from Mr. Banks. 
FN3. The record contains little evidence regarding how Mr. Atilebawi had allegedly cheated Mr. Banks. 
FN4. Mr. Banks was on his way from Maco Tires and Auto Care to his brother's house to get some sleep when he 
was spotted by Officer Miller. 
FNS. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(l) (Supp. 2002). 
FN6. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (Supp. 2002). 
FN7. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-12-101 (1997). 
FN8. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-403(a) (1997). 
FN9. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(6) (Supp. 2002). 
FN 10. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(7) (Supp. 2002). 
FN 11. Specifically, the jury determined that "[t]he murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering 
with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another" and that "[t]he murder was knowingly 
committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant, while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or 
attempting to commit, or was fleeing after having a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, any 
robbery." 
FN 12. Mr. Banks is correct that the statement does not qualify for the dying declaration exception to the hearsay 
rule. Mr. Atilebawi's statement cannot qualify as a dying declaration because he survived the attack. State v. Lewis, 235 
S.W.3d 136, 149 (Tenn. 2007) (noting that one element of the dying declaration exception is that the declarant is "dead 
at the time of the trial"). Tennessee evidence law provides that the exception for statements made "under belief of 
impending death" only applies where the declarant is unavailable because he or she has died. Tenn. R. Evid. 804(b)(2); 
Tenn. R. Evid. 804(b)(2) advisory comm'n cmt.; see also Neil P. Cohen et al., Tennessee Law of Evidence§ 8.35[2][b], 
at 8-156 (5th ed. 2005) ( 'Tennessee Law of Evidence'). 
FN13. Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. Pa. L.Rev. 165, 176-77 
(2006). 
FN14. The evidence does not permit an exact determination of the length of the interval between Mr. Atilebawi 
being shot and Officer Jones arriving on the scene. For the purpose of this opinion, we accept Mr. Banks's suggested 
time frame that approximately six hours passed between Mr. Atilebawi being shot and his response to Officer Jones's 
inquiry. 
FN15. Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9 ("[t]hat in all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath the right ... to meet the 
witnesses face to face"); U.S. Const. amend VI (that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him"). 
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FN16. Mr. Banks specifically questions the portion of the translation of Mr. Atilebawi's testimony regarding Mr. 
Atilebawi's personal use of marijuana. He insists that he had no way to challenge the impartiality of the interpreter or the 
accuracy of the translation because an Arabic language interpreter had not been assigned specifically to the defense. 
FN 17. See http://tscaoc. tsc.state.tn.us/geninfo/Programs/Interpreters/rosterindex.htm. 
FN18. While not critical to our evaluation of the arguments presented herein, it is, nevertheless, a matter of at least 
some relevance to the discussion of Mr. Ghanem as an interpreter that the overwhelming majority of Mr. Atilebawi's 
examinations, both by the prosecution and by the defense, required no translation. The examinations were conducted in 
English, including the discussion of the actual offense and identification of Mr. Banks as the perpetrator. 
FN 19. Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 42 cmt. states that two interpreters may be used in lengthy proceedings to enable the 
interpreters to take breaks and to facilitate attorney-client communications during a court proceeding. 
FN20. Mr. Banks's brief uses the verb "poll" rather than the verb "interview." "Polling" the jury relates to questioning 
the jury after the verdict as to whether they concur with the verdict. The context of the use of the verb "poll" in Mr. 
Banks's brief indicates that the term connotes interviewing the jury either before or after the verdict. Accordingly, we 
have chosen to substitute the verb "interview" for "poll." Lovell v. McCullough, 222 Tenn. 567, 575-78, 439 S.W.2d 105, 
108-10 (1969); Dixon Stave & Heading Co. v. Archer, 40 Tenn. App. 327, 334-40, 291 S.W.2d 603, 607-10 (1956); 6 
Wayne R. Lafave et al., Criminal Procedure§ 24.9(e), at 522-24 (3d ed.2007). 
FN21. As discussed below, this limitation applies to attempt and solicitation. 
FN22. See Act of May 24, 2001, ch. 338, 2001 Tenn. Pub. Acts 708, 709. 
FN23. State v. Page, 184 5.W.3d at 229. 
FN24. "If the offense solicited did occur, ... the defendant may not be convicted of both the solicitation and the 
completed offense. The solicitation is merged with the completed offense, and the offender may be guilty of the 
completed offense under§ 39-11-402." Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-12-102 (1997) (Tenn. Sentencing Comm'n cmt.). 
FN25. In addition to charging the jury as to first degree premeditated murder, the trial court also charged the jury as 
to facilitation of first degree murder, murder in the second degree, facilitation of second degree murder, voluntary 
manslaughter, facilitation of voluntary manslaughter, and reckless homicide. With regard to the first degree murder in 
the perpetration of a robbery count, the trial court also charged the jury as to facilitation of first degree murder, second 
degree murder, and reckless homicide. As for the charge of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder, the trial 
court also charged the jury with facilitation to commit attempted first degree murder, attempted second degree murder, 
facilitation to commit second degree murder, criminal attempt to commit voluntary manslaughter, and facilitation to 
commit voluntary manslaughter. Finally, in addition to charging the jury as to especially aggravated robbery, the trial 
court also charged the jury as to especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, facilitation of aggravated robbery, 
robbery, and facilitation to commit robbery. 
FN26. Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-13-202(d). 
FN27. Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-13-211 (1997). 
FN28. The State is mistaken on this point. In his amended motion for new trial, Mr. Banks asserted that the trial 
court erred "in not providing a curative instruction during the penalty phase correcting the prosecutor's misstatements 
regarding mitigating factors during the state's closing argument." 
FN29. The United States Supreme Court has noted that argument between the defendant and counsel for the Crown 
was an essential part of English criminal trials. As other procedural protections developed, the importance of argument 
was neither discarded nor diluted. Rather, the primary function of argument shifted to summation of the evidence at the 
close of the trial. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. at 860-61, 95 S.Ct. 2550. 
FII.J30. Unobjected to closing arguments warrant reversal only in exceptional circumstances. Umted States v. Smith, 
00124 
https · 1 \frmo. l:mriter.net/states/T~J/hooks 1Case I.awlresu]t'Jnum her=1 ~!]JI; ()()Q 
Casemaker - TN - Case Law - ch - Result Page 55 of 57 
508 F.3d 861, 864 (8th Cir.2007). Accordingly, like the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, "[w]e bear in 
mind that fleeting comments that passed without objection during the rough-and-tumble of closing argument in the trial 
court should not be unduly magnified when the printed transcript is subjected to painstaking review in the reflective quiet 
of an appellate judge's chambers." United States v. Mullins, 446 F.3d at 758. 
FN31. Mr. Banks's brief states that "[t]he prosecutor improperly implied that the jury should decide whether an 
aggravating circumstance deserves any weight based upon whether the jury would then have to give other aggravating 
circumstances any weight" (emphasis added). Based on the substance and context of the argument, Mr. Banks was 
clearly referring to "mitigating circumstances" rather than "aggravating circumstances." 
FN32. The term "corpus delicti" is often confused for the "dead body." Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern legal 
Usage 226 (2nd ed. 1995) ( ':4 Dictionary of Modern legal Usage'). However, it refers to "[t]he fact of a trangression" 
and will generally be established in a criminal homicide case through the evidence of the death of the victim joined with 
some evidence that the death resulted not from an accident but a criminal act. Black's Law Dictionary 346 (7th ed.1999); 
A Dictionary of Modern legal Usage 226. 
FN33. United States v. High Elk, 442 F.3d 622, 626 (8th Cir.2006); Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making 
Sentencing Sensible, Ohio St. J.Crim. L. 37, 52-54 (2006). 
FN34. See State v. Gomez, 239 S.W.3d at 739. 
FN35. State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 343 (Tenn. 2008). 
FN36. See Act of May 18, 2005, ch. 353, 2005 Tenn. Pub. Acts 788. 
FN37. These principles can be found in Tenn. Code Ann.§§ 40-35-102, -103 (2006 & Supp. 2007). The Tennessee 
General Assembly chose "Bookerization" rather than "Blakelyization" when it replaced the formerly presumptive guideline 
in favor of advisory guidelines. Stephanie Watson, Fixing California Sentencing law, 39 McGeorge L.Rev. 585, 593 n. 89 
(2008) (hereinafter "Watson") (quoting Model Penal Code: Sentencing (Prelim. Draft. No. 4 2005)). Tennessee was the 
first state in which the legislature converted a former presumptive guidelines system into an advisory system. Model 
Penal Code: Sentencing, Reporter's Introductory Memorandum xxxvii & n. 19 (Tent. Draft No. 1 2007); Watson at 593. In 
2007, the California State Legislature also opted for "Bookerization" rather than "Blakelyization." Watson at 591-97. 
FN38. Mr. Banks's lawyer questioned her client when the sentencing hearing began. After discussing the "old 
sentencing law" and the "new sentencing law," she asked Mr. Banks "which law do you wish to go under?" He 
responded, "[t)he new one." 
FN39. Mr. Banks acknowledged his understanding that he was not entitled to a presumptive sentence when he 
agreed that his lawyer had "explained to ... [him] that under the new sentencing law that the court is required to start 
at the ... minimum time in the range for the particular offense as opposed to where they used to start at the middle of 
the range." 
FN40. Tenn.Code Ann.§ 40-35-114(1) (2006). 
FN41. Tenn.Code Ann.§ 40-35-114(2). 
FN42. Tenn.Code Ann.§ 40-35-114(6). 
FN43. Tenn.Code Ann.§ 40-35-114(8) 
FN44. Tenn.Code Ann.§ 40-35-114(13)((). 
FN45. Tenn.Code Ann.§ 40-35-114(14). 
FN46. In the brief filed in this Court, the State seeks to side-step its concession in the Court of Criminal Appeals that 
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the trial court should not have considered the enhancement factors in Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-114(6), (14). This the 
State cannot do because of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. See Marcus v. Marcus, 993 S.W.2d 596, 602 (Tenn.1999) 
(quoting Obion County v. McKinnis, 211 Tenn. 183, 186, 364 S.W.2d 356, 357 (1962)) (holding that "a party will not be 
permitted to occupy inconsistent positions or to take a position in regard to a matter which is directly contrary to, or 
inconsistent with, one previously assumed by him"). 
FN47. The aggravating circumstance in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(6) arises when "[t]he murder is committed 
for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing the lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another." 
FN48. The aggravating circumstance in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(7) arises when "[t]he murder was knowingly 
committed ... by the defendant, while the defendant had a substantial role in committing ... any ... robbery .... " 
FN49. Mr. Banks's precise words were "I tried to pull him away but he was too heavy to move." 
FN50. See Act of May 22, 1995, ch. 377, 1995 Tenn. Pub. Acts 587. 
FN51. Even prior to this legislative amendment, Mr. Banks's argument would have been unavailing for, as this Court 
indicated 1n State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 679, 692-93 (Tenn. 1997), "application of the felony murder aggravating 
circumstance is inappropriate only if the defendant is convicted solely on the basis of felony murder. Implicit in that 
statement is the recognition that the circumstance properly may be applied if a defendant is convicted of premeditated 
first degree murder." See also Carter v. State, 958 S.W.2d 620, 624-25 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Price, 46 S.W.3d 785, 
826-27 (Tenn.Crim.App.2000). 
FN52. He asserts that all the challenged provisions "[e]xcept where otherwise noted," violate U.S. Const. amend. V, 
VI, VII, and XIV. 
FN53. Likewise, he asserts that the challenged provisions "[e]xcept where otherwise noted," violate Tenn. Const. art. 
I,§§ 8, 9, 16, 17 and Tenn Const. art. II,§ 2. 
FN54. See generally Joan E. Jacoby, The American Prosecutor: A Search for Identity47 (1980); William T. Pizzi, 
Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an 
Instrument of Reform, 54 Ohio St. L.J. 1325, 1337-40 (1993); Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the 
Law, 104 Mich. L.Rev. 709, 725-29 (2006). 
FN55. Frank W. Miller, Prosecution: The Decision to Charge a Suspect With a Crime 294-95 (1969). 
FN56. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495-96, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977); Turner v. 
Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 358-59, 90 S.Ct. 532, 24 L.Ed.2d 567 (1970). 
FN57. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,987, 108 S.Ct. 2777, 101 L.Ed.2d 827 (1988); 
Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400-01, 106 S.Ct. 3000, 92 L.Ed.2d 315 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring in part); Int'l 
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 337-42, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). 
FN58. The "Baldus studies" at issue in McCleskey v. Kemp consisted of two statistical studies examining over 2,000 
murder cases that occurred in Georgia during the 1970s. These studies suggested that black defendants who kill white 
victims had the greatest likelihood of receiving the death penalty. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 286-87, 107 S.Ct. 
1756. The United States District Court found the studies' methodology flawed and declined to consider them. The United 
States Court of Appeals assumed that the Baldus studies showed racial disparities in the imposition of the death penalty 
in Georgia. The United States Supreme Court did not address the studies' methodology. 
FN59. Mr. Banks makes specific reference to a "nationwide study published in the Dallas Times Herald, June 17, 
1985," information compiled by the NAACP and found on the Death Penalty Information Center's website, and a 1990 
Report of the General Accounting Office to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. 
FN60. Scholarly analysis of crime and conviction data indicates that the difference between the number of men and 
women sentenced to death can be attributed to non-discriminatory factors. There is, for example, a significant variance 
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between the number of murders committed by men and the number of murders committed by women. Lawrence M. 
Friedman, Dead Hands: Past and Present in Crimina/Justice Policy, 27 Cumb. L.Rev. 903, 911 (1996-1997); David 
McCord, Imagining a Retnbutivist Alternative to Capital Punishment, 50 Fla. L.Rev. 1, 123 n. 459 (1998). Similarly, there 
is a well-documented variance between the types of murders generally committed by men and those generally 
committed by women. Elizabeth Rapaport, Equality of the Damned: The Execution of Women on the Cusp of the 21st 
Century, 26 Ohio N.U. L.Rev. 581, 582-83 (2000); Elizabeth Rapaport, The Death Penalty and Gender Discrimination, 25 
Law & Soc'y Rev. 367, 369-74 (1991); Victor L. Streib, Gendering the Death Penalty: Countering Sex Bias in a Masculine 
Sanctuary, 63 Ohio St. L.J. 433, 459 (2002); see also Lawrence A. Greenfeld & Tracy L. Snell, Bureau of Justice Statistics 
Special Report Women Offenders4 (Revised 2000), available athttp://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ bjs/pub/pdf/wo.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2008). 
FN61. Riley C. Darnell, Tennessee Blue Book 2007-2008 641 (2008) (reporting data collected by the United State 
Census Bureau's 2000 census). 
FN62. This information is available through a review of the annual Crime in Tennessee reports available from the 
Tennessee Bureau of Investigation Statistical Analysis Center, available at http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/divisions/isd_csu_ 
sac.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2008). The date for the period from 2001 through 2007 shows that 39 .2% of the murders 
reported in Tennessee in 2001 occurred in Shelby County; 38.5% in 2002; 34.3% in 2003; 30.9% in 2004; 33.7% in 
2005; 36.7% in 2006; and 34.9% in 2007. 
FN63. The data for the period from 2001 through 2007 shows that 71.1 % of the murders reported in Tennessee in 
2001 occurred in Davidson, Hamilton, Knox, Madison, Shelby, and Sullivan Counties; 69.8% in 2002; 67.0% in 2003; 
62.6% in 2004; 72.6% in 2005; 71.9% in 2006; and 68.9% in 2007. 
FN64. The homicides reported in these six counties exceeded 70% of the total number of homicides reported 
statewide in 2001, 2005, and 2006. 
FN65. Between 2001 and 2007, the average percentage of the reported homicides in these six counties was 69.1 % 
of the statewide total. 
FN66. We also note that the United States Supreme Court has declined to invalidate a substantially similar execution 
protocol that was challenged on essentially the same grounds. Baze v. Rees,_ U.S.__,_, 128 S.Ct. 1520, 1528, 
170 L.Ed.2d 420 (2008). 
FN67. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., Report on Administration of Death Sentence in Tennessee (Apr. 30, 2007), available at 
Workman v. Breedesen, 486 F.3d 896, 913-921 (6th Cir.2007) (Appendix A); see also State v. Payne, No. M1988-00096-
SC-DPE-DD, (Tenn. Oct. 22, 2007) (order), available athttp://www.tsc.state.tn.us/ OPINIONS/ 
TSC/Ca pCases/Payne/20071022/ Payne&Puml ;ervisOrderl 0-22-07. pdf. 
FN2. It is undisputed that, during the course of the Appellant's representation, certain reassignments in the Public 
Defender's Office resulted in Attorney Thackery being relieved from this case. Attorney White was appointed in her place. 
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Sullivan, Scott D. Criss, and Veronica Calderon Malavia), for Appellee. 
Justice HALL delivered the opinion of the court: 
Following a jury trial, defendant Darryl Sutton was convicted of seven counts of 
214 
murder for the rape and shooting death of Monica Rinaldi. He was sentenced to four 100-year extended-term prison 
sentences and three natural life sentences. On direct appeal we reversed defendant's conviction and remanded the case 
for a new trial after we determined, among other things, that the trial court erred in admitting the hypnotically enhanced 
testimony of sole eyewitness David Janik. People v. Sutton, 349 III.App.3d 608, 622, 285 Ill.Dec. 723, 812 N.E.2d 543 
(2004). 
The State has now filed this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(l) (188 Ill.2d R. 604(a) 
( 1 )), along with a certificate of substantial impairment, seeking to overturn two pretrial rulings the trial court made on 
remand suppressing Janik's out-of-court statements to police as well as his lineup identification of defendant and his 
potential in-court identification of defendant at the upcoming retrial. 
The State contends on appeal that the trial court erred in suppressing Janik's lineup identification of defendant and 
his potential in-court identification of defendant without first holding a pretrial evidentiary hearing to determine whether 
these post-hypnotic identifications were based upon Janik's independent pre-hypnotic recall. The State also contends the 
trial court erred in finding that Janik's out-of-court statements to responding police officers at the scene and in the 
ambulance were inadmissible under Crawford v. Washington, 541 u:s. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). For 
the reasons which follow, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the cause for further proceedings. 
The facts of this case have already been set forth at length in our prior opinion and need not be repeated here in 
their entirety. To the extent particular facts are important to the issues before us, they will be discussed. 
The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. Shortly after midnight on February 14, 1991, police officers 
responded to the call of a man ringing doorbells of houses located on the 4000 block of Forest Avenue in Brookfield, 
Illinois. Upon their arrival police found David Janik staggering and bleeding. Janik told police he had been shot and 
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robbed and that his girlfriend had also been shot. Police discovered Janik's girlfriend, Monica Rinaldi, lying across the 
backseat of her car parked in a nearby alley. Rinaldi was unclothed and had sustained a fatal gunshot wound to the 
head. 
Officer Timothy Moroney rode with Janik in an ambulance to the hospital. On the way to the hospital, Janik allegedly 
gave the officer a brief account of events leading up to the shootings along with a general description of the assailant. 
According to Officer Moroney, Janik described the assailant as a black man of about 30 to 35 years of age, with a 
moustache, wearing a dark coat and hat. At trial, however, Janik had no memory of his conversation with Officer 
Moroney. 
Doctors discovered that although Janik's gunshot wound to the head had not penetrated his cranium or caused 
major vascular injuries, he had suffered amnesia regarding the offense. Hospital charts revealed Janik could not 
remember anything from the time he left work on February 13, 1991, to the time he awoke in the hospital, and initially 
could not remember the day or year it was. 
Janik was released from the hospital after five or six days. Following his release, Janik viewed a photographic array 
but was unable to identify his assailant from the photographs. 
215 
Shortly thereafter, from March 1991 to December 1991, Janik underwent periodic sessions of hypnosis and other 
memory-retrieval therapies such as guided imaging and dream interpretation in an effort to identify the assailant. Janik 
testified that his memory came back "in bit and pieces." Medical notes reveal that during one therapy session Janik 
remarked that the assailant had "Mexican" like features. 
At trial, conflicting accounts were given as to the time period a composite sketch of the assailant was made. Officer 
Michael Manescalchi testified that Janik assisted a police sketch artist in preparing a composite sketch of the assailant on 
February 28, 1991. Janik, however, testified that by May 11, 1991, he still could not visualize the assailant's face. He 
testified that after one particular therapy session he regained memory of what the assailant looked like and afterwards 
enlisted the services of an artist friend to draw a composite sketch of the assailant. 
In September 1991, approximately six months into his therapy, Janik allegedly provided Officer Manescalchi with a 
more detailed description of the assailant and a somewhat different version of the offense than he had previously given 
police. Rather than merely describing the assailant as a black man of about 30 to 35 years of age, with a moustache, the 
offender was now described as a black male, approximately 5 feet 11 inches in height, weighing 175 pounds, with a 
mustache, medium skin, and black hair cut very short and neat. Rather than merely describing the assailant as wearing a 
dark coat and hat, the attacker was now described as having worn a caramel-colored leather driving hat with matching 
leather jacket. 
In addition, Jani k's pre hypnotic and posthypnotic statements set forth different accounts of the offense. Janik initially 
told Officer Moroney he was shot after he was forced into the trunk of the car and the car had traveled an unknown 
period of time. However, in his posthypnotic statement, Janik stated he was shot as he put one foot in the trunk of the 
car. 
Jani k's prehypnotic and posthypnotic statements also differed in the amount of detail surrounding the offense. In the 
posthypnotic statement, unlike the prehypnotic statement, Janik recounts the specific route the assailant took after 
hijacking the vehicle and also describes the assailant's threatening comments and behavior. 
Janik further states in his posthypnotic statement that while he was in the car's trunk he heard mumbling and felt 
someone moving around in the car. The car was shaking and he started screaming and kicking the car's backseat 
whereupon the assailant yelled at him to be quiet. When the car stopped shaking, he heard a gunshot and smelled 
gunpowder. He then heard the driver's-side door open and close. The offender yelled at him through the trunk, "I didn't 
want to shoot you but if you ID me, I will [kill] you." Janik eventually exited the vehicle and began banging on the doors 
of nearby homes. 
On May 21, 1998, approximately seven years after the shooting incident and his discontinuance of the hypnosis 
sessions, Janik viewed a lineup and identified defendant as the shooter. Defendant had been placed in the lineup based 
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upon DNA evidence. 
On direct appeal, we reversed defendant's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial alter we determined 
that pursuant to the holding in People v. Zayas, 131 Ill.2d 284, 295, 137 Ill.Dec. 568, 546 N.E.2d 513 (1989), the trial 
court had erred in admitting Janik's hypnotically enhanced testimony. Sutton, 349 III.App.3d at 617,285 Ill.Dec. 723,812 
N.E.2d 543. In Zayas, the supreme court held that 
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because the relevant scientific community had not generally accepted hypnosis as an accurate or reliable means of 
restoring a witness's memory, the hypnotically enhanced testimony of anyone other than a defendant was per se 
inadmissible. Zayas, 131 Ill.2d at 295, 137 Ill.Dec. 568,546 N.E.2d 513. 
We determined that in comparison to Janik's prehypnotic statement, his posthypnotic testimony contained much 
more detail indicating it was influenced by hypnosis, especially in light of his testimony explaining that over the course of 
therapy his memory came back "in bits and pieces" and that alter he stopped therapy he did not regain any more 
memory of the offense. Sutton, 349 III.App.3d at 617, 285 Ill.Dec. 723, 812 N.E.2d 543. We further concluded that the 
trial court's error in admitting Janik's hypnotically influenced testimony was compounded when the court improperly 
precluded defendant from presenting expert testimony concerning the possible effects of hypnosis and other memory-
retrieval processes on a witness's ability to accurately recall events. Finally, we determined that defendant's 
constitutional rights to a fair trial, confront witnesses, and present a defense were violated when, as a discovery 
sanction, the trial court denied defendant's pretrial discovery request to independently retest the DNA evidence 
recovered in this case. Sutton, 349 III.App.3d at 618, 285 Ill.Dec. 723, 812 N.E.2d 543. 
Following remand, defendant filed a motion to suppress Janik's testimony on the ground that it was hypnotically 
enhanced and should be suppressed pursuant to the holding in Zayas. Defendant argued that since we determined in 
Sutton /that Janik's posthypnotic statements were influenced by hypnosis and were therefore per se inadmissible under 
Zayas, the law of the case required his testimony be suppressed. The State countered that the trial court should not 
suppress Janik's testimony without first conducting a pretrial evidentiary hearing to determine whether the testimony 
was based upon his independent prehypnotic recall. 
The trial court granted the defendant's motion suppressing Janik's testimony, without holding an evidentiary hearing, 
concluding that the testimony was rendered inadmissible under Sutton I. The trial court also granted defendant's motion 
in //mine excluding Janik's out-of-court statements given to police at the scene and in the ambulance pursuant to 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). Alter its motion to reconsider the 
Crawford ruling was denied, the State filed this interlocutory appeal along with a certificate of substantial impairment 
seeking to overturn the two rulings. 
ANALYSIS 
The State contends the trial court erred in suppressing Janik's 1998 lineup identification of defendant and his 
expected in-court identification of defendant at the retrial, without first holding a pretrial evidentiary hearing to 
determine whether these posthypnotic identifications were based upon Janik's independent prehypnotic recall. The State 
maintains the trial court erred in this regard because it improperly concluded that our finding in Sutton I - that Janik's 
trial testimony was hypnotically influenced - constituted the law of the case precluding the trial court on remand from 
holding such an evidentiary hearing. 
Under the law of the case doctrine, issues presented and disposed of by a reviewing court in a prior appeal are 
binding upon remand to the trial court and on subsequent appeal to the reviewing court unless the facts presented are 
so different 
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as to require a different interpretation or a higher court has changed the law. 81/ut v. Northwestern University, 296 
III.App.3d 42, 47, 230 Ill.Dec. 161, 692 N.E.2d 1327 (1998); Emerson Electric Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 352 
II I.App.3d 399, 417, 287 Ill.Dec. 280, 815 N.E.2d 924 (2004 ). The law of the case doctrine was developed to ensure 
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uniformity of decisions, maintain consistency during the course of a single trial, and bring litigation to an end. Emerson 
Electric Co., 352 III.App.3d at 417, 287 Ill.Dec. 280,815 N.E.2d 924. 
There are two exceptions to this doctrine. The first exception applies when a higher reviewing court, following the 
first appeal, makes a contrary ruling on the precise issue of law on which the appellate court based its prior decision. 
Martin v. Federal Life Insurance Co., 268 III.App.3d 698, 701, 205 Ill.Dec. 826, 644 N.E.2d 42 (1994). The second 
exception, which the State contends applies here, allows a reviewing court to depart from the doctrine if the court 
determines that its prior decision was palpably erroneous. Martin, 268 III.App.3d at 701, 205 Ill.Dec. 826, 644 N.E.2d 42. 
We disagree with the State's contention that our decision in Sutton /was palpably erroneous. 
However, as a preliminary matter, we reject defendant's argument that the State waived this issue by failing to 
challenge the Sutton I decision in a petition for rehearing or a petition for leave to appeal. Review of the record shows 
that on direct appeal and following remand, the State has consistently maintained the position that Janik's lineup 
identification testimony and in-court identification of defendant were admissible. Under these circumstances it can hardly 
be said that the State sat on its rights thereby waiving this issue. 
Moreover, defendant cites no legal authority supporting his assertion that in order to preserve an issue for 
interlocutory appeal under Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(l), the State must first either file a petition for rehearing or a 
petition for leave to appeal. Under Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) (188 Ill.2d R. 341(e)(7)), any argument not supported 
by citation to legal authority is deemed waived and need not be addressed on appeal. People v. Mora/es, 343 III.App.3d 
987,991, 279 Ill. Dec. 183, 799 N.E.2d 986 (2003). 
In another preliminary argument, defendant contends the State's claims are not properly before this court pursuant 
to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(l) because the State is not actually appealing the trial court's suppression ruling, but is 
instead using the interlocutory appeal to challenge our decision in Sutton fin lieu of filing a petition for rehearing. We 
disagree. 
As mentioned, following remand defendant filed a motion to suppress Janik's testimony on the ground that since we 
had determined in Sutton /that Janik's posthypnotic statements were influenced by hypnosis and were therefore per se 
inadmissible under Zayas, the law of the case required his testimony be suppressed. After the trial court granted the 
motion and denied the State's motion to reconsider, the State appealed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(l). 
Supreme Curt Rule 604(a)(l) provides in relevant part that "[i]n criminal cases the State may appeal only from an 
order or judgment the substantive effect of which results in * * * suppressing evidence." 188 Ill.2d R. 604(a)(l). Rule 
604(a)( 1) permits the State to appeal a pretrial suppression order if the substantive effect of the order suppresses 
evidence and the suppression substantially impairs the State's ability to prosecute the case. People v. Young, 82 Ill.2d 
234, 247, 
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45 Ill.Dec. 150,412 N.E.2d 501 (1980); People v. Sargeant, 292 III.App.3d 508, 510, 226 Ill.Dec. 501, 685 N.E.2d 956 
( 1997). 
In the instant case, the trial court's order suppressing Janik's testimony had the substantive effect of preventing 
evidence from being admitted at trial and impairing the State's ability to prosecute the case. Therefore, the State's claims 
are properly before this court pursuant to Rule 604(a)(l). 
Turning to the merits, a trial court's decision not to revisit a matter previously litigated in reliance upon the law of 
the case doctrine will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Daniels, 346 III.App.3d 350, 355, 805 
N.E.2d 1206 (2004). The State maintains that our decision in Sutton /was palpably erroneous and therefore the trial 
court erred in concluding that the decision constituted the law of the case. 
The State contends that our decision in Sutton /was palpably erroneous under People v. Wilson, 116 Ill.2d 29, 106 
Ill.Dec. 771, 506 N.E.2d 571 (1987), because we improperly acted as fact finder in concluding that Janik's posthypnotic 
identification of defendant was influenced by hypnosis. The State maintains that pursuant to Wilson, the matter should 
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be remanded to the trial court for a pretrial evidentiary hearing to give the State an opportunity to present evidence 
establishing that Janik's posthypnotic identification of defendant was based upon his prehypnotic recall. The State asks 
us to reverse the trial court's ruling and remand the cause for a full pretrial evidentiary hearing. We must decline the 
State's request. 
In Wilson, the supreme court found that although the trial court correctly ruled that a previously hypnotized witness 
could testify to his prehypnotic recollection, the court should have held a pretrial hearing to determine whether the 
witness's posthypnotic identification was based upon his prehypnotic recall where he did not view defendant until after 
the hypnosis session, the extent of the witness's recall was in dispute, and the prehypnotic description was not set forth 
in the record. Wilson, 116 Ill.2d at 49, 106 Ill.Dec. 771, 506 N.E.2d 571. 
Wilson does not support the State's position because the extent of Janik's pre hypnotic recall is not in dispute and his 
prehypnotic description of the assailant is fully set forth in the record. Thus, unlike Wilson, there was no need for the 
Sutton I court to remand the case to the trial court for a pretrial hearing to determine the extent of Jani k's prehypnotic 
recollection. 
There also was no need for the Sutton I court to remand the matter to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to 
determine whether Janik's posthypnotic testimony was anchored in his prehypnotic recall since the record clearly showed 
his testimony was influenced by hypnosis making it per se inadmissible under Zayas. At the time Sutton I was decided, it 
did not take an expert to conclude that Janik's posthypnotic testimony was not based upon his prehypnotic recall where 
the record revealed he underwent hypnosis after having given the most generic description of the assailant and emerged 
from hypnosis giving a far more detailed description of the attacker and a significantly different version of events. 
Moreover, evidence was presented that after Janik ceased therapy he did not regain any more memory of the offense. 
(fnl) At retrial, Janik should be allowed 
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to testify to matters he was able to recall prior to undergoing hypnosis. 
The State next contends the trial court erred in concluding that the admission of Janik's out-of-court statements to 
police at the scene and in the ambulance would violate defendant's sixth amendment right to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him in violation of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The 
trial court's determination on this issue is subject to de nova review. See, e.g., United States v. Rondeau, 430 F.3d 44, 
47 (1st Cir.2005) (asserted Crawford constitutional error reviewed under de nova standard). 
The sixth amendment states that in all "criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right* * * to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const., amend. VI. In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court held 
that the sixth amendment's confrontation clause bars the admission of an out-of-court testimonial statement by a 
witness who does not appear at trial, unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the accused had a prior opportunity 
to cross-examine the witness. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54, 124 S.Ct. at 1365, 158 L.Ed.2d at 194. 
Defendant contends the trial court properly ruled that Janik's out-of-court statements were inadmissible under 
Crawford because they were testimonial in nature and Janik was rendered unavailable for cross-examination due to his 
having undergone hypnosis. We disagree. 
Although the Crawford Court did not articulate a comprehensive definition of testimonial statements, it did provide 
some examples of a "core class" of statements that would be considered testimonial, including: (1) ex parte in-court 
testimony or its functional equivalent such as affidavits or custodial examinations; (2) extrajudicial statements in 
formalized testimonial materials such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions; (3) statements made 
under circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available 
for use at a later trial; and (4) statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations. People v. Kim, 368 Ill. 
App.3d 717, 719, 307111.Dec. 92,859 N.E.2d 92 (2006), citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52, 124 S.Ct. at 1364, 158 
L.Ed.2d at 193. 
Building on Crawford, the Court in Dav,sdistinguished between testimonial and nontestimonial statements in the 
context of police interrogations. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S.___, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2273-74, 165 L.Ed.2d 224, 236-37 
(2006). The Davis Court determined that out-of-court statements are nontestimonial 
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for purposes of the sixth amendment's confrontation clause "when made in the course of police interrogation under 
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet 
an ongoing emergency"; the Court found such statements are testimonial and therefore inadmissible as violative of the 
confrontation clause "when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution." Davis, 547 U.S. at_, 126 S.Ct. at 2273-74, 165 L.Ed.2d at 237. 
The question of whether a statement obtained through police interrogation is testimonial is a factual inquiry 
determined on a case-by-case basis. People v. West, 355 III.App.3d 28, 36, 291 Ill.Dec. 72, 823 N.E.2d 82 (2005). The 
relevant inquiry is whether the circumstances of an interrogation objectively indicate the officer was acting to meet an 
ongoing emergency or was rather acting in an investigative capacity to obtain evidence in anticipation of a potential 
criminal prosecution. Davis, 547 U.S. at_, 126 S.Ct. at 2277, 165 L.Ed.2d at 240-41. 
The facts and circumstances of this case, when viewed objectively, indicate that when officers first arrived on the 
scene, the primary purpose of their interrogation was to elicit statements to ascertain if they were facing an ongoing 
emergency and if so, to obtain information necessary to resolve that emergency as opposed to seeking evidence to 
establish the facts of a past crime. When officers arrived at the scene, they did so in response to calls of a man ringing 
house doorbells. Officers found Janik staggering and bleeding from the head. 
Janik told police he had been shot and robbed and that his girlfriend, Monica Rinaldi, had also been shot. He 
described the assailant as a black man of about 30 to 35 years of age, with a moustache, wearing a dark coat and hat. 
Officers discovered Rinaldi, lying across the backseat of her car parked in a nearby alley. She was unclothed and had 
sustained a fatal gunshot wound to the head. 
Under these circumstances any reasonable observer would deduce that the primary purpose of the initial 
interrogation was to ascertain if there was an ongoing emergency and if so, to obtain information necessary to resolve 
that emergency. We consequently find that the on-the-scene statements elicited from Janik were nontestimonial in 
nature and therefore not subject to Crawford and Davis. Moreover, we find that these statements are admissible under 
the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule. 
For a statement to qualify as a spontaneous declaration, three requirements must be met, (1) there must be an 
occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement; (2) there must be an absence of 
time for the declarant to fabricate the statement; and (3) the statement must relate to the circumstances of the 
occurrence. People v. Williams, 193 Ill.2d 306, 352, 250 Ill. Dec. 692, 739 N.E.2d 455 (2000). All three requirements 
were present in the case at bar. The shooting was sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting 
declaration. The record indicates there was an absence of time for Janik to fabricate his statements. And finally, Janik's 
statements to police that he had been shot and robbed and that his girlfriend had also been shot relate to the 
circumstances of the occurrence. 
In regard to the interrogation in the ambulance, the circumstances objectively 
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indicate that the primary purpose of this interrogation was to establish the facts of a past crime rather than ascertain or 
resolve an ongoing emergency. Once the police secured Janik's safety and called the ambulance, their interrogation 
evolved and they elicited testimonial responses. Although some portions of Janik's statements to obtain medical help 
may have arguably been nontestimonial, the bulk of his elicited statements were testimonial in nature where they 
consisted of an account of the crime and a general description of the assailant. 
That being said, we still find that the statements elicited from Janik in the ambulance are admissible and not subject 
to Crawford and Davis, since the record and relevant case law indicate he is available for cross-examination. 
We reject defendant's contention that Janik is unavailable for cross-examination for purposes of the confrontation 
clause by virtue of his decision to undergo hypnosis. Even though Janik's posthypnotic statements are inadmissible under 
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Zayas, this does not render him legally incompetent to give testimony concerning matters occurring before he was 
hypnotized. At retrial, Janik should only be allowed to testify to matters he was able to recall at the first trial prior to 
undergoing hypnosis. 
Finally, the State contends that defendant has forfeited his sixth amendment right to confront Janik by having 
caused his unavailability. Under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, a defendant waives his sixth amendment right 
to confront his accuser if he causes the witness's unavailability at trial. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 98 U.S. 
145, 25 L.Ed. 244 {1878); Davis, 547 U.S. at_, 126 S.Ct. at 2280, 165 L.Ed.2d at 244. We do not reach this final issue 
in light of our recommendation that we find Janik available for cross-examination. 
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's order granting defendant's motion suppressing Janik's posthypnotic 
statements, we reverse the court's order granting defendant's motion in limine excluding Janik's out-of-court statements 
to responding police officers at the scene and in the ambulance, and we remand the cause for further proceedings 
consistent with this order. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded. 
HOFFMAN and SOUTH, JJ., concur. 
Footnotes: 
FN 1. At oral argument it was suggested that the law of the case doctrine might not govern retrial of defendant 
concerning this issue because the doctrine applied to Sutton I only insofar as we found that Jani k's trial testimony was 
hypnotically influenced. It was suggested that since the case was remanded for a new trial and we found Janik had given 
police prehypnotic statements that were not ·influenced by hypnosis, the doctrine did not preclude the trial court from 
conducting a pretrial evidentiary hearing to ascertain if, through the passage of time, Janik had regained any further 
memory of the offense that was not influenced by hypnosis. It was suggested that this issue should be settled in a 
pretrial evidentiary hearing at which the trial judge would hear expert testimony from both sides and Janik would be 
subject to cross-examination. 
The problem with these suggestions is that our supreme court in Zayas has determined that a previously hypnotized 
witness is virtually immune from effective cross-examination because having been hypnotized, the witness "gains 
complete confidence in his 'restored' memory, forgets how it was 'restored,' and is unable to differentiate between that 
which he was able to recall before hypnosis and that which the hypnosis elicited." Zayas, 131 Ill.2d at 291, 137 Ill.Dec. 
568, 546 N.E.2d 513. Therefore, at retrial, Janik should only be allowed to testify to matters he was able to recall at the 
first trial prior to undergoing hypnosis. 
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Appeal from the Circuit Court, Cook County, Joseph J. Kazmierski, J. 
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Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney of Cook County, Chicago, IL (James Fitzgerald and Eve Reilly, Asst. State's Attorneys, 
of Counsel), for Plaintiff-Appellee. 
Patricia Unsinn, Deputy Defender of Cook County, Chicago, IL (Katherine M. Donahoe, Asst. Appellate Defender, of 
counsel), for Defendant-Appellant. 
Justice McBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court: 
In 2004, defendant Wade Hampton was arrested and charged with the 1993 shooting death of Terrance McKinney. 
Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of first degree murder. The trial court subsequently sentenced 
defendant to 28 years in prison. 
Defendant appeals, arguing that: (1) he was deprived of his constitutional right to cross-examine one of the State's 
witnesses who testified that he was unable to remember the events surrounding the shooting and the trial court then 
allowed the admission of the witness's prior testimony from a codefendant's trial; and (2) the prosecutor's comments in 
closing and rebuttal arguments exceeded the bounds of fairness and impartiality and denied defendant a fair trial. 
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The following evidence was admitted at defendant's June 2006 trial. 
Demetrius Foster testified that in July 1993, he was friends with Terrance McKinney. They had known each other 
since high school. On the night of July 17, 1993, he met some friends, including McKinney, at Union Hall, located at 9340 
South Chicago, for a reggae party. 
At around 2:30 a.m., Foster saw McKinney talking to a man he did not know. Foster estimated he was 20 to 25 feet 
away from McKinney at this time. He said the men talked for about five to six minutes. One man went outside and 
McKinney turned to Foster and asked Foster to get someone. McKinney then went outside. Foster identified defendant as 
the man he saw talking to McKinney. Foster went outside about two to three minutes after McKinney. 
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When Foster went outside, McKinney was standing a little in front of him. Then, Foster saw a red car pull up and 
defendant went to the car. Defendant turned around and shot McKinney. Foster was about 25 to 30 feet away at this 
point. Foster saw McKinney get shot in the stomach. McKinney then turned to take cover between cars and defendant 
walked toward him. Foster stated that defendant fired the gun five or six times. Foster testified that he made eye contact 
with defendant and then he "dove" for cover between some cars. The shots went over his head. After he took cover, 
Foster "heard the wheels go." He got up and saw McKinney on the ground. 
Later at the hospital, Foster spoke with the police. He was shown pictures and he identified defendant and the driver 
of the red car. In August 1993, Foster viewed a lineup and identified the driver of the red car. 
On cross-examination, Foster stated that he testified at the trial for Dwight Ramsay, the driver of the red car. He 
admitted he knew William Lockwood, one of the bouncers at Union Hall, but he was not a personal friend. He does not 
remember if he talked to Lockwood right before the shooting, but he seemed to remember talking to him at some point. 
He denied that Lockwood had to break up the conversation between McKinney and defendant. He admitted that he 
might have testified at Ramsay's trial that he went outside seconds after McKinney. Foster said that he had a few beers 
that night, but denied that had been getting drunk at home before going out. However, he admitted that he had testified 
at Ramsay's trial that he had been home getting drunk. Foster did not recall describing the shooter to the police as 5 feet 
6 inches tall, 145 pounds with a medium complexion. 
Dr. Edmund Donoghue testified that he is employed by the office of medical examiner of Cook County. He stated 
that McKinney was shot three times; once in the abdomen and twice in his left leg. He said there was no evidence of 
close-range firing. He concluded that the cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds and the manner of death was 
homicide. 
William Lockwood testified that in July 1993, he was employed as a bouncer for Union Hall, a reggae club. Lockwood 
stated that all he could remember about the night of July 17, 1993, was that someone got shot and a red car was 
involved. When asked questions about the details of the shooting and any identifications he made, he testified that he 
could not recall. Lockwood also said that he did not remember testifying in the 1995 trial for codefendant Ramsay. The 
prosecutor went through Lockwood's prior testimony and asked him if he recalled the questions asked and the answers 
given. Other than 
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questions about his employment and the color of the car involved, Lockwood indicated that he did not remember. 
Lockwood testified that he "had major reconstructive surgery and [his] memory [was] not what it used to be." On cross-
examination, Lockwood explained that he had been in a car accident and now has a steel jaw. When asked lf this 
accident effected his memory, Lockwood answered that "it's kind of sketchy." Lockwood continued to answer that he did 
not recall the circumstances of the shooting and said he did not recognize defendant. 
Sergeant Charles Popelarz testified that in July 1993, he was a detective with the Chicago police department and 
was assigned to investigate McKinney's homicide. He interviewed both Foster and Lockwood and assembled a photo 
lineup for them. Popelarz stated that Foster identified defendant as the shooter and codefendant Ramsay as the driver of 
the red car. Lockwood viewed the pictures separately and he also identified defendant as the shooter and Ramsay as the 
driver. In August 1993, Popelarz was informed by the state police in Ohio that Ramsay was in custody. Ramsey was 
subsequently extradited to Chicago. Later, a lineup was conducted and Foster identified Ramsay in the lineup. 
On cross-examination, defendant's attorney asked Popelarz about his initial interview of Foster and Popelarz's report 
of that interview. Popelarz said that Foster told him that the offender was the passenger in the red car when it pulled up 
in front of the club. The offender then got out of the car and started firing at McKinney. Popelarz did not recall being told 
by Foster that the offender pointed a gun at him and they made eye contact. 
Codefendant Dwight Ramsay testified for the State and admitted that he was convicted in 1995 for McKinney's 
murder and received a 20-year sentence. At the time of trial, Ramsay had completed his time for McKinney's murder, but 
was serving time for a conviction for contraband in a penal institution. Ramsay knew defendant "from a frierid of a 
friend." In 1993, he had known defendant for about a year and a half. Ramsay identified defendant in court. 
Ramsay stated that on July 17, 1993, he went to a reggae party at 93rd and South Chicago with defendant. The 
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men took his car, which was a 1987 red Sterling. Ramsay said that he brought a gun with him to the party and he 
believed that defendant had one too. At around 2:30 a.m., Ramsay saw defendant talking to McKinney, whom he had 
seen on one prior occasion. Ramsay thought something was going on because McKinney had "aggressive" body 
language. Eventually, defendant came over to Ramsay and told him to leave first and defendant would follow. Ramsay 
exited the club and went to his car. He pulled the car onto the street and saw defendant in a conversation with 
McKinney. Ramsay stated that he opened the passenger door and shouted for defendant "to come on." 
Defendant came over to the car and then turned around and fired on McKinney. Ramsay testified that defendant got 
the gun from his waist. Ramsay said that McKinney was a few feet from defendant when the shooting started. McKinney 
tried to take cover behind some cars while defendant chased him and continued shooting. After the shooting, defendant 
got in the passenger seat of Ramsay's car and Ramsay drove off. 
After the shooting, Ramsay and defendant decided to go to New York to lay low. On the way to New York, they were 
in a car accident in Ohio. Ramsay showed the Ohio police an identification with a fake name on it and was arrested 
under that 
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name. Defendant left the area. When Ramsay posted bond, he tried to retrieve his car, but was unable to do so. He then 
flew to New York and met up with defendant. He stayed there for about two weeks. On his way back to Chicago, 
Ramsay again tried to retrieve his car in Ohio, but he was arrested by the Ohio police and later brought back to Chicago. 
Ramsay denied being offered any promises in exchange for his testimony. 
On cross-examination, Ramsay testified that he had someone else bring his gun into the club. He said that when he 
pulled up in his car, he called for defendant to "come on," and opened the door hoping that defendant would get in the 
car. Ramsay also stated that the first time he was approached by the State to testify, he declined. Later, Ramsay 
contacted the State and offered to help. Ramsay admitted that he had immigration problems because he is a Jamaican 
citizen. He did not want to be sent back "as a convict being shackled." He testified that the State offered to write a letter 
saying that Ramsay testified in defendant's case. 
Detective John Campbell testified that he is employed by the Chicago police department and assigned to the cold 
case homicide squad. In 2004, Campbell was assigned to the fugitive apprehension section. In April 2004, defendant was 
taken into custody in Oakland, California, and Campbell went there to bring him back to Chicago. Campbell identified 
defendant in court. Campbell stated that at the time of his arrest, defendant had an Illinois State identification card 
bearing his picture under the name of Kevin King. 
Campbell flew back to Chicago with defendant. During the flight and after having been given his Miranda rights, 
defendant asked Campbell about the case. He asked how many years Ramsay had received and who were the witnesses 
against him, but Campbell did not divulge that information. Defendant admitted to Campbell that he had been at the 
reggae club that night, but was evasive when Campbell asked about his involvement. 
The State offered a stipulation that if called to testify Angela Tisdale would state that she was an assistant State's 
Attorney and was present in 1995 for Ramsay's trial. She would testify that Lockwood testified in that case. The State 
then read into the record the transcript of Lockwood's testimony. 
Lockwood testified that in July 1993 he knew who McKinney was, but they were not friends. He saw McKinney at 
Union Hall on the night of July 17, 1993. At around 2:30 a.m., Lockwood was by the door and was called to "neutralize 
the situation." He asked the two men arguing to take it outside. Lockwood said one of the men was McKinney, but he did 
not know the name of the other man, though he recognized him as previously having attended the club. The men 
walked outside and stood near the curb. Lockwood was having a conversation with his partner and Foster. At that time, 
a red car pulled up and the other man turned and walked toward the car. He then turned around and proceeded to 
shoot McKinney. McKinney was shot once and then tried to take cover while the other man continued to shoot. The 
other man then jumped into the red car and it pulled away. 
Lockwood identified the red car as a Sterling. He described it as having a neon pink trim around the back license 
plate and panels that were gray on the bottom part of the car. Lockwood saw at least two individuals in the car. 
Lockwood said that he could not see the type of weapon used, but testified that "from [his] knowledge [he] knew it was 
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an automatic, a large caliber automatic." Lockwood did not recall how many shots were fired. He 
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knew it was more than 2, possibly more than 5, but did not know if it was more than 10. Lockwood said when the shots 
were fired, he took cover behind a car. 
Later, on July 20, 1993, Lockwood stated the police came to his house to show him several black and white 
photographs. He identified the man he saw arguing with McKinney and the driver of the red car. The State also 
stipulated that the pictures identified in Lockwood's testimony were of defendant and Ramsay. 
The State rested following this stipulation. Defendant moved for a directed finding, which the trial court denied. 
Defendant offered two stipulations in his case. One was the letter prepared by the prosecutor to Ramsay's immigration 
attorney indicating that the prosecutor would contact the individuals involved in Ramsay's immigration status and inform 
them of Ramsay's participation as a witness and "his willingness to cooperate." The second stipulation was from a retired 
police officer who would have testified that Foster's description of the shooter was of a male black Jamaican, 5 feet 6 
inches tall, 145 pounds, in his twenties and with a medium complexion. Defendant then rested his case. 
Following arguments and instructions, the jury began its deliberations. During deliberations, the jury requested a 
copy of the police report containing Foster's statements and a copy of Lockwood's 1995 testimony. The parties agreed to 
respond that the jury had all of the exhibits it would receive. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and 
the trial court subsequently sentenced defendant to a term of 28 years' imprisonment. 
This appeal followed. 
Defendant first argues that his right to cross-examine witnesses was denied in violation of the confrontation clause 
under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), and section 115-10.l(b) of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-10.l(b) (West 2004)). Specifically, defendant contends that the trial 
court erred in admitting Lockwood's testimony from Ramsay's 1995 trial because defendant was not able to effectively 
cross-examine Lockwood due to Lockwood's memory loss. The State maintains that defendant's sixth amendment right 
to confrontation was not violated because Lockwood was subject to cross-examination and the admission of his prior 
inconsistent statements satisfied both Crawford and section 115-10.1. 
"It is important to note that in determining whether a prior out-of-court statement is admissible, the proponent of 
the statement first must meet the requirements of the applicable statutory hearsay exception as set out in section 115-
10 et seq. (725 ILCS 5/115-10 et seq. (West 2002)). The holding in Crawford should be considered only after the court 
determines the proffered statement complies with the requirements of the applicable statute." People v. Martinez, 348 
III.App.3d 521,535, 284 Ill.Dec. 546,810 N.E.2d 199 (2004). Accordingly, we will first consider whether Lockwood's 
prior testimony from Ramsay's trial satisfies the requirements of section 115-10.1. We review the trial court's decision to 
admit Lockwood's prior testimony for an abuse of discretion. People v. Watkins, 368 III.App.3d 927, 931, 307 Ill.Dec. 
265,859 N.E.2d 265 (2006). 
Section 115-10.1 provides, in relevant part: 
"In all criminal cases, evidence of a statement made by a witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay 
rule if 
(a) the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing or trial, and 
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(b) the witness is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and 
(c) the statement--
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(1) was made under oath at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding[.]" 725 ILCS 5/115-10.1 (West 2004). 
Here, defendant asserts that subsection (b) has not been satisfied in this case because Lockwood was not able to 
recall his prior testimony and therefore was not subject to cross-examination. Defendant relies on People v. Yarbrough, 
166 Ill. App.3d 825, 117 Ill.Dec. 765, 520 N.E.2d 1116 (1988), and People v. Redd, 135 Ill.2d 252, 142 Ill.Dec. 802, 553 
N.E.2d 316 (1990), for the proposition that he was denied his right to confront Lockwood. In Yarbrough, the Fifth District 
found that the trial court erred in admitting a prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence pursuant to section 
115-10.1 after a witness refused to answer any questions and claimed he could not remember testifying before the 
grand jury. Yarbrough, 166 III.App.3d at 830-31, 117 Ill.Dec. 765, 520 N.E.2d 1116. The reviewing court held that 
section 115-10.1 was not satisfied because the witness was not subject to meaningful cross-examination concerning the 
out-of-court statements. Yarbrough, 166 III.App.3d at 831, 117 Ill.Dec. 765, 520 N.E.2d 1116. However, decisions issued 
by the United States Supreme Court and the Illinois Supreme Court after Yarbrough was published render its authority 
questionable. In Redd, the witness invoked his fifth amendment privilege and refused to answer any questions about his 
grand jury testimony. Redd, 135 Ill.2d at 297-98, 142 Ill.Dec. 802, 553 N.E.2d 316. The supreme court found that the 
witness's refusal to respond undermined the cross-examination requirement and held that the trial court erred in 
admitting the prior inconsistent statements. Redd, 135 lll.2d at 312, 142 Ill.Dec. 802, 553 N.E.2d 316. 
The confrontation clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is 
effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 
S.Ct. 292,294, 88 L.Ed.2d 15, 19 (1985). In United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 564, 108 S.Ct. 838,845, 98 L.Ed.2d 
951, 961 (1988), the Supreme Court held "that neither the [c]onfrontation [c]lause nor Federal Rule of Evidence 802 is 
violated by admission of an identification statement of a witness who is unable, because of a memory loss, to testify 
concerning the basis for the identification." 
"Ordinarily a witness is regarded as · subject to cross-examination' when he is placed on the stand, under 
oath, and responds willingly to questions. Just as with the constitutional prohibition, limitations on the 
scope of examination by the trial court or assertions of privilege by the witness may undermine the 
process to such a degree that meaningful cross-examination within the intent of the Rule no longer exists. 
But that effect is not produced by the witness's assertion of memory loss-which, as discussed earlier, is 
often the very result sought to be produced by cross-examination, and can be effective in destroying force 
of the prior statement." Owens 484 U.S. at 561-62, 108 S.Ct. at 844, 98 L.Ed.2d at 959. 
In People v. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d 66, 131 Ill.Dec. 106, 538 N.E.2d 481 (1989), the Illinois Supreme Court considered 
the issue of whether a prosecution witness who testifies that he does not remember events was subject to cross-
examination. The witness testified under a grant of immunity. On direct examination, he said he could not recall a 
conversation with defendant 
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about the death of the victim. The witness also stated that he did recall testifying before the grand jury, but could not 
remember the substance of his testimony. After refreshing his recollection with a transcript of his grand jury testimony, 
the witness acknowledged that it contained an accurate description of his grand jury testimony. Flores, 128 Ill.2d at 78-
79, 131 Ill.Dec. 106, 538 N.E.2d 481. On appeal, the defendant argued that the witness's "professed memory loss as to 
the content of the conversation he had with the defendant deprived defense counsel of an opportunity to cross-examine 
the witness concerning his prior testimony," and therefore, the admission of the witness's grand jury testimony denied 
defendant his rights under the confrontation clause. Flores, 128 Ill.2d at 88, 131 Ill.Dec. 106, 538 N.E.2d 481. The Flores 
court relied extensively on Owens and found the witness was sufficiently subjected to cross-examination and the trial 
court did not err in admitting the grand jury testimony. Flores, 128 Ill.2d at 90, 131 Ill.Dec. 106, 538 N.E.2d 481. 
Contrary to the defendant's assertions, a gap in the witness's recollection concerning the content of a prior statement 
does not necessarily preclude an opportunity for effective cross-examination. Flores, 128 Ill.2d at 88, 131 Ill.Dec. 106, 
538 N.E.2d 481, citing Owens, 484 U.S. at 564, 108 S.Ct. at 845, 98 L.Ed.2d at 961. 
Likewise, in People v. Wheat/er, 187 Ill. App.3d 371, 135 Ill.Dec. 24, 543 N.E.2d 259 (1989), the defendant argued 
on appeal that he was denied his right to cross-examine a witness after the witness responded "I don't remember" to 
every question asked. In that case, the defendant was on trial for armed robbery and unlawful use of a weapon by a 
felon. The defendant's case was being heard as a bench trial while defendant's brother Kenneth received a jury trial. At 
Kenneth's trial, another brother, Vincent, gave testimony that exculpated Kenneth but inculpated the defendant. The 
State called Vincent at the defendant's trial, but Vincent claimed he did not want to testify and did not remember his 
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prior testimony. On cross-examination, Vincent repeatedly answered questions with "I don't remember." Over the 
defendant's objection, the trial court admitted the transcript of Vincent's testimony in Kenneth's trial. Wheatley, 187 
III.App.3d at 375-76, 135 Ill.Dec. 24, 543 N.E.2d 259. The defendant claimed on appeal that he was denied his right to 
cross-examine Vincent because he would only answer "I don't remember" to defense counsel's questions. Wheat/er, 187 
Ill. App.3d at 379-80, 135 Ill.Dec. 24,543 N.E.2d 259. Following Owens and Flores, the reviewing court held that Vincent 
was properly subject to cross-examination because Vincent "rather than having refused to answer questions, merely 
testified he did not remember." Wheatley, 187 Ill. App.3d at 381, 135 Ill.Dec. 24, 543 N.E.2d 259. The Wheatley court 
also noted that "when a witness' prior statement was made under oath at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding there is 
no requirement under section 115-10.1 that the witness admit he made the prior statement before it can be introduced 
as evidence." Wheat/er, 187 III.App.3d at 381, 135 Ill.Dec. 24, 543 N.E.2d 259. 
More recently, the decisions in People v. Martinez, 348 III.App.3d 521, 284 Ill.Dec. 546, 810 N.E.2d 199 (2004), and 
People v. Watkins, 368 III.App.3d 927, 307 Ill.Dec. 265, 859 N.E.2d 265 (2006), have also addressed the admissibility of 
prior inconsistent statements under section 115-10.1 when the testifying witness professed a memory loss for the 
incident in question. In Martinez, a witness gave a statement to an assistant State's Attorney about the events 
surrounding a fatal beating, but at 
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trial, she said she remembered about 50% of the events. The trial court admitted the witness's statement as substantive 
evidence. The defendant argued on appeal that the witness' inability to recall the events made her "incapable of cross-
examination." Martinez, 348 III.App.3d at 531, 284 Ill.Dec. 546, 810 N.E.2d 199. The reviewing court, relying on Flores 
and Wheatley, rejected the defendant's argument and found that the defendant's attorney thoroughly questioned the 
witness about her inability to recall the events and challenged her reliability. Thus, the court found her available for 
cross-examination and in satisfaction of section 115-10.1. Martinez, 348 III.App.3d at 533, 284 Ill. Dec. 546, 810 N.E.2d 
199. 
In Watkins, two witnesses responded "' I don't recall,' 'I don't remember,' or 'I can't remember' to virtually every 
question that was asked" at trial about the circumstances of an altercation involving several people. Watkins, 368 
III.App.3d at 929, 307 Ill.Dec. 265, 859 N.E.2d 265. The witnesses' grand jury testimony as well as one of the witnesses' 
statements to the police were admitted as substantive evidence. On appeal, the defendant contended that she did not 
have a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses about the substance of their statements. The Watkins 
court found support in Flores and Wheatley as well as Owens and Martinez and concluded that the witnesses were 
sufficiently cross-examined by defense counsel about their ability to recall the circumstances of the altercation. Watkins, 
368 III.App.3d at 931, 307 Ill.Dec. 265, 859 N.E.2d 265. 
In the present case, Lockwood testified at defendant's 2006 trial that as to the night of July 17, 1993, he 
remembered a shooting occurred and that a red car was involved. When asked if he recalled ever identifying or speaking 
to the police in regards to the persons that did the shooting, he responded, "I do recall that, yes." When asked if he 
testified at Ramsay's 1995 trial, Lockwood responded, "Yes, I guess so. You have my testimony there." The prosecutor 
asked Lockwood if he told the truth at the 1995 trial and Lockwood replied, "I am sure I did." Further, Lockwood 
described his memory as "sketchy" and "not what it used to be." He stated that he had "major reconstructive surgery" 
following a car accident. On cross-examination, defendant's attorney further questioned Lockwood about his memory 
loss. He asked Lockwood if he recognized defendant, and Lockwood said he did not. Unlike the witnesses in Yarbrough 
and Redd, Lockwood never refused to answer any questions nor raised a fifth amendment privilege. He willingly 
answered questions about the shooting and what he could recall. He did not deny testifying at Ramsay's trial, he stated 
that he did not recall but was sure he told the truth. We find that the trial court did not err in admitting Lockwood's prior 
testimony under section 115-10.1 where defendant was given the opportunity to challenge Lockwood's credibility 
through cross-examination. 
Next, we turn to defendant's constitutional challenge under Crawford. Several recent cases have addressed similar 
issues to that raised in this case. These cases considered whether a witness appeared for cross-examination in light of 
the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), which 
differentiated between "testimonial" and "nontestimonial" hearsay. The Crawford Court stressed that when the declarant 
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Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. at 1369 n. 9, 158 L.Ed.2d at 198 n. 9. 
In People v. Sharp, 355 III.App.3d 786, 292 Ill.Dec. 118, 825 N.E.2d 706 (2005), the Fourth District discussed what it 
meant to "appear for cross-examination" for purposes of the confrontation clause. In Sharp, the defendant was charged 
with predatory criminal sexual assault. Following a hearing pursuant to section 115-10 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115-10 
(West 2000)), the trial court allowed into evidence hearsay statements that the victim had made to her mother and to 
the director of a children's advocacy center. The victim testified at the defendant's trial, but did not respond on direct 
examination to questions about the details of the actual offense. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked general 
questions regarding the victim's activities on the day of the alleged assault as well as questions about the room where 
the assault allegedly took place. However, defense counsel did not to ask the victim any questions about what happened 
in the room when she and defendant were in it together. A jury convicted the defendant of the charged offense. Sharp, 
355 Ill. App.3d at 790-91, 292 Ill.Dec. 118, 825 N.E.2d 706. 
The Sharp court pointed out that although Crawford did not explain what it meant to appear for cross-examination, 
it did not overrule or call into question the prior decisions of Fensterer and Owens. Sharp, 355 III.App.3d at 792-93, 292 
Ill. Dec. 118, 825 N.E.2d 706. After reviewing this authority, the court determined that the victim appeared for cross-
examination "[b]ecause she was present for cross-examination and answered defense counsel's questions." Sharp, 355 
III.App.3d at 795, 292 Ill.Dec. 118, 825 N.E.2d 706. Therefore, the court concluded that because the victim appeared for 
cross-examination, the confrontation clause did not bar the admission of the victim's hearsay statements at trial. Sharp, 
355 III.App.3d at 795-96, 292 Ill.Dec. 118, 825 N.E.2d 706. 
Similarly, in People v. Bueno, 358 Ill. App.3d 143, 293 Ill.Dec. 819, 829 N.E.2d 402 (2005), the Second District 
considered whether a witness was unavailable for cross-examination after the witness refused to answer questions. In 
Bueno, the defendant was charged with aggravated discharge of a firearm within 1,000 feet of real property comprising 
a school, aggravated discharge of a firearm, and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. In that case, one of the State's 
witnesses gave multiple statements to the police, implicating different individuals. At trial, the witness admitted that he 
"gave some statements" concerning the shooting. In addition, the witness acknowledged providing police with a verbal 
statement, which the police reduced to writing. He then identified People's exhibit 34 as the first statement he gave to 
police. When questioned about the specifics of the first statement, the witness indicated that he could not remember and 
then refused to testify any further. The witness persisted in refusing to testify, despite a trial court order that he respond 
to the State's inquiries. At that point, the court found the witness in direct contempt of court and delayed any further 
questioning until the witness had a chance to consult with his attorney. The State recalled the witness after he spoke 
with his attorney. The witness denied making certain statements to police and then refused to testify any further. 
However, the trial court made the witness available to defense counsel for cross-examination. On cross-examination, the 
witness admitted that he signed the first statement. He then reviewed the statement and testified that parts of the 
statement were his, but that he could not recall which ones. Defense counsel then stated that he had "nothing 
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further." Bueno, 358 III.App.3d at 154-55, 293 Ill.Dec. 819,829 N.E.2d 402. 
The Bueno court followed the Fourth District's analysis in Sharp and its consideration of Crawford, Owens, and 
Fensterer. Bueno, 358 III.App.3d at 152-55, 293 Ill.Dec. 819,829 N.E.2d 402. The court concluded that, like the victim in 
Sharp, the witness "appeared" for cross-examination and the admission of the hearsay statements did not implicate the 
confrontation clause. Bueno, 358 III.App.3d at 155, 293 Ill.Dec. 819, 829 N.E.2d 402. 
Two cases from the First District have also reviewed similar Crawford claims. In People v. Desantiago, 365 III.App.3d 
855, 303 Ill.Dec. 61, 850 N.E.2d 866 (2006), the defendant was charged with first degree murder and attempted first 
degree murder after he drove a van onto a sidewalk where three men were standing, two of whom ran away and the 
third was struck and killed. At trial, a passenger in the defendant's van testified that he had been hit in the head with a 
shovel and was no longer able to recall the relevant events or his grand jury testimony. The State offered the witness's 
grand jury testimony as substantive evidence. On appeal, the defendant, citing to Crawford, argued that his cross-
examination was limited and did not satisfy the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. The reviewing court held 
that the confrontation clause was not violated, finding that "a defendant's rights under the confrontation clause are not 
absolute." Desantiago, 365 III.App.3d at 870, 303 Ill. Dec. 61, 850 N.E.2d 866. The court pointed out that the witness 
appeared and testified at trial, which permitted defendant to cross-examine him regarding his inconsistent testimony, 
prior arrests, drug and alcohol use on the day of the incident, and his bad memory. Desantiago, 365 Ill. App.3d at 870, 
303 Ill.Dec. 61, 850 N.E.2d 866. 
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Likewise, in People v. Bakr, 373 Ill. App.3d 981, 312 Ill.Dec. 19, 869 N.E.2d 1010 (2007), the defendant was on trial 
for first degree murder in a shooting that occurred outside a Dunkin Donuts. Two codefendants were called by the State. 
One testified that he could not recall his conversations with Chicago police officers or several parts of his videotaped 
statement. The second codefendant stated that he could not remember the details of the murder, his conversations with 
police and his videotaped statement. The videotaped statements of both codefendants were admitted over the 
defendant's objections. The defendant contended on appeal that his constitutional right to confront witnesses was 
violated because both of the codefendants testified that they did not recall making the videotaped statements and 
therefore he was unable to cross-examine them. Relying on Desantiago, the reviewing court held that "no confrontation 
clause problems exist simply because a declarant's alleged memory problems precluded the declarant from being cross-
examined to the extent that defense counsel would have liked." Bakr, 373 III.App.3d at 987, 312 Ill.Dec. 19, 869 N.E.2d 
1010. The court found that defense counsel was able to cross-examine the witnesses as to their motive to lie and bias 
and was able to impeach their credibility. The court concluded this cross-examination satisfied the confrontation clause. 
Bakr, 373 III.App.3d at 988, 312 Ill.Dec. 19,869 N.E.2d 1010. 
Defendant attempts to distinguish this line of cases by arguing that the decisions did not address "Crawford's 
requirement that the witness be available at trial to 'defend and explain' the prior statement." Defendant is referring to 
the following statement from Crawford: 
"Finally, we reiterate that, when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the [ c]onfrontation 
[c]lause 
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places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements. [Citation.] It is therefore 
irrelevant that the reliability of some out-of-court statements '"cannot be replicated, even if the declarant 
testifies to the same matters in court."' [Citation.] The [c]lause does not bar admission of a statement so 
long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it." (Emphasis added.) Crawford, 541 U.S. at 
59 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. at 1369 n. 9, 158 L.Ed.2d at 197 n. 9. 
However, the Supreme Court did not elaborate to what extent the witness must be able to "defend or explain" the 
prior statements nor does defendant cite any authority in which that phrase places additional requirements on cross-
examination beyond the holdings of the aforementioned cases. Here, Lockwood appeared for cross-examination and 
answered all questions posed, even though his professed memory loss prevented him from recalling details from the 
shooting and his testimony. We cannot agree with defendant's argument that his confrontation rights were violated 
because he was unable to cross-examine Lockwood to the extent he would have liked. 
Next, defendant contends that he was denied his right to a fair trial when the prosecutors made improper comments 
in closing arguments. Specifically, defendant asserts that the prosecutors' comments shifted the burden of proof, 
suggested that defendant should be convicted because Ramsay had been convicted, and misstated the facts and the 
law. The State maintains that the challenged comments were either proper, invited by defense counsel's argument or 
cured by the trial court. 
Initially, the State points out that several of the complained-of comments were forfeited by defendant. "To preserve 
claimed improper statements during closing argument for review, a defendant must object to the offending statements 
both at trial and in a written posttrial motion." People v, Wheeler, 226 Ill.2d 92, 122, 313 Ill.Dec. 1, 871 N.E.2d 728 
(2007). Defendant failed to adhere to this rule for four of the comments raised on appeal, including all of the comments 
related to his argument that the State shifted the burden of proof. Further, defendant only makes a single passing 
reference to the plain error rule, but does not discuss the rule nor how it applies in the instant case. This reference is not 
sufficient to raise the plain error rule on appeal and it is waived. See People v. Nieves, 192 Ill.2d 487, 503, 249 Ill.Dec. 
760, 737 N.E.2d 150 (2000) (finding that the failure to argue "that the evidence was closely balanced nor explains why 
the error is so severe that it must be remedied to preserve the integrity of the judicial process" waived plain error on 
appeal); 210 Ill.2d R. 341(h)(7). Therefore, our focus will be on the comments that were properly objected to and 
preserved. However, we review closing arguments in their entirety and the complained-of comments must be viewed in 
context. Wheeler, 226 Ill.2d at 122, 313 Ill.Dec. 1, 871 N.E.2d 728. Thus, the forfeited comments will be considered as 
part of the whole closing argument and add context to the preserved statements. Wheeler, 226 Ill.2d at 123, 313 Ill.Dec. 
1, 871 N.E.2d 728. 
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Generally, a prosecutor is given wide latitude in closing arguments, although his or her comments must be based on 
the facts in evidence or upon reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. People v. Page, 156 Ill.2d 258, 276, 189 Ill.Dec. 
371, 620 N.E.2d 339 (1993). ''The prosecutor has the right to comment on the evidence and to draw all legitimate 
inferences deducible therefrom, even if they are unfavorable to the defendant." People v. Simms, 192 Ill.2d 348, 396, 
249 Ill.Dec. 
545 
654, 736 N.E.2d 1092 (2000). "Whether a prosecutor's comments or arguments constitute prejudicial error is evaluated 
according to the language used, its relation to the evidence, and the effect of the argument on the defendant's right to a 
fair and impartial trial." Simms, 192 Ill.2d at 396, 249 Ill.Dec. 654, 736 N.E.2d 1092. "In reviewing comments made at 
closing arguments, this court asks whether or not the comments engender substantial prejudice against a defendant 
such that it is impossible to say whether or not a verdict of guilt resulted from them." Wheeler, 226 Ill.2d at 123, 313 
Ill.Dec. 1, 871 N.E.2d 728. "Prosecutorial misconduct warrants reversal only if it · caused substantial prejudice to the 
defendant, taking into account the content and context of the comment[sJ, its relationship to the evidence, and its effect 
on the defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial."' People v. Love, 377 Ill. App.3d 306,313, 316 Ill.Dec. 67,878 
N.E.2d 789 (2007), quoting People v. Johnson, 208 Ill.2d 53, 115, 281111.Dec. 1, 803 N.E.2d 405 (2004). "If the jury 
could have reached a contrary verdict had the improper remarks not been made, or the reviewing court cannot say that 
the prosecutor's improper remarks did not contribute to the defendant's conviction, a new trial should be granted." 
Wheeler, 226 Ill.2d at 123,313 Ill.Dec. 1,871 N.E.2d 728. "The trial court may cure errors by giving the jury proper 
instructions on the law to be applied; informing the jury that arguments are not themselves evidence and must be 
disregarded if not supported by the evidence at trial; or sustaining the defendant's objections and instructing the jury to 
disregard the inappropriate remark." Simms, 192 Ill.2d at 396-97, 249 Ill.Dec. 654, 736 N.E.2d 1092. 
Defendant contends that the State made improper comments on defendant's failure to deny his participation in the 
murder. The State maintains that the comments were proper and based on evidence. 
Defendant complains of the following statements. In the closing argument, the prosecutor said, "He says, he never 
denies, he never denies that he didn't do it." Defense counsel objected and the trial court sustained his objection. Later, 
in rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor stated: 
"You know, consider the defendant's own words to Detective Campbell back on the plane. How's Dwight 
doing, what did Dwight get, you got witnesses, who are the witnesses who say I did this. Not I didn't do 
it, I wasn't there--." 
Again, defendant's attorney objected and the trial court sustained his objection. Defendant acknowledges that the 
objections were sustained, but argues the comments were improper because they directed the jury's attention to the fact 
that defendant did not testify and commented on his postarrest silence. The State responds that these statements were 
a proper comment on evidence elicited by defense counsel. However, the record indicates that the portion of Detective 
Campbell's testimony to which the State is referring occurred during redirect examination by the prosecutor. Thus, that 
portion of the State's response is without merit. 
As mentioned above, the trial court sustained obJections to both comments. The jury was instructed at the start of 
closing arguments that the statements by the attorneys "should be confined to the evidence and the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Any argument made by the attorneys which is not based on the evidence 
should be disregarded." Later, the jury was similarly instructed by the court during jury instructions. The court also told 
the jury that the closing 
546 
arguments "are not evidence, and any statement or argument by the attorneys which is not based on the evidence 
should be disregarded." 
Defendant contends that the State impermissibly commented on his postarrest silence, in violation of Doyle v. Ohio, 
426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). "There the Supreme Court held that since a defendant's silence after 
being informed of his right to remain silent is 'insolubly ambiguous', and in light of the implied assurance given in the 
Miranda warnings that silence will carry no penalty, 'it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process 
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to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial."' People v. 
Bock, 242 Ill. App.3d 1056, 1072, 183 Ill.Dec. 525, 611 N.E.2d 1173 (1993), quoting Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617-18, 96 S.Ct. 
at 2244-45, 49 L.Ed.2d at 98. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that it is error to comment on a defendant's postarrest 
silence, even if he did not remain silent yet did not incriminate himself. See People v. Herrett, 137 Ill.2d 195,214, 148 
Ill.Dec. 695,561 N.E.2d 1 (1990). However, the Herrettcourt went on to say that "a comment upon a defendant's post-
arrest silence, while improper, is not an error of such magnitude as to clearly deprive the defendant of a fair trial" and 
found that the improper comments did not reach plain error. Herrett, 137 Ill.2d at 215, 148 Ill.Dec. 695, 561 N.E.2d 1. 
Here, the prosecutors were discussing defendant's statements made to Detective Campbell after he had received his 
Miranda rights. Defendant asked Detective Campbell several questions about codefendant Ramsay, the witnesses against 
him, and admitted to being at Union Hall that night, but he did not admit to committing the murder or arguing with 
McKinney. The prosecutors' comments that he did not deny the crime were improper. However, the two comments were 
made in separate parts of the State's closing arguments-- the first by the prosecutor in the initial closing argument and 
the second by another prosecutor in the rebuttal closing argument. Both comments were immediately objected to by 
defense counsel and the objections were sustained. 
Further, the evidence against defendant was compelling. Three witnesses testified that they saw defendant argue 
with McKinney inside the club, then go outside. A red car pulled up, defendant walked toward the car and then turned 
and started firing a gun at McKinney. McKinney tried to take cover between cars, but defendant kept shooting. 
Defendant fired several shots and then got into the passenger side of the red car and left. While there were some 
inconsistencies in the witnesses' testimony, none of the inconsistencies were substantial or changed the sequence of the 
events on the night of July 17, 1993. Further, Sergeant Popelarz testified that Foster and Lockwood identified defendant 
in a photograph as the shooter shortly after the shooting in 1993. Since the trial court properly sustained objections to 
these comments and instructed the jury that the closing arguments are not evidence, and in light of the evidence 
presented, we do not believe that the jury would have reached a different verdict had these comments not been made. 
Defendant also asserts that these comments also improperly directed the jury's attention to the fact that defendant 
did not testify. We disagree. "When determining whether the accused's right not to testify has been violated, a reviewing 
court must examine the challenged prosecutorial comments in the context of the entire proceeding." People v. Johnson, 
208 Ill.2d 53, 112, 281 Ill.Dec. 1, 803 
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N.E.2d 405 (2003). When we review the context in which these statements were made, it is clear that the prosecutors 
were discussing Detective Campbell's testimony and the statements defendant made to Detective Campbell after his 
arrest. These comments were not pointed at defendant's failure to testify. 
Next, defendant argues that the prosecution improperly emphasized that the evidence presented had been sufficient 
to convict codefendant Ramsay. Specifically, defendant complains of the following comments: 
"Mr. Ramsay is convicted. Mr. Ramsay was out there." 
"We don't convict people based on bad evidence, is that what I just heard counsel say7 Maybe we ought 
to tell that to Dwight Ramsay, huh?" 
"This is Wade Hampton's trial. Dwight Ramsay has had his trial." 
Defendant's attorney objected to all three comments, but was overruled on the first and third comments and was 
sustained as to the second. We will consider the comments with the overruled objections first. The first comment 
occurred during the first part of the closing arguments and was part of the following paragraph: "When he [defendant] is 
turning, coming back, Mr. Ramsey tells you. Mr. Ramsey is convicted. Mr. Ramsey was out there. Mr. Foster tells you he 
was out there. Mr. Lockwood--" The prosecutor was interrupted by defendant's objection. 
The third comment came toward the end of the rebuttal closing argument: "This is Wade Hampton's trial. Dwight 
Ramsay has had his trial. Lockwood wasn't on trial and Foster wasn't on trial." After the defendant's objection was 
overruled, the prosecutor continued: ''They were attacked as if they were on trial. The only person on trial Wade 
Hampton [sic]. Our system allows for that." 
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Neither of these comments was asking the jury to consider Ramsay's conviction as proof against Hampton. In both 
situations, the prosecutors were discussing all of the occurrence witnesses. While the first comment's reference to 
Ramsay's conviction is questionable, but when viewed in context, the prosecutor only made a passing reference to it 
while stating that the witnesses were present at the time of the shooting. In the third instance, the mention of Ramsay's 
trial was used to point out that defendant was the only one on trial that day as a way of putting defense counsel's 
credibility attacks against the witnesses in perspective. There was nothing improper in this comment. 
The second comment by the prosecutor was made at the start of the rebuttal closing argument after defendant's 
attorney had argued that the evidence in the case was insufficient and the witnesses were not credible. The prosecutor 
responded by saying, "We don't convict people based on bad evidence, is that what I just heard counsel say? Maybe we 
ought to tell that to Dwight Ramsay, huh?" It is true that "[a] prosecutor's comments during rebuttal argument will not 
be deemed improper, however, if they were invited by defense counsel's closing argument." love, 377 III.App.3d at 313, 
316 Ill.Dec. 67, 878 N.E.2d 789; see also Bakr, 373 III.App.3d at 990, 312 Ill.Dec. 19, 869 N.E.2d 1010. However, this 
statement went beyond defense counsel's invitation that the evidence was insufficient, but our analysis does not end 
here. This improper comment was immediately objected to and the objection was sustained. Moreover, in addition to the 
previously mentioned instruction that arguments are not evidence, the trial court also gave the jury a specific 
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instruction regarding its consideration of Ramsay's conviction: 
"Evidence that a witness may have been convicted of an offense may be considered by you only as it may 
affect the believability of the witness. You are not to consider the fact of Dwight Ramsay's conviction as 
evidence against the defendant. The defendant is entitled to have his case decided on the evidence and 
the law that applies to him." 
Any error made by the prosecutor's comment was cured through the sustained objection and multiple jury 
instructions. Given the evidence against defendant, the jury's verdict would not have been different absent this remark 
by the prosecutor. 
Defendant's final argument is that the State misstated the evidence and the law in an attempt to manipulate the 
jury's evaluation of the witness testimony. Specifically, defendant points to these comments for his assertion: (1) Foster 
"was saying the same thing then that he said to you" and (2) the prosecutor's multiple references that the jury only 
needed to believe one witness in order to reach a guilty verdict. However, defendant's claims against the comment about 
Foster's testimony were not properly preserved because he did not object or raise any objection in a posttrial motion and 
will not be considered on appeal. See Wheeler, 226 Ill.2d at 122, 313 Ill.Dec. 1, 871 N.E.2d 728. 
Defendant's remaining argument is premised on the following comments, in context: 
"And if you believe that Wade Hampton was at the party and shot Terrance McKinney, the defendant is 
guilty of first degree murder. 
If you believe that because you believe one of the witnesses, a single finger identification with all the 
things, all the supporting items, the bullets, everything else is sufficient--" 
The prosecutor was interrupted by defense counsel's objection, which was overruled. Later, the prosecutor made a 
similar comment: 
"Now the People have to prove certain propositions. And those propositions are to sustain the charge of 
first degree murder, the State must prove the following propositions: First, that the defendant performed 
the acts which caused the death of Terrance McKinney. If you believe the witnesses, if you believe one of 
the witnesses, he did. 
Especially with all the circumstantial evidence I talked about earlier, the circumstantial evidence you might 
be able to pick out on your own." 
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Defendant contends that these statements suggested to the jury that it "should simply disregard any testimony it 
found troubling." Contrary to defendant's argument, the prosecutor did not tell the jury to select one of the stories 
presented by the witnesses and disregard the others. Rather, the prosecutor was arguing that if the jury believed 
defendant was guilty because it believed one of the witnesses, that was enough to find defendant guilty. That is a proper 
statement of law. ''The testimony of a single witness, if it is positive and the witness credible, is sufficient to convict." 
People v. Castillo, 372 III.App.3d 11, 20,309 Ill.Dec. 845, 865 N.E.2d 208 (2007); People v. Smith, 185 Ill.2d 532, 541, 
236 Ill.Dec. 779, 708 N.E.2d 365 (1999}. Thus, the comments were not improper. 
As we have concluded that none of the comments deprived defendant of a fair trial, we do not find that any 
cumulative error existed. The evidence presented by the State was substantial and more than sufficient to find defendant 
guilty while the trial court properly sustained objections to the improper comments and instructed the 
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jury that closing arguments were not evidence and that Ramsay's conviction could not considered as evidence against 
defendant. Any improper comments by the State were cured by these actions. Therefore, we conclude that the result of 
the trial would not have been different absent the improper comments. 
Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook County. 
Affirmed. 
O'MALLEY, P.J. and J. GORDON, J., concur. 
IL 
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Darren B. Hooper was convicted of lewd conduct with his daughter, six-year-old A.H. At trial, the district court 
deemed A.H. unavailable and admitted a videotaped interview of the child. After Hooper's conviction, the U.S. Supreme 
Court decided Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), and Davis v. Washington, 
547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006). Hooper appealed. The Court of Appeals held that a videotaped 
interview of the child victim was testimonial under Crawford and Davis, that the admission of the videotape was error, 
and that the error was not harmless. The court vacated the conviction and remanded for further proceedings. This Court 
granted the State's petition for review. We hold that the videotaped statements were testimonial in nature, based on 
Crawford and Davis, and that admission of the statements was not harmless error. We vacate the conviction and remand 
the case for further proceedings. 
I. 
On August 2, 2003, Crystal Hooper woke and learned Darren Hooper was in the bathroom with their daughter, A.H. 
The door was locked. Crystal Hooper used a screwdriver to open the bathroom door. She ordered A.H. into Crystal's 
bedroom and questioned Darren about his activities in the bathroom. Then, after speaking with A.H., Crystal accused 
Darren of sexually molesting A.H. and called the police. 
When the police arrived, they questioned Darren and Crystal Hooper and attempted to question A.H. The police did 
not collect evidence at this time, but Detective Marshall and Detective Plaza arranged a forensic examination with on-call 
personnel at the Sexual Trauma Abuse Response ("STAR") Center in Ontario, Oregon. 
913 
At the STAR Center, Dr. De La Paz first talked with Crystal Hooper and then conducted a sexual abuse examination 
of A.H., during which she found breaking and swelling in the rectal area. Jeremi Helmick, a STAR Center nurse and 
forensic interviewer, interviewed A.H. after Dr. De La Paz completed the medical examination. Helmick videotaped the 
interview while Detective Plaza observed from another room via a closed circuit system. At the end of the interview, 
Detective Plaza talked with Helmick and Crystal Hooper. Plaza collected the videotape and two swabs taken during the 
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physical examination and put them into evidence storage at the Payette Police Department. Following the examination 
and interview, the police returned to the Hooper home to collect evidence, including a sheet from A.H.'s bed, underwear 
belonging to A.H. and a washcloth from the bathroom. 
Prior to trial, the State served notice of intent to introduce the videotaped interview of A.H. and hearsay statements 
made by A.H. to the forensic examiner, based on Idaho Rules of Evidence 803(24) and 804(5). The District Court 
reserved ruling on the matter. At trial, the State called A.H. to testify. After A.H. was unable to take the oath, the district 
court declared A.H. unavailable and the state sought to introduce the videotaped interview. The defense objected based 
on the Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him.(fnl) The court 
admitted the videotape over Defendant's objection, based on a pre-Crawford analysis, and played the video for the jury. 
The jury found Mr. Hooper guilty of lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor child under the age of sixteen pursuant 
to Idaho Code§ 19-1508. The District Court sentenced Mr. Hooper to six years imprisonment, with two and one-half 
years fixed. Mr. Hooper timely filed his Notice of Appeal from his Judgment of Conviction. The Court of Appeals held that 
the admission of the videotaped interview violated Mr. Hooper's right to cross-examine his accuser as guaranteed by the 
Confrontation Clause: "The conclusion is inescapable that the nurse was acting in tandem with law enforcement officers 
to gain evidence of past events potentially to be used in a later criminal prosecution." The court further held the error 
was not harmless. As a result, the court vacated the Judgment of Conviction and remanded the case. This Court granted 
the State's Petition for Review. 
II. 
The question presented is whether videotaped statements made by a child during an interview by a forensic 
examiner at a sexual trauma abuse response center are testimonial when the police directed the child to the center and 
observed the interview from another room. We hold that the videotaped statements were testimonial in nature, based on 
Crawford and Davis, and that admission of the statements was not harmless error. We vacate the conviction and remand 
the case for further proceedings. 
A. 
When considering a case on review from the Court of Appeals, this Court gives serious consideration to the Court of 
Appeals' decision. State v. Cope, 142 Idaho 492, 495, 129 P.3d 1241, 1244 (2006) (quoting Garza v. State, 139 Idaho 
533, 535, 82 P.3d 445, 447 (2003)). This Court does not merely review the correctness of the decision. Id. Rather, the 
Court acts as though it is hearing the matter on direct appeal from the trial court's decision. Id. 
914 
When a violation of a constitutional right is asserted, the appellate, court should give deference to the trial court's 
factual findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous. Doe v. State, 133 Idaho 811, 813, 992 P.2d 1211, 1213 
(Ct.App.1999) (citing State v. Peightal, 122 Idaho 5, 7, 830 P.2d 516, 518 (1992)). The appellate court exercises free 
review over the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the 
facts found. Id. Hooper asserted below that admission of the videotaped interview violated his right to confront adverse 
witnesses under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. This is a question of law over which the Court exercises 
free review. See Doe, 133 Idaho at 813,992 P.2d at 1213. 
B. 
This is an issue of first impression for the Idaho Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), significantly altered the Supreme Court's 
Confrontation Clause analysis. A subsequent case, Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 
(2006), further clarified Crawford, but left many issues unresolved. State courts have interpreted these cases in varying 
ways, and the parties in the present case similarly disagree on the proper application of the Supreme Court precedent. 
Hooper contends the videotaped statements are testimonial because the forensic nurse examiner was acting as an 
agent of the police and no emergency existed at the time the statements were taken. According to Hooper, investigative 
interrogations are directed at establishing the facts of a past crime in order to identify, or provide evidence against, the 
perpetrator. Since the purpose of a forensic interview is to collect information to be used in a criminal prosecution, and 
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there is a clear connection between the police and the STAR Center, the interview was the functional equivalent of a 
police interrogation. Thus, it is testimonial under Crawford and Davis, and inadmissible unless the witness is unavailable 
and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. 
The State argues the Court of Appeals erred in its application of Davisto this case. According to the State, Davis 
applies only to determine whether statements to law enforcement personnel or their agents are testimonial. Since 
Hooper has not shown the interviewer here was an agent of the police, Davis is inapplicable and the question is whether 
the statement at issue is one of the three "core testimonial statements" listed in Crawford. Pointing to the third 
formulation of "core testimonial statements," the State contends the evidence is nontestimonial because the defendant 
has not shown the circumstances of the interview would have led a child of the victim's age to reasonably believe she 
was making a statement for use at a later trial. The State asserts that, at most, Hooper is entitled to have this case 
remanded so that evidence of agency may be presented to the district court. 
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to be confronted with witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI, cited in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42, 124 
S.Ct. at 1359, 158 L.Ed.2d at 187. Prior to Crawford, the Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause did not bar 
admission of an unavailable witness's statement against a criminal defendant if the statement bears "adequate indicia of 
reliability." Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539, 65 L.Ed.2d at 608. To meet that test, the declarant must be 
unavailable and evidence must either fall within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or "bear particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness." Id. 
Crawford altered this analysis with regard to testimonial statements. In Crawford, the Court held that testimonial 
statements of witnesses absent from trial are admissible only where declarant is unavailable and where defendant had a 
prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. 541 U.S. at 59, 124 S.Ct. at 1369, 158 L.Ed.2d at 197. Although the 
Court declined to spell out a comprehensive definition of "testimonial," the Court did set forth some guidelines. First, the 
Court looked to Webster's dictionary 
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definition of "testimony" from 1828. Testimony is "[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of 
establishing or proving some fact." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 124 S.Ct. at 1364, 158 L.Ed.2d at 192 (quoting 1 N. 
Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)). The Court then listed three formulations of "core" 
testimonial statements: 
(1) "ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material such as affidavits, custodial 
examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial 
statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially;" 
(2) "extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, 
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions;" and 
(3) "statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to 
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial." 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52, 124 S.Ct. at 1364-1365, 158 L.Ed.2d at 192-193 (internal citations omitted). This is not 
an exclusive list of "testimonial" evidence. Rather, these formulations all share a "common nucleus" and then define the 
Clause's coverage at various levels of abstraction around it. Id. 
The determination of whether evidence is testimonial requires the court to consider the purpose behind the 
Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court based its holding in Crawford on the historical underpinnings of the 
Confrontation Clause, and noted that the Sixth Amendment must be' interpreted with this history in mind: 
First, the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal 
procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused .... The 
Sixth Amendment must be interpreted with this focus in mind. 
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541 U.S. at 50, 124 S.Ct. at 1363, 158 L.Ed.2d at 192 . For example, the Court noted that statements taken by 
police officers in the course of interrogations are testimonial "under even a narrow standard" because police 
interrogations bear a "striking resemblance to examinations by justices of the peace in England." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 
52, 124 S.Ct. at 1364, 158 L.Ed.2d at 193. Thus, interrogations by law enforcement officers fall "squarely within that 
class" of testimonial hearsay. Id. In closing, the Court noted that "[W]hatever else the term [testimonial] covers, it 
applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police 
interrogations. These ,are the modern practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was 
directed." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. at 1374, 158 L.Ed.2d at 203. 
The Supreme Court applied this new Confrontation Clause doctrine in consolidated cases Davis v. Washington and 
Hammon v. Indiana, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006). In Davis, the Supreme Court began with the 
clarification that "[i]t is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while 
subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause." Thus, the threshold 
question in a Confrontation Clause case is whether the statement is testimonial. If the evidence is testimonial, the 
evidence may be admitted only if the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine the witness. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59, 124 S.Ct. at 1369, 158 L.Ed.2d at 197; Davis, 547 U.S. at 821, 126 S.Ct. 
at 2273, 165 L.Ed.2d at_. 
In Davis, the Supreme Court held that "[s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police 
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of interrogation is to enable police 
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is 
no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S.ct. at 2273-74, 165 L.Ed.2d at_. 
Thus, a statement is testimonial under Crawford and Davis when the circumstances objectively indicate that the 
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primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution, 
unless made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.(fn2) 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S.Ct. at 2274, 165 
L.Ed.2d at 
The circumstances surrounding the statements in Davis led the Court to conclude the statements were 
nontestimonial. In reaching its holding, the Court articulated certain factors that distinguished the nontestimonial 
statements in Davis from the testimonial statements in Crawford. First, the witness in Davis was speaking about events 
as they were actually happening, rather than describing past events. 547 U.S. at 827, 126 S.Ct. at 2276, 165 L.Ed.2d at 
_. Second, any reasonable listener would recognize the witness in Davis was facing an ongoing emergency. Id. Third, 
the nature of what was asked and answered in Davis, viewed objectively, was such that the elicited statements were 
necessary to be able to resolve the present emergency, rather than simply to learn what had happened in the past. Id. 
Finally, the Court elaborated on the different levels of formality between the two interviews. Id. Based on these factors, 
the Court held that the statements in Davis were nontestimonial: 
We conclude from all this that the circumstances of McCottry's interrogation objectively indicate its 
primary purpose was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. She simply was not 
acting as a witness: she was not testifying. What she said was not a "weaker substitute for live 
testimony." 
547 U.S. at 828, 126 S.Ct. at 2277, 165 L.Ed.2d at_. Comparing the statements made in Davis to those in 
Crawford, the Court noted that, unlike the situation in Crawford, where the ex parte actors and evidentiary products of 
the ex parte communications aligned perfectly with their courtroom analogues, the statements made in Davis did not. Id. 
("No · witness' goes to court to proclaim an emergency and seek help."). 
The Court considered the same factors to hold the statements made in Hammon were testimonial. First, there was 
no emergency in progress. "It is entirely clear from the circumstances that the interrogation was part of an investigation 
into possibly criminal past conduct-as, indeed, the testifying officer expressly acknowledged." 547 U.S. at 829, 126 S.Ct. 
at 2278, 165 L.Ed.2d at_. "Objectively viewed, the primary, if not indeed the sole, purpose of the interrogation was to 
investigate a possible crime." Id. In addition, the Court pointed to the formality of the statements, and that the 
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statements were deliberately recounted in response to police questioning relating to how criminal conduct progressed: 
"Such statements under official interrogation are an obvious substitute for live testimony, because they do precisely what 
a witness does on direct examination; they are inherently testimonial." 547 U.S. at 830, 126 S.Ct. at 2278, 165 L.Ed.2d 
at_. The Court distinguished the statements 
917 
based on the purpose of the interview and the similarities between this interview and live testimony. 
We will employ a totality of circumstances analysis in order to determine whether the videotaped statements here 
were testimonial in nature. In this case, the police detectives arranged an examination with forensically-trained 
personnel at the STAR Center. The referral by police officers, in and of itself, is not of great significance, absent evidence 
of the purpose of the referral. Similarly, the fact that an interviewer has forensic training does not, in and of itself, make 
the statements "testimonial" in nature. The purpose of such interviews can be two-fold-medical treatment and forensic 
use. Statements made to medical personnel have frequently been held to be nontestimonial when the primary purpose 
was treatment, even where police officers referred the child to the medical personnel. See, e.g., People, v. Vig,!, 127 
P.3d 916, 923-24 (Colo. 2006) (statements made to a physician conducting a sexual assault exam were nontestimonial 
where the police officer was not involved in the medical examination and not present in the room when the doctor 
performed the examination); Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 447 Mass. 56, 849 N.E.2d 218, 220 (2006) (child's 
statements to an emergency room physician were nontestimonial where police took the child to the emergency room to 
receive a medical assessment because the doctor's purpose was to determine whether the child was injured and whether 
she needed medical treatment); State v. Krasky, 736 N.W.2d 636, 642 (Minn.2007) (child's statements to nurse were 
nontestimonial even though police and social services jointly referred the child to the hospital where no law enforcement 
officer was present at the assessment and the primary purpose of the interview was to assess and protect the child's 
health and welfare). 
A review of the factors in this case indicates that the interview was geared toward gathering evidence, rather than 
providing medical treatment. When the Officers questioned Darren Hooper, the accused abuser, Detective Marshall 
informed him that the child would be going to the STAR Center for an interview, and that "depending on the type of 
information [he] get[s] back from there, gonna depend on what kind of action is done." The Detective also asked Hooper 
whether there was any information A.H. was going to divulge to the counselors that Marshall should know "before [heJ 
hear[s] it from them." See Davis, 547 U.S. at 829, 126 S.Ct. at 2278, 165 L.Ed.2d at . At the STAR Center, Detective 
Plaza observed the interview via a closed circuit system. 
At the beginning of the interview, Helmick showed A.H. the camera and stated "That's where my special camera is 
and that makes it so I don't have to write everything down we talk about, cause I forget stuff sometimes, okay? ... and 
my friend John [Detective Plaza] is watching to make sure that I remember to ask all the questions I need to ask, okay?" 
Helmick commenced the interview by describing certain rules to A.H. with regard to telling the truth: "Make sure that 
what we talk about is only the truth in here, okay?" Helmick then proceeded to ask questions regarding the event in 
question. She sought details, including questions seeking to identify the perpetrator: Who is that? What was his name? 
Where were you when that happened? How many times did it happen? Toward the end of the interview, Helmick 
consulted with the detective. When she returned to the room, she said "I did forget just a couple things," and continued 
to ask a few questions regarding specific details of what happened in the bathroom. At the end of the interview the 
detective talked with. Helmick and Crystal Hooper, then collected the videotape and two swabs taken during the physical 
examination and put them into evidence storage at the Payette Police Department. The police also returned to the 
Hoopers' home to collect additional evidence following the interview. These factors suggest the STAR Center interviewer 
was working in concert with the police to establish or prove past events relevant to a later criminal prosecution. 
Based on the foregoing facts, we hold the videotaped statements were testimonial under Crawford and Davis. The 
circumstances surrounding this particular case objectively indicate that the primary purpose of the 
918 
interview was to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution, as opposed to meeting 
the child's medical needs. Helmick did not ask any questions regarding A.H.'s medical condition, or whether the child was 
injured. Further, this interview took place alter a medical assessment and separately from the medical assessment. The 
police officer was present only at the second interview, not during Dr. De La Paz' examination. Unlike the situation in 
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Davis, there is no evidence the statements were made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances 
objectively indicating the primary purpose of the interrogation was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency. The parties clearly anticipated that the videotaped statements would provide a substitute for the child's live 
testimony in court. Thus, the statements are admissible only if A.H. was unavailable and only if the defendant had a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Since Hooper had no prior opportunity to cross-examine A.H., it was error to 
admit the videotape in evidence at trial. 
C. 
The State argues that even if the videotaped statements are testimonial in nature, the admission of the statements 
at trial was harmless error. An error that does not affect a defendant's substantial rights is considered harmless and does 
not require reversal or a new trial. State v. Doe, 137 Idaho 519, 527, 50 P.3d 1014, 1022 (2002). Whether a conviction 
for a criminal offense should stand when a state has failed to accord a constitutionally guaranteed right is a federal 
question. Chapman v. State of California, 386 U.S. 18, 20-21, 87 S.Ct. 824,826, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Before a federal 
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, Id. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828, 17 L.Ed.2d at 710. The test for harmless error is whether a reviewing court 
can find beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same result without the admission of the 
challenged evidence. Doe, 137 Idaho at 527, 50 P.3d at 1022 (quoting State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814,821,965 P.2d 
174, 181 (1998)). 
Idaho courts applied the harmless error test to Confrontation Clause violations prior to Crawford and Davis. See, 
e.g., Doe, 137 Idaho at 526-27, 50 P.3d at 1021-22; State v. Green, 136 Idaho 553, 557, 38 P.3d 132, 136 
(Ct.App.2001) ("A Confrontation Clause violation does not automatically require reversal; rather, the doctrine of harmless 
error applies."). In addition, courts in other states have applied the harmless error test to Confrontation Clause violations 
after Crawford and Davis. See, e.g., State v. Blue, 717 N.W.2d 558,566 (N.D.2006); State v. Justus, 205 S.W.3d 872, 
880-81, 878 (Mo. 2006 ). There is no reason to assume the harmless error test would not apply post Crawford. 
Whether an error is harmless in a particular case depends upon a host of factors, including the importance of the 
witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of 
evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination 
otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case. Green, 136 Idaho at 558-559, 38 
P.3d at 136-37 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1438, 89 L.Ed.2d 674, 686 (1986)). 
In this case, the child's testimony was essential. Although there was some corroborating evidence, much of the physical 
evidence was inconclusive. We cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same result 
had the videotape been excluded. 
III. 
We vacate the conviction and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. This result 
renders a discussion of additional issues unnecessary because Hooper's additional issues can be corrected on remand. 
Specifically, in response to Hooper's 
919 
argument that the jury instruction created a fatal variance from the indictment, we note that the jury instruction should 
match the indictment on remand. See State v. Sherrod, 131 Idaho 56, 59, 951 P.2d 1283, 1286 (Ct.App.1998). 
Chief Justice EISMANN, and Justices BURDICK, W. JONES, and Justice Pro Tern TROUT concur. 
Footnotes: 
FNl. Defense objected based on the Supreme Court's ruling in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 
L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). One month after Hooper's conviction, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), which significantly altered the Confrontation Clause analysis. When the 
U.S. Supreme Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, "that rule is the controlling interpretation of 
federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review." Harper v. Virginia Dep't of 
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Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 2517, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993}. See also State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 387-
88, 871 P.2d 801, 804-05 (1994}. Thus, we apply Crawford and Dav1:S-here. 
FN2. In Davis, where the statements were made to a 911 operator during the course of a domestic disturbance, the 
statements met the emergency exception and were deemed nontestimonial. See Davis, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 
165 L.Ed.2d 224. The Court referred to its statement in Crawford that interrogations by law enforcement officers fall 
"squarely within the class" of testimonial hearsay, and noted that it had in mind interrogations directed at establishing 
the facts of a past crime in order to identify the perpetrator. 547 U.S. at 826, 126 S.Ct. at 2276, 165 L.Ed.2d at_. The 
product of such interrogation is testimonial. Id. The Court assumed for the purposes of the decision that even if 911 
operators are not themselves law enforcement officers, they may at least be agents of law enforcement when they 
conduct interrogations of 911 callers and therefore the court considered their acts to be the acts of the police for the 
purposes of the decision. 547 U.S. at 823 n. 2, 126 S.Ct. at 2274 n. 2, 165 L.Ed.2d at_ n. 2. Nevertheless, the 
statements were nontestimonial because they were not aimed at establishing the facts of a past crime, but rather 
describe a situation as it happened to enable police assistance for the victim. On the other hand, statements made to 
police officers who arrived on the scene after the disturbance had terminated, where the parties were separated and 
questioned individually, were deemed testimonial in Hammon because they were for the purpose of proving past events 
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This case is before the Court on the defendant's Motion to Dismiss challenging the 
magistrate's probable cause finding. Both sides have submitted briefing. 
In order to bind over a defendant to stand trial for a felony charged in an Information, a 
magistrate must find that the evidence submitted at a preliminary hearing provides probable or 
sufficient cause to believe that the defendant has committed the charged offense. ICR 5.1. If 
there is substantial evidence upon every material element of the offense charged, probable cause 
will be found. It is not required that the State prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt for the 
defendant to be bound over. E.g., State v. Behrens, 138 Idaho 279, 61 P.3d 636 (Ct. App. 2003); 
State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho296, 912 P.2d 664 (Ct. App. 1995). 
The defendant has been charged with Attempted Strangulation. The facts upon which 
this Decision is based and which were the foundation of the magistrate's probable cause finding 
are set forth in the preliminary hearing transcript. The matter came to the police's attention as a 
result of a tip about domestic violence from Crime Stoppers. The police investigated further and 
went to the home of Kristy Robinson and told her of the tip. As a result of their contact, she 
came for an interview on September 2, 2008 at the Family Advocacy Center and Education 
Services facility and spoke to the detective who had come to her home. The interview was 
videotaped. The victim described several months where the defendant subjected her to physical 
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abuse. She had photographed her injuries. She described the defendant as choking her on one 
occasion in July to the point where she was unable to breathe. The police also spoke to another 
witness. The police interviewed both the purported victim and the defendant. The defendant 
initially denied any wrongdoing but as the detective probed and provided more information from 
his investigation, the defendant began providing additional detail. The defendant began to cry 
and confessed to the strangulation in July, 2008. The interview continued and he explained that 
he was very upset and had grabbed the victim by the neck and was afraid he may have hurt her. 
The confession was recorded. The defendant was not arrested after the interview. Five days 
after giving her interview, the victim was severely injured in a crash when she was rear-ended by 
another car, stepped out of her car to survey the damage and was struck by a drunk driver. She 
suffered a serious brain injury and, although she is available to testify, she no longer has an 
independent recollection of the incident which gives rise to the charge before the Court. She 
appeared at the preliminary hearing and testified although she had no independent recollection of 
the event. 
Under the Sixth Amendment "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed. 2d 177 (2004), the defendant stabbed a man, allegedly for trying 
to rape his wife. His wife's story differed from her husband's in a taped statement she had made 
to the police. The defendant was charged with assault and attempted murder. He claimed self 
defense. His wife did not testify because of Washington's marital privilege but the tape of her 
statement was played because its marital privilege rule did not bar the use of out of court 
statements. The wife's statement was admitted under the hearsay exception for statements 
against penal interest although the Washington Supreme Court upheld the admission of the 
statement not because it was a firmly rooted hearsay exception but because it "bore guarantees of 
trustworthiness." The Supreme Court, after an extensive discussion of the history of the 
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Confrontation Clause, pointed out that it was designed for two principal purposes: curbing the 
use of ex parte examinations as evidence against an accused and precluding the use of out of 
court statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless the witness was unavailable to 
testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination 1• It summed up prior 
case law: "Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where 
the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross 
examine." Id. at 59. It also noted : "Finally, we reiterate that, when the declarant appears for 
cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his 
prior testimonial statements ... The Clause does not bar admission of a statement so long as the 
declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it." Id. The Court expressly held that, if the 
declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause will not bar the use of 
prior testimonial statements. Subsequently, in Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S. Ct. 
2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006), the Court further addressed the requirements of the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment in the context two domestic violence cases. The 
case specifically addressed the issue of when statements are "testimonial" for the purposes of the 
Confrontation Clause. In one case where the defendant was charged with violation of a no 
contact order, the purported victim did not appear at trial, the evidence consisted of the testimony 
of the officers who responded to the 911 call who said that they observed her injuries and her 
"frantic efforts" to gather her children and her belongings so they could leave the residence and 
the 911 call which was admitted into evidence at trial. In the second of the consolidated appeals, 
the victim gave a handwritten statement to the police but did not appear at trial. In both cases, 
the victim was absent from the trial. The Court allowed the 911 call as non-testimonial but did 
not permit the use of the written statement in the second case. Davis permitted non-testimonial 
1 The Decision does note certain exceptions which are not relevant here. 
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statements made by a declarant absent from trial. It clarified that it is testimonial hearsay, 
specifically interrogations by law enforcement officers, where the declarant is absent from the 
trial that runs afoul of the Confrontation Clause. The present sense impression hearsay of the 
victim making the 911 call was therefore admissible even though the declarant was absent from 
trial while the statement of the absent witness to a law enforcement officer interviewing her 
about a previously committed offense was not. Davis amplified and reaffirmed the Crawford 
decision. In Davis, it is key to the Confrontation Clause analysis of both domestic violence cases 
before the Supreme Court that the victim was absent from the trial. 
In this case, there is no question that the prior statement is testimonial but the victim is 
available to testify. She will not be absent from the trial. She can be cross-examined. Both 
sides concede that the brain injury she suffered has removed her independent recollection of the 
actual crime. However, there is no reason why issues of bias or prejudice or then-existing 
disabilities which would affect perception and the credibility of the videotaped interview could 
not be explored. It is clear from the preliminary hearing transcript that the defense was aware of 
the August hospitalization of the victim. There is no reason why any limits on her ability to 
perceive accurately at the time of the alleged incident could not be explored. The rules of 
evidence make provision for the unrefreshed recollection of a witness. IRE 803 provides that: 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available 
as a witness ... 
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a 
witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify 
fully and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was 
fresh in the memory of the witness and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the 
memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit 
unless offered by an adverse party. 
The defense argues that the fact that the witness no longer has any independent recollection of 
the event means that her testimony is barred by the Confrontation Clause even though she will 
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appear at trial and is competent to testify although she has no longer has an independent 
recollection of the event. The defense reading is not supported by the Supreme Court's holding 
in Crawford v. Washington, which expressly holds that the Confrontation Clause does not bar 
otherwise admissible statements if the declarant appears and testifies at trial. The witness will 
not be absent from trial. She is going to be called and will testify. The State has to establish the 
foundation for an IRE 803(5) statement. An available witness may offer testimony which is not 
excluded under the hearsay rule if the witness "once had knowledge but now has insufficient 
recollection" of an event. If the State establishes the foundation for the admission of an 
unrefreshed recollection, it may be considered by the jury subject to the limitations set forth in 
the Rule. 
The defense carries Crawford well beyond what the case can sustain. Is testimony 
inadmissible because a witness freezes on the stand and will not reply to questioning? Or 
because a witness is sleepless the night before trial and provides a sketchy, incomplete version of 
prior statements? A jury can certainly consider both present and past limitations on the witness' 
ability to perceive events clearly and relate them. A jury can consider if the relationship between 
the defendant and the victim was in such a bad state on September 2, 2008, the date of the 
interview, that she might have been biased. Her mental condition at the time of the interview is 
also relevant and can be addressed in several ways. In State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 176 P.3d 
911 (2007), a six year old child provided videotaped statements to a forensic examiner about 
sexual abuse by her father but, at trial, was unable to take the oath and was therefore, "absent" at 
trial and did not testify. The limitations of the child in the area of perception and bias were, 
therefore, not capable of being explored. The purported victim in this case has no obstruction to 
taking the oath and being examined. The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses 
enshrined in the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee the quality of the witness-the witness 
may have a poor memory, or no recollection of an event; the witness may express himself or 
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herself in the most confusing way possible; the witness may not be sophisticated and may be 
flummoxed by lawyer-ese; the witness may be abnormally taciturn and incapable of expanding 
on any fact; the witness may be an expert who cannot be threatened, pressured, cajoled or 
directed to speak in terms that a lay juror could understand. Any trial lawyer could give many 
examples of the vagaries of witnesses. Virtually every experienced trial lawyer is sensitive to 
the vast range of quality in witnesses. I doubt that there is any trial lawyer who has handled a 
reasonable number of trials who has not interviewed an eloquent and delightful person who 
speaks in vivid terms about their proposed testimony and then placed that witness on the witness 
stand and been dismayed to get little more than a "yes" or "no" to every single question. Is the 
inexpressive witness "unavailable"? The expert who cannot speak plainly so that a lay juror 
could understand-is he or she "unavailable"? There is no logical stopping point for 
"unavailability" if it is applied to the quality of the witness' memory or ability to express himself 
or herself. If the witness is competent2, not absent from trial and available for cross-
examination, the Sixth Amendment is satisfied. 
In United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 108 S. Ct. 838, 98 L.Ed. 951 (1988), the United 
States Supreme Court held that the admission of a prior statement of identification of a person 
made by a witness who thereafter suffered a complete memory loss was not barred by the 
Confrontation Clause. If the declarant "is placed on the stand, under oath, and responds 
willingly to questions", the Confrontation Clause is satisfied. Id. at 562. Although it was prior 
to Crawford and Davis, it was authored by the same author, Justice Scalia, and involved the 
same issue before this Court. In Owens, the victim of the offense, almost a month after being 
brutally beaten with a metal pipe, described his attacker to an FBI agent at the hospital and 
identified him from a photo lineup but, at trial, he had no memory of who his assailant was. The 
2 Every person is presumed to be competent. In rare instances, a person may be so seriously disabled that under no 
circumstances can they "receive just impressions" of facts or relate them truly but this is an overall grave disability, 
not a transitory one. IRE 601. 
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Supreme Court, resolving a conflict in the Circuits on the interplay between memory loss and the 
Confrontation Clause, held that the Confrontation Clause guarantees only "an opportunity for 
effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to 
whatever extent, the defense might wish." Id. at 842, quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 
739, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2664, 96 LEd. 631 (1987). "It is sufficient that the defendant has the 
opportunity to bring out such matters as the witness' bias, his lack of care and attentiveness, his 
poor eyesight, and even ... the very fact that he has a bad memory. Id. (citation omitted). In the 
instant case, the defense can bring out the fact that the victim was under some degree of 
emotional turmoil, that she was breaking up with the defendant, that perhaps she was impaired 
for some reason at the time of the event, that she may have suffered, at the time of the alleged 
crime, from some disability which would affect her perception. There is no bar at all to 
exploring bias or prejudice. 
This case is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss. The videotaped statement of the 
victim was not the only evidence offered to the magistrate. The defendant also confessed to the 
crime. The magistrate could consider the victim's videotaped statement because Crawford held 
that "when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places 
no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements ... " Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. at 59. The defendant confessed. Evidence of his confession was placed before the 
magistrate at the preliminary hearing along with the victim's videotaped statement. The 
magistrate viewed the videotape as corroborating the defendant's confession. Preliminary 
Hearing Tr. Page 33. 
Under the corpus delicti rule in Idaho, while an extra-judicial confession, standing alone, 
is not sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of some corroborating circumstances, slight 
corroboration will suffice. State v. Tiffany, 139 Idaho 909, 912, 88 P.3d 728, 732 (2004); State v. 
Webb, 144 Idaho 413, 162 P.3d 792 (Ct. App. 2007). The victim's statement was made near the 
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time of the incident and admissible per Crawford. The magistrate's probable cause finding was 
warranted on this record. While at trial the State will no doubt wish to provide other evidence 
which also corroborates the facts of the defendant's confession, the magistrate had substantial 
evidence before her which warranted her probable cause finding. The case is not subject to 
dismissal. 
The motion to dismiss is denied. 
It is so ordered. 
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STATEMENT OF RIGHTS & EXPLANATION OF WAIVERS BY PLEA 
OF GUILTY 
(PLEASE INITIAL EACH RESPONSE) 
I. You have the right to remain silent. You do not have to say anything 
about the crime(s) you are accused of committing. If you elected to have a 
trial, the state could not call you as a witness or ask you any questions. 
However, anything you do say can be used as evidence against you in court. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to remain silent 
about the charge I am pleading guilty to both before and after trial. 
2. The waiver of your right to remain silent only applies to your plea of 
guilty to the crime(s) in this case unless you are waiving your rights under 
State v. Estrada. Unless you waive your rights under Estrada, even after 
pleading guilty, you will still have the right to refuse to answer any 
question or to provide any information that might tend to show you 
committed some other crime(s). You can also refuse to answer or provide 
any information that might tend to increase the punishment for the crime(s) 
to which you are pleading guilty. 
I understand that by pleading guilty to the crime(s) in this case, I still have 
the right to remain silent with respect to any other crime(s) and with respect 
to ans\\ering quest.ions oi· prm iding information lhat may increase my 
sentence. 
J. '{ou han:- the right to be represented by an attorney. If you want an 
attorney and cannot pay for one, you can ask the judge for an attorney \d10 
\\ i 11 he paid by the county. 
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• 4. You are presumed to be innocent. You would be found guilty if: 1) you 
-.~lead guilty in front of the judge, or 2) you are found guilty at a jury trial. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to be presumed 
innocent. 
5. You have the right to a speedy and public jury trial. A jury trial is a court 
hearing to determine whether you are guilty or not guilty of the charge(s) 
brought against you. In a jury trial, you have the right to present evidence in 
your defense and to testify in your own defense. The state must convince 
each and every one of the jurors of your guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to a speedy and 
pub! ic jury trial. 
'-, -
\\;y6. You have the right to confront the witnesses against you. Th is occurs 
J during a jury trial where the state must prove its case by calling witnesses to 
testify under oath in front of you, the jury, and your attorney. Your attorney 
could then cross-examine ( question) each witness. You could also call your 
own witnesses of your choosing to testify concerning your guilt or 
innocence. If you do not have the funds to bring those witnesses to court, the 
state will pay the cost of bringing your witnesses to court. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to confront the 
witnesses against me, an present witnesses and evidence in my defense. 
QUESTIONS REGARDING PLEA 
(Please answer every question. If you do not understand a question 
consult your attorney before answering.) 
PLEASE CIRCLE ONE 
I. Do you read and write the English language'.)E0 NO 
If noL ha,·e you heL'll pro, ic.kd \\ ith an inll'rpreter to 
help you till out this frmn'? YFS NO 
2. What is your age'? "}L) 
3. What '. s y~ur true le¥al name'; . \,,-r;;,\ \v\ Yyc c,c\ \("{ \)r\,~ 
..i. How tar did you go 111 school? 1. ,1·ttl-. 
If you did not co111plell' high school. ha,e you recei,·L,d 
eithL'r a gellL'ral education diploma or high school 
00166 
equivalency diploma? YES NO 
5. Are you currently under the care of a mental 
health professional? YES<@) 
6. Have you eve~~ diagnosed with a mental 
health disorder?~NO 
If so, what w s the dia$nosis and when was it made? 
\ 
7. Are you currently prescribed any medication? YES/NO 
If so, have you taken your prescription medication 
during the past 24 hours? YES NO 
8. In the last 24 hours, have you taken any medications 
or drugs, or drank any alcoholic beverages 
which you believe affect your ability to ll}aJ_e a reasoned 
and informed decision in this case? YES~ 
9. Is there any other reason that you would be unable 
to make a reasoned and informed decision in this 
;-'----
case? YES~ --
10. ls your guilty plea the result ofa plea agreement?§No 
If so, what are the terms of that plea agreement? (If 
available, a written plea agreement should be attached 
hereto as "Addendum 'A'" 
&u.J 
-+-=~~~....._,__~~~~__:..::_::_~~~='-L-~~ 12 ~ ~ 
+--~'-""-/'--=-U.~++-_,_--'---'~--'--L-.=.-+-#=-':.-<£...:""-=.,_,_--'-~-=-<-=..>...L..-1--~=-"'c.::.....a.,_,_~v~c/ 
JP 1 l. I UIH.krstand that my pica agreement is a non-binding plea agreement. 
This means that the cou11 is not bound hv the aL!.reement or anv ., -- . 
senlcncing recommendations, and may impose any sentence authorized 
hy law, up to the maximum sentence f<Jr any offense. Because the court 
is not bound by the agreement, if the district cou11 chooses not to fol low 
the agreement. I ,vi.II not hm·e the right to withdraw my guilty plea. 
1.2 . .,\s a term of ynur pka agrL'ement, arc you pleading 
00167 
guilty to more than one crime? YES ~QJ 
If so, do you understand that your sentences for each 
crime could be ordered to be served either concurrently 
(at the same time) or consecutively (one afl:er 
the other)? YES NO 
13. Is this a conditional guilty plea in which you are~ 
reserving your right to appeal any pre-trial issues?<'YES/NO . 
Ifso, what issue are you reserving the right to appiar(JJ7(_,,(!;c.·,IJ ~/11~ J of µof,nr,, 
14. Have you waived your right to appeal your judgment fl) IJ,j;n•-S 1 
of conviction and sentence as part of your plea 
agreement? YES~ 
15. Have any other promises been made to you which_ 
have int:uenced your decision to_ plead guilty? YES(NQ 
It so, what are those promises? --. .. 
16.Do you feel you have had sufficient time to discuss 
your case with your attorney?@ NO 
17. Have you tol~~ur attorney everything you know 
about the crime\::_EJNO 
18. Is there anything you have requ5s;ed your attorney 
to do that has not been done? YES(t:9 
If yes, please 
explain. ---------------------------
19. Your attorney can get various items from the prosecutor 
relating to your case. This may include police 
reports, witness statements. tape recordings, photographs, 
reports of scientific testing. etc. This is culled 
discovery. l la\'e you rc,·ie,\'cd the c,·idencc prm·idcd lo 
\'(Hlr allorncv duri1112: discoverv?r-YT~s) NO • • ~ • \ ,,,r 
20.l Jave you told your attorney al56i1t an~·itncsses 
\\lio would show your innocence? YES tr~ 
21. Do you understand that hy pleading guilty you 
\\ill \\:1in~ any dcfr.·11scs, both factual a&,d 'gal. that 
\'OU hclic\'e \'Oll ma\' ha,e in this case') TS NO . .. . ----
001GB 
22. Are there any motions or other requests for relief 
that you believe should still be filed in this case? YE@ 
If so, what motions or 
requests? ________________________ _ 
23. Do you understand that if you enter an unconditional 
guilty plea in this case you will not be able to 
challenge any rulings that came before the guilty plea 
including: l ) any searches or seizures that occurred in 
your case, 2) any issues concerning the method or 
manner of your arrest, and 3) any issues about any ·-·"'"··:-. 
statements you may have made to law enforcement? ~NO 
24. Do you understand that when you plead guilty, 
you are admitting the truth of each and every allegation 
contain~~~ the charge(s) to which you plead 
guilty?~NO ,,. 
25. Are you currently on probation or parole? YES@ 
If so, do you understand that a plea of guilty in this 
case could be the basis of a violation of that probation 
or parole? YES NO 
26.Are you aware that if you are not a citizen of the 
United States, the entry of a plea or making of factual 
admissions could have consequences of deportation 
or removal, inability to obtain legal status in the 
United States, or den~l of an application for United 
States citizenship? ~E~ NO . . . 
27.Do you know whether the cnme to which you wtll 
plead guilty would require you t~~ister as a sex 
offender? (I.C. § 18-8304) YES~ 
28. Are you aware that if you plead guilty you may be 
required to pay ~ution to the victims in this case? 
(LC.~ l9-5304)~NO 
29.1 lave you agrcl!d to pay restitution to any other 
party as a condition of your plea agreemc:nt'.) YES@ 
lfso. to \Vhom·: ---------------
30. Is there a mandatory driver's license suspension 
as a resu [t of a guilty plea in this case? YES~ 
l f so, for how long must your license 
he suspended? ______________ _ 
31. Are you pleading guilty to a cri1rn: for which a 
001.69 
mandato1~omesTi~ ~ol~substance abuse, or 
psychosexual ev.aluation 1s~ired? (LC.§§ 18-
9l 8(7)(a),-8005(9),-83 l 7)~NO 
32. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which you 
may be required to pay the costs of prosecution and 
investigation? (J.C. § 37-2732A(K)) YEs::@) 
33. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which you 
will be required to s~~,¥ ...... a DNA sample to the state? 
(l.C. § I 9-5506) YE~ 
34. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which the 
court could impose a fine for a crime of violence of up 
to $5,000, payable to the victim of the crime? (LC. § 
19-5307) YES@ 
35. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a 
felony, during the period of your sentence, you will 
lose ~!r right to vote in Idaho? (ID. CONST. art. 6, § 
3}'YE§)NO 
3~o you understand that if you plead guilty to a 
felony, during the period of your sentence, you will 
lose your right to hol5Lpublic office in Idaho? (ID. 
CONST. art. 6, § 3 )(Y~ NO 
3 7. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a 
felony, during the period of your sentence, you will 
lose your right to perform jury service in Idaho? (ID. 
CONST. art. 6, § 3) ~ES)NO 
38. Do you understarid'that if you plead guilty to a 
felony you will lose your right t9_t1_urchase, possess, or 
carry firearms? (I.C. § 18-310) ~EJNO 
39. Do you understand that no one, including your .·-<, 
attorney, can force you to plead guilty in this case? (YE~_NO 
40. Are you entering your plea freely and voluntarilf?_.,.~O 
41. Are you pleading guilty because you did com~.......---J 
the acts alleged in the information or indictment'?~~rNO 
-+2. 11\ou were proYidcd with an intt?rprcter to help 
,ou Iii] out this form, ha\'e ,·ou had anv trouble understandin!..! ., ., ., ....... 
your interpreter'? YES NO 
-l3. lfave you had any trouble answering any of the 
questions in this form ,,·hich you could not resoty hy 
discussing the issue ,,·ith your attorney': 1:'L\'NO') 
. ,/ 
001.'70 
I have answered the questions on each page of this Guilty Plea Advisory 
form truthfully, I understand all of the questions and answers in this form, 
and r have discussed each question and answer with my attorney, and have 
completed this form freely and voluntarily. Furthermore, no one 
has thre~tened m~ to dor:5ot·,.w' 
Dated this day ot tJ ol· 1, 20£?.9_. 
/ / , ci.,(" ",, ... , , 
I. L '1 ~., '2. > t :: , _1~, ?,'n \ i •--..... 
L .... / le ;,j/ 'V\<> ~f\j 
DEFENI{t\.NT 
I hereby acknowledge thak~'e · c.~u sed, in detail, the foregoing 
questions and a11ZWtrs / ! // 
with my clie,( J , 1 // , 
/// ~-···1/, ) J 
_.,..,---""> // ..,./'' / // // -~ ~ / -· 
001!,f 
JUL 6 - 2009 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Case No. CR-FE-2009-0003944 
STIPULATION TO ENTER 
CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA 
JUSTIN BRADLEY DA VIS, 
Defendant. 
The parties above-named, by and through undersigned counsel, come now and hereby 





With approval of the Court, the defe1}tf.a11t~all enter a condition plea of 
·'guilty'' in the above-entitled case rw ' '~-/)rf] 
Pursuant to a stipulaf \~ r , , th, ,,~w:s, the defendant shall be 
released from custody u e en y of his guilty plea. 
The defendant's conditional plea of "guilty" shall reserve in writing the 
right, on appeal from judgment, to review the Court's adverse ruling on 
the defendant's MOTION TO DISMISS purusant to l.C. § 19-81 SA. 
lf the defendant prevails on appeal, the defendant shall be allowed to 
withdraw his conditional plea of "guilty" pursuant to ICR 1 l(a)(2). 
STIPULATION TO ENTl:!:R CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA 
i.ft 
, this h :_ day of July 2009. 
1:;( 
Attorney for Defendant 
Defendant 
STIPULATION TO ENTER CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA 
DATE: L'/4:;x'i{;co 9 DEFENDANT PRESENT CUSTODY/BOND 
FROM: Jud e Deborah Bail/ Carol Luedtka/ Susan Gambee 




COURT: ( ) Judgment Withheld; ___ years of probation 
( ) Judgment of Conviction 
Term ofyears= ____ fixed followed by ____ indeterminate for a total: ______ _ 
( ) RETAINED JURISDICTION ( ) COMMUTED ____________ _ 
( ) SUSPENDED, CONDITIONS OF PROBATION: 
I. Counseling as directed by P .0. with proof of attendance, and specifically: 
Mental health counseling, Substance abuse counseling, Vocational Rehabilitation, 
Cognitive Self-Change, 90 days AA in 90 days, Anger Management, Parenting Classes 
Other:---------------------------------
2. Restitution: $ ________ or State has ____ days to provide restitution figure; Defense has 
____ days to object. Joint and Several 
3. Defendant shall be subject to random blood, breath and urinalysis. 
4. Defendant is subject to search of person, property, and residence and waives 4 th Amendment rights 
5. Defendant shall maintain full time employment. 
6. Defendant shall maintain full time employment or be involved in a full time educational program with the 
approval of his or her P .0. 
7. Defendant shall not refuse any blood alcohol content tests. 
8. Defendant may not purchase, posses or consume any alcohol. 
9. Defendant shall not frequent any establishment where the sale of alcohol is the primary business. 
10. Defendant shall not own, carry or have in his/her possession any firearms or other weapons. 
I I. Probation may be transferred to the State of ____________________ _ 
12. Defendant shall take all medications prescribed by his or her attending physician and shall provide a copy of 
the prescription to his/her P.O. 
I 3. Defendant shall complete his/her GED/HSE. 
I 4. Defendant shall not associate with individuals specified by P.O. 
15. Defendant shall have no contact with any minor children. 
ADA COUNTY MAGISTRATE MINUTES 
Justin Bradley Davis CR-FE-2009-0003944 
Scheduled Event: Video Arraignment Tuesday, December 08, 2009 
DOB
01 :30 PM 
Judge: Daniel L Steckel Clerk: __ J:{L--""'--~---"-----
Prosecuting Agency: k- BC 
Interpreter: _______ _ 
GC 
• 1 118-923 Strangulation-Attempted F 
[ lf ( q () 3 Case Called Defendant: ~ent Not Present 4 In Custody 
__ Advised of Rights ___ Waived Rights ~ __ Waived Attorney 
Guilty Plea/ PV Admit N/G Plea __ Advise Subsequent Penalty 
/'\J -~ ti~ ---w 
~ Bond I U:UU · _. __ ROR __ Pay/ Stay __ Payment Agreement 
I 
In Chambers PT Memo __ Written Guilty Plea ~-- No Contact Order 
lli Oft* 'cQ ~ 
( 





FROM: Judge Deborah Bail/ Carol Luedtka/ Susan Gambee 
RE: State v ,_] 1fu ' :1/J.t-£:1 CASE NO. (.1,l7c) f/c'J() 3 711 
Counsel fdr the State A.'. .z, .(Ji 
Counsel for the Defendant_-+---=...::::::.,t__,L::d'.::::z:.::t::::--L-__________ _ 
Interpreter ________________________ _ 
Plea Bargain ________________________ _ 
Motion for Bond Reduction - cin.:lc/ Not Advanced/ Withdrawn Denied Granted 
AJJitional Remarks (include anything the ddcndant or either counsd was told) ____ _ 
·--------------------------------
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7 400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409 
NO. -
iUL_ :~~=z:J-.:1 
DEC1l 6 2009 
lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
.JUSTIN BRADLEY DA VIS, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-FE-209-0003944 
ORDER FOR DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE EVALUATION 
PSI ORDERED ~s ONO 
For good cause appeanng, this Court hereby ORDERS the defendant to undergo a 
domestic violence evaluation as provide by LC. § 18-918(7)(a) at Ada County's expense while in 
the custody of the Ada County Sheriff. Dave Sanford shall conduct the evaluation. , 
The scope and contents of Dave Sanford's report shall follow the guidelines set forth in 
ICR 33.3(c)(l-9). Upon completion, Dave Sanford shall deliver/file four copies with the Clerk 
of the District Court, or his deputy, for further transfer to the presentence investigator in time for 
preparation of the PSI report before sentencing of the defendant (if a presentence report has been 
ordered). Sentencing for the defendant is scheduled for February 1, 2010. The Clerk shall 
provide copies of the evaluation to the presentence investigator, the prosecutor, and the public 
defender. 
ORDER FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE EVALUATION 
If the evaluation has been ordered at the expense of Ada County, the defendant shall be 
subject to making restitution to Ada County for all funds used to pay for the evaluation in 
accordance with the restitution procedure for crime victims under chapter 53, title 19, Idaho 
Code. If English is not the defendant's first language, the defendant will require the services of 
an interpreter; all costs incurred for the services of said interpreter shall be borne by Ada County 
and subject to reimbursement. 
The Ada County Sheriff shall allow Dave Sanford, including staff and interpreter if 
necessary, entry into the Ada County Jail at any and all reasonable, prearranged times. The Ada 
County Sheriff shall also provide a private, quiet area with a table and any and all other 
reasonable facilities and necessary equipment to the evaluator. Some evaluations require the use 
of at least one hand; the Ada County Sheriff shal I also take the necessary course of action to 
ensure that the defendant is able to complete any and all testing offered by the evaluator. 
SO ORDERED AND DATED, this ~day of December 2009. 
Clerk will provide copies to: 
[8J Public Defender ~ Plaintiff 
DEBORAH A. BAIL 
District Judge 
Deputy Clerk 
ORDER FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE EVALUATION 
·Pmseii:ulor; Da _,___.-.I..IE_......, __ ~......_;.;;.;;;a,_ 
· 1 IC :reeom eud&: __________________________ _ 
Dt:·ft!t\5c n:comm,:md~: --~-----~-~~----~-- - - ~---~ 
i,u Tfl wr --~----------- --- - - ---------
CO RT: ( ) J1L1dglil'J.Cnt Withh ~d· ~~-·:r=an Oifpmhl,.itm , 
( ) J d__gmcn a' Conv··e-tio;n 
~ 'fffl or years= ";it:cd· :fQllowcd by _____ - d miute ror 101*1'; ----~-
( J RETAlNE.DJURl'SDl ON f) 00 D~~~--~~----
l SU PgNDED ·c .· NDITrONS, OF PROBA TIO · 
I, Co.un.5,(!liti 1151 dlir~~4 by P ,0. wil11, ~oaf a 1!.'l'l~Ade.Jli:11!: , 1md .specsi:tke,V~}'! 
M.c l'l tn• n,;e,tl~, 1i'Cl!IIJSC'll~;s,.S!:!b.JBJ1C,:;·11~ ~~l~g. Vocamtam ~ ftclu~iJrmlialll, 
C~il>l~S._ ~f.,C: · s,e. W di. : i ·sio day.i, ~r Mall grrn,e Pa,,cn ;' .Cw51!:5 
-----~-'1 S! ~ _ ___ dayswpce>"'I 
;anijkwm 
J.. Oi.:-fc11 m. sh~U be ~c- . Uli rlttd - m b1~1. li'.ircili :ilid I ti ljl5i 1. 
IDei ~~ ru· i! !9tr l\lJcct 10 5C'U(I!. ~·tpc:raon propmy, . - - iY . 411. 
:S , Dc:fcmlllln · - II ifWnl im ii I] t :mC! cmpl~mmt. 
6. p~ ~.,_ _ II! sl$Whnf 1U3ini· (Uil', 1timl· 4!:TI\pl@YJllrni o~ be U\¥0 · c · ,n ,i : _ hitl:l.:: _ ~u · nn _ pn;ip.m w,lih 1ihci 
- . r-Q'o\Ql !!>flus. Iii be · P.O. 
P)' bl'oQd - cohol COill - I -
I. 
9. · , le af ~r«i 
:t 111 II n I G'Wti , aJq!" a II.a-...~ n Eli'.bi:r'~ 
11. Pmh 00!1 ma"}' bcl IR115ifc _. ID~ S -·- or _ __ ~ ---------------
1' 
I Oe-fcndru! ~h, lll I r kc n'II 1rncd at - , pl"CS1!rl'bcd II: . bis or ·_ attmdirig -p ysl.i:it1.11111!1di - - I f rDJ;, ' rto-P 11r 
ll1.e ·rip Ii m 1:o, l,i · er P .0. 
I l. Qcf(!11dltim. i~ ti C'(IJ!:iplelt h · r GEDIJf l!SE:. 
winh f,ndilt'Nl1111f:si sptc,ificdi by .P.0 , 
llJI' m · · r ,cltill 
DJSCRE?I OiNAR V JAIL T,Q POi '·-------- -----
SENTENCING MEMO 
DATE:~fi, dJ/0 DEFENDANTPRESENT(Y/N CUSTOD 





O e f ense recommendsJl""'-.JH'-L,.L-"'=---_µ:;.--"""e:..=:.......::...,.__----"""+--l----"l~"------'=-.e=~--.....,,.-1--~-------
l ill,.:rrm.:Lcr 
COURT: ( ) Judgment Withheld; ____ years of probation 
(VJ Judgment of Conviction 
Term of years= .~ fixed followed by 8 indeterminate for a total: --..........,.~/.....,u_J'--_ 
(i-~TAU\JED JURISDICTION ( ) COMMUTED ____________ _ 
) SUSPENDED, CONDITIONS OF PROBATION: 
I. Counseling as directed by P.O. with proof of attendance, and specifically: 
Mental health counseling, Substance abuse counseling, Vocational Rehabilitation, 
Cognitive Self-Change, 90 days AA in 90 days, Anger Management, Parenting Classes 
Other: ---------------------------------
2. Restitution: $ ________ or State has ____ days to provide restitution figure; Defense has 
____ days to object. Joint and Several 
Defendant shall be subject to random blood, breath and urinalysis. 
4. Defendant is subject to search of person, property, and residence and waives 4•h Amendment rights 
5. Defendant shall maintain full time employment. 
6. Defendant shall maintain full time employment or be involved in a full time educational program with the 
approval of his or her P.O. 
7. Defendant shall not refuse any blood alcohol content tests. 
8. Defendant may not purchase, posses or consume any alcohol. 
9. Defendant shall not frequent any establishment where the sale of alcohol is the primary business. 
I 0. Defendant shall not own, carry or have in his/her possession any firearms or other weapons. 
11. Probation may be transferred to the State of _____________________ _ 
12. Ddend:mt shall take all medications prescribed by his or her attending physician and shall provide a copy of 
rl1e prescription to his/her P.O. 
I J. Defendant shall complete his/her GED/HSE. 
14. Defendant shall not associate with individuals specified by P.O. 
l 5. Defendant shall have no contact with any minor children. 
ADA COUNTY JAIL DISCRETIONARY JAIL TO PO --------- ------
1> L Sl'SPE\'SIO\' Additional Conditions: ----------- ····-----·-----------·-- -------- ------· -----
STATE OF IDAHO, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
) 
Case No. (/ZFf01 b 00:> c}4f ) 
Plaintiff, ) Reference No. 
) 




Defendant. ) D Ada e Boise D GC D Meridian 
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-named defendant shall not contact (including: in person or through another person, 
or in writing or e-mail, or by telephone, pager, or facsimile) or attempt to contact, harass, follow, communicate with, or 
knowingly remain within 100 feet of: V .. T R G . . 
Exceptions are: l\n <;y I M ~f (I 
m no exceptions 
D to contact by telephone between____ .m. and _____ .m. on ____________ _ 
_______ for the following purposes: _______________________ _ 
D to participate in counseling/mediation 
D to meet with or through attorneys and/or during legal proceedings 
D to respond to emergencies involving the natural or adopted children of both parties 
D other:---------------------------------------
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant named herein shall not go within 300 yards of the above-named 
residence or w rkplace as set forth below (provide this information only if requested by prosecution): 
-~1 (5 f 
Resi~e )\ddress r Ii . t . 
,•I s-e ~ytJ(! 
Work Address 
person's 
A VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS A SEPARATE CRIME under Idaho Code § 18-920, for which no bail will be set until an 
appearance before a judge. A first and second conviction for the crime of violation of a no contact order is a misdemeanor 
and is punishable by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed 
one (1) year, or both. A third conviction for violation of a no contact order within five (5) years is a felony and is punishable 
by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000) or by imprisonment in the state prison not to exceed five (5) years, or 
both. Further, any such violation of this order may result in the increase, revocation, or modification of the bond set in the 
underlying charge for which this no contact order was imposed. 
If there is more than one domestic violence protection order in place, the most restrictive provision will control any 
conflicting terms of any other civil or criminal protection order. 
This order may subject you to Federal prosecution under 18 U.S. Code§ 922 if you p ssess, receive or transport a firearm. 
I 
THIS ORDER CAN BE MODIFIED ONLY BY A JUDGE AND WILL EXPIRE: 
D at 11 :59 p.m. on__________ OR 
. r-d~--A 
Judge 






























IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 




vs. ) Case No. CRFE09003944 
) 
JUSTIN BRADLEY DA VIS, ) JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION 
) AND ORDER OF RETAINED 





On the 4Lh day of February, 2010, before the Honorable Deborah A. Bail, 
District Judge, personally appeared Whitney Welsh, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for 
the County of Ada, State of Idaho, and the defendant with his attorney, Tony Geddes, 
this being the time fixed for pronouncing judgment in this matter. 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant has been convicted upon a plea of 
guilty of the offense of ATTEMPTED STRANGULATION, FELONY, I.C. §18-923, 
of the Information; and the Court having asked whether the defendant had any legal 
cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced against him, and no 
sufficient cause to the contrary having been shown or appearing to the Court; 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the defendant is sentenced pursuant to 
































held and incarcerated by said Board in a suitable place for a period of time as 
follows: 
For a minimum fixed and determinate period of confinement of two (2) years; 
such fixed minimum period shall thereafter be followed by an indeterminate period 
of custody of up to eight (8) years, for a total term not to exceed ten (IO) years. 
The Court retains jurisdiction for 180 days under Idaho Code §19-
2601(4). 
lT lS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant be committed to the custody 
of the Sheriff of Ada County, ldaho, for delivery forthwith to the custody of the 
ldaho State Board of Co1Tection at the ldaho State Penitentiary or other facility 
within the state designated by the State Board of CoITection. 
IT JS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk deliver a certified copy of this 
Judgment and Commitment to the said Sheriff, which shall serve as the commitment 
of the defendant. 

































CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this ~
1 
day of February, 2010, I mailed (served) 
a true and correct copy of the within instrument to: 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
INTERDEPT MAIL 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
INTERDEPT MAIL 
ADA COUNTY JAIL 
INTERDEPT MAIL 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION 
CENTRAL RECORDS 
1299 NORTH ORCHARD SUITE 110 
BOISE ID 83706 
PROBATION & PAROLE-PSI DEPARTMENT 
INTERDEPT MAIL-PICKUP BOX 
3 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
ByG~J~) 
Deputy Court Clerk 
001.84 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 W. Front, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
NC=p· . ... 
A.M \ =-u ·je;;;o ------
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By SCAF-lLETT 
JEPUTv 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 











Criminal No. CR-FE-2009-0003944 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, GREG BOWER, ADA COUNTY 
PROSECUTOR, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Defendant, appeals against the 
State of Idaho to the Idaho Supreme Court from the 
Adverse Ruling entered on the 26 th day of June, 
2009 in the above-entitled action, the Honorable 
Deborah A. Bail, District Judge, presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho 
Supreme Court, and the Judgment described in 
paragraph one (1) above is appealable pursuant to 
I .A.R. 11 (c) (1). 
3. That the Defendant requests the entire reporter's 
standard transcript as defined in Rule 25(a), 
I .A.R. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL, Page 1 
001_85 
4. The Defendant also requests the 
following additional portions 
transcript: 
preparation of the 
of the reporter's 
Hearing held: June 15, 2009 
Court Reporter: S. Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this 
hearing estimated: 50 
5. The Defendant requests that the clerk's record 
contain only those documents automatically 
included as set out in I.A.R. 28 (b) (2), including 
the Grand Jury Transcript if Indicted, any Jury 
Instructions requested and given, Pre-Sentence 
Investigation Report, Judges written Ruling on 
hearing held June 15, 2009, and Briefs. 
6. I certify: 
a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has 
been served on the reporter. 
b) That the Defendant is exempt from paying 
the estimated transcript fee because he 
is an indigent person and is unable to 
pay said fee. 
c) That the Defendant is exempt from paying 
the estimated fee for preparation of the 
record because he is an indigent person 
and is unable to pay said fee. 
d) That the Defendant is exempt from paying 
the appellate filing fee because he is 
indigent and is unable to pay said fee. 
e) That service has been 
parties required to be 
to I.A.R. 20. 
made upon all 
served pursuant 
7. That the Defendant anticipates raising issues 
including, but not limited to: 
a) Adverse ruling on Crawford iss 
DATED This _j_ day of February, 201 
~ 
A~,torney for Defendant 
NOTICE OF APPEAL, Page 2 
00186 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, That on the 4,~ day of February, 2010, I 
mailed a true and correct copies of the foregoing, NOTICE OF 
APPEAL to: 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, and 
S. GAMBEE, HONORABLE JUDGE BAIL'S COURT REPORTER 
by depositing the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
Ste~~ 
NOTICE OF APPEAL, Page 3 
00187 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 w. Front St., Ste. 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
RECEIVED 
FEB D 5 20!0 
ADA COUNTY CLERK 
00. 
-lM. //-_- j-~---::::-,P.=i.-- --. 
--..,~':-_...._ ...... 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 






JUSTIN BRADLEY DAVIS, ) 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Criminal No. CR-FE-2009-0003944 
ORDER APPOINTING STATE 
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
ON DIRECT APPEAL 
The above - named Defendant, JUSTIN BRADLEY DAVIS, being 
indigent and having heretofore been represented by the Ada County 
Public Defender's Office in the District Court, and said 
Defendant having elected to pursue a direct appeal in the above-
entitled matter; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, That the ldaho 
State Appellate Public Defender is appointed to represent the 
above named Defendanc, JUSTIN BRADLEY DAVIS, in a ll matters 
pertaining to the direct appeal . 
DATED This day of 
ORDER APPOINTING STATE APPELLATE 
PUBLIC DEFENDER ON DIRECT APPEAL 
,· ,:__ .- , . ~, ~ -6--' • ,.. • I C,. ... ~ 
DEBORAH A. BAIL 
District Judge 
001.88 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. # 4843 
SARA B. THOMAS 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. # 5867 
364 7 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
HAR 2 5 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR ADA COUNTY 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
V. 











CASE NO. CR 2009-3944 
S.C. DOCKET NO. 37387 
AMENDED 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE 
PARTY'S ATTORNEYS, GREG BOWER, ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR, 200 
WEST FRONT STREET 3RD FLOOR, BOISE, ID, 83702, AND THE CLERK OF 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named appellant appeals against the above-named 
respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the entered in the above-entitled 
action on the 4th day of February, 2010, the Honorable Deborah A. Bail, 
presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders 
under and pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule (I.A.R.) 11(c)(1-10). 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 1 001_89 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the appellant then 
intends to assert in the appeal, provided any such list of issues on appeal shall 
not prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal, is/are: 
(a) Did the district court err in issuing and adverse ruling on the 
Crawford issue? 
4. There is a portion of the record that is sealed. That portion of the record 
that is sealed is the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSI). 
5. Reporter's Transcript. The appellant requests the preparation of the 
entire reporter's standard transcript as defined in I.AR. 25(c). The appellant 
also requests the preparation of the additional portions of the reporter's 
transcript: 
(a) Pretrial Conference held on June 15, 2009 (Court Reporter: Susan 
Gambee, estimation of 50 pages); 
(b) Entry of Guilty Plea Hearing held on July 6 1 2009 (Court Reporter: 
Susan Gambee, estimation of 50 pages); 
(c) Sentencing Hearing held on February 1, 2010 (Court Reporter: 
Susan Gambee, estimation of 50 pages); and 
(d) Sentencing Hearing held on February 4, 2010 (Court Reporter: 
Susan Gambee, estimation of 50 pages). 
6. Clerk's Record. The appellant requests the standard clerk's record 
pursuant to I.AR. 28(b)(2). The appellant requests the following documents to 
be included in the clerk's record, in addition to those automatically included 
under I.AR. 28(b)(2): 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 2 001.90 
(a) All items, including any affidavits, objections, responses, briefs or 
memorandums, offered in support of or in opposition to the 
defendant's motion to dismiss, filed or lodged, by the state, 
appellant or the court including, but not limited to, the 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss lodged 
April 15, 2009, State's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
filed April 21, 2009, and Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss lodged May 18, 2009; 
(b) Brief in Support of State's Motion to Introduce Statements Pursuant 
to 803(b) lodged April 21, 2009; 
Preliminary Hearing Transcript flied May 1, 2009; (c) 
(d) Request to Modify or Dismiss No Contact Order filed June 17, 
2009; 
(e) Guilty Plea Advisory filed July 6, 2009; and 
(f) Any exhibits, including but not limited to letters or victim impact 
statements, addendums to the PSI or other items offered at 
sentencing hearing. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Amended Notice of Appeal has been served on 
the Court Reporter, Susan Gambee; 
(b) That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the record because the appellant is indigent. (Idaho 
Code§§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, I.AR. 24(e)); 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 3 0019f 
(c) That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in a 
criminal case (Idaho Code§§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, I.AR. 23(a)(8)); 
(d) That arrangements have been made with Ada County who will be 
responsible for paying for the reporter's transcript, as the client is 
indigent, I.C. §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, I.AR. 24(e); and 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to I.AR 20. 
DATED this 25th day of March, 201 O. 
· Defender 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 4 00192 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 25th day of March, 2010, caused a 
true and correct copy of the attached AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL to be 
placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
ANTHONY GEDDES 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE 
200 W FRONT ST DEPARTMENT 17 




200 W FRONTST 
BOISE ID 83702 7300 
GREG BOWER 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTORS OFFICE 
200 WEST FRONT STREET 3RD FLOOR 
BOISE ID 83702 
STATEHOUSE MAIL 
KENNETH K JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720 0010 
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court 
MJHfrMF/SBT/hrl 
HEATHER R. LEWIS 
Administrative Assistant 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 5 001.93 
TO: Clerk of the Court 
Idaho Supreme Court 
451 West State Street 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
AU 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TBE STATE OF IDAHO 
201U 
- - - - - - - - - - - x Docket No. 37387-2010 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
VS. 
JUSTIN BRADLEY DAVIS, 
Defend.ant-Appellant. 
- - - X 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT of 62 PAGES LODGED 
Appealed from tha District Court oft.he 
Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho , in and for the Cou.n ty of Ada, 
Deborah A. Bail, District Court Judge. 
This transcript contains hearings held on: 
6/15/09, 7/6/09, 8/24/09, 2/4/10 
Susan G. Gambee, Official Court 
CSR No. 18 
Reporter 
00194 
TO: Clerk of the Court 
Idaho Supreme Court 
451 West State Street 





IN TBE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
0 
x Docket No. 37387-2010 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs . 
JUSTIN BRADLEY DAVIS , 
Defendant-Appellant. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT OF 7 PAGES LODGED 
Appealed from the Oist~iet Court of tha 
Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, 
Deborah A . Bail, District Court Judge. 
This transcript contains hearing held on: 
2/1/10 
DATE : April l, 2010 
Susan G. Gambee, Official Court Reporter 
Official Courc Reporter, 
Judge Deborah Bail 
Ada County Courthouse 
Idaho Certified Shorthand Reporter No. 18 
Registered Merit Reporter 
00195 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Supreme Court Case No. 37387 
Plain tiff-Respondent, 
VS. CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
JUSTIN BRADLEY DA VIS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State ofldaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as 
CONFIDENTIAL EXHIBITS to the Record: 
1. Pre-Sentence Investigation Report. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as EXHIBITS to 
the Record: 
1. Transcript of Preliminary Hearing Held March 18, 2009, Boise, Idaho, filed 
April 29, 2009. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 3rd day of May, 2010. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
001.96 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JUSTIN BRADLEY DA VIS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Supreme Court Case No. 37387 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, J. DA YID NAVARRO, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
ST ATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
Date of Service: 
0 3 2010 
--------
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
J.DAVIDNAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
By _______ _ 
Deputy Clerk 
001.97 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
Supreme Court Case No. 37387 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
JUSTIN BRADLEY DA VIS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State ofldaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true 
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
5th day of February, 2010. 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
001.98 
